In a letter to Mieczysław Kotlarczyk dated 2 November 1939, young, less than twenty-year-old Karol Wojtyła writes “And think – my Friend – how happy a man would be if the communities based their development on culture.”

Throughout his life he remained faithful to the conviction expressed at that time, devoting much attention to broadly understood culture and art. In this paper, I would like to present basic features of the philosophical concept of culture in Wojtyła’s view. In particular, I intend to emphasize the distinction between the “culture of the person” and the “culture of works,” which seems to be fundamental for the whole anthropology and ethics of the philosopher from Wadowice.

1 This article is the proprietary version of a paper published in Polish titled: Kultura osoby i kultura dzieł według Karola Wojtyły, in: Uniwersytet wobec uniwersum, red. Z. Zarębianka, Kraków 2020, p. 119–131.

1. Preliminary Remarks

Culture is often considered to be literary works, such as Adam Mickiewicz’s epic poem *Pan Tadeusz* or paintings such as Leonardo da Vinci’s *Mona Lisa* or Vincent van Gogh’s *Sunflowers*, as well as musical compositions by Fryderyk Chopin or Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Visiting the Gothic St. Mary’s Basilica or the Wawel Royal Castle in Kraków, probably we will also have no doubt that we are exposed to culture. And so, looking at Neolithic objects discovered by archaeologists, we will certainly find that they testify to the culture of the peoples of the time. Just these few exemplifications of what is called “culture” prove the ambiguity of this concept and the reality it describes. Consequently, it may even turn out that “culture is everywhere” and may be “everything” or “nothing.” “Culture” – as we will read in one of the academic textbooks – “can refer to Shakespeare or Superman comics, opera or football, who does the washing-up at home or the organization of the office of the President of the United States of America.”3 Moreover, “it goes without saying that culture means something rather different to market researchers in London, a Japanese mogul, New Guinean villagers, and a radical clergyman in Teheran.”4 All of this underlines the ambiguity of what is – or even more precisely – what may be called “culture.”

2. “Two Cultures”

At the conference at the end of the session on the contemporary culture and its relation to Christianity and the Church, on 19 April 1964 in Kraków, Wojtyła – then Archbishop of the Metropolitan of Kraków pointed out the fundamental relationship between the concept of “culture” and man and the clear ambiguity of what we call culture. In order to preserve the authenticity of the archbishop’s thoughts, I quote a longer fragment of the words he said at that time:

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The word *culture* – as Wojtyła analysed – is one of those that are closest to man, which define his earthly existence and, in a way, indicate his very essence. Man is the one who creates culture, who needs culture, and who creates himself through it. Culture is a set of facts in which man expresses himself again and again more than in anything else. He expresses himself for himself and for others. Works of culture that last longer than man bear witness to him. It is a testimony of spiritual life, and the human spirit lives not only because it controls matter, but also because it lives in itself with content that is accessible and meaningful to it alone. He lives, therefore, with truth, goodness, and beauty – and he is able to express his inner life externally and objectively in his works. Therefore, man, as the creator of culture, gives a special testimony to humanity. (...) In a sense, the greatest work of culture is man himself – not any of his works or creations, but he himself. (...) After all, man's actions and their fruit are in the closest relationship with who he is and what he lives with. Thus, the works of man's culture are the fruit of this work of culture, which is man himself.5

The aforementioned characteristic of culture polarizes its two meanings. On one hand, the designators of culture are the works and products of man, on the other hand – the value of man himself as a person – his inner (spiritual) life, who he is as a man. This is how Wojtyla differentiated “the culture of human works” and “human culture” itself, to be more precise, “the culture of the person.” The culture of works of art is derived from the “culture of the person” itself, which is – as he expressed it – “culture” in the most profound and inner meaning.

This two-dimensionality is supported by the very etymological meaning of the concept of “culture,” which the ancient Greeks defined as everything that can be cultivated in any way, namely both the land (*cultus agri*) and the effort to transform the human interior (*cultura animi*). It was Plato who first differentiated between the two types of culture: the external (material) one – including food, clothing, technique, etc., embodied by Hephaestus, and the internal (spiritual) one – embodied

by Athena and consisting in acquiring wisdom through philosophy, art and religion.

In general, Wojtyla continued this tradition. However, after St. Thomas Aquinas, he focused on the specificity of human deed, which includes two profiles: (1) external – “transitive” (transiens) “insofar as it tends ‘beyond the subject,’ seeks an expression and effect in the external world, and is objectified in some product”⁶ and (2) internal (immanens) – “intransitive” (intransiens) “insofar as it ‘remain in the subject,’ in determines the subject’s immanent quality or value.”⁷ Thus, the effect of the “transitive” dimension of deed constitutes a culture of works of art, which includes not only useful objects created by man in response to the situation in order to preserve and improve material existence (utile works), but often also completely non-utilitarian objects (unutile), in the form of various works of art. In the intransitive profile an effect of the act is “cultivating the inner life,” the constitution in man of his own personal culture.

However, the indicated profiles cannot be understood as two separate effects of the human act. In fact, human actions that constitute culture have not only a double effect, but a simultaneous one. During the 4th Philosophical Week of the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) in February 1961 Wojtyła said that “when we act in a manner proper to a person, we always create something: either we create something outside ourselves in the surrounding world or within ourselves—or outside and inside at the same time.”⁸ In other words, by performing a particular act that results in a particular product, a work (“culture of works”), man somehow expresses himself, does himself, updates who he is in potentia, shapes himself and even “creates” himself (“culture of the person”).

The consequence of this is, in a way, questioning the traditional division of culture according to its nature and the content of products into – generalizing – spiritual “culture” and material “civilization.” One

must not forget that even the greatest works of culture cannot be separated from their creator and who he is as a human. After all – as Wojtyła emphasized – “what is transitive in our culturally creative activity and is expressed externally as an effect, objectification, product, or work can be said to be a result of the particular intensity of what is intransitive.” In this way, man (…) fills the outer, material world (…) with his thought and his being.” However, in order to properly understand and interpret this relationship, it is necessary to take a thorough, in-depth and comprehensive look at the specificity of human action, at all the praxis.

3. Effectuality & Duty

Wojtyła pointed out that “human praxis includes not only its ‘effectuality’ (the fact that man acts, that he does this or that), but also his ‘duty’ (=the fact that man should act in a certain way).” However, he did not treat “duty” purely formally as Immanuel Kant did, but as a personal element of the act and morality, as an expression of a call to self-fulfilment. According to Wojtyła, one cannot stop only at the “effectuality” of human action, but it is necessary to pay attention to the whole dynamism of human subjectivity (suppositum) and the tension that exists between “what it is like” and “what – by the very nature of human existence – it should be like,” both in the “transitive” and “intransitive” dimensions. For, as Wojtyła emphasized, duty is in fact a human, personal, factual dimension of all human praxis, an experimental form of dependence on the truth the freedom of the person is subject to. It is not an ad hoc imposition, but results from human nature, from the fact that man is “someone,” he is a person and not “anything else.”

10 K. Wojtyła, Thomistic Personalism, op. cit., p. 171.
In his conferences entitled *Considerations on the Essence of Man*, Wojtyła pointed out that “the very ability to create and use concepts, something inherently inborn in man and connected to his nature, enables his enormously penetrating dominion over the multiplicity of beings which surround him.” In these possibilities of human nature there is the pillar of culture. However, culture itself neither ends nor cumulates in these communication competences. As Wojtyła pointed out – “what is most characteristic of a person, in which he (considering only the natural order) most fully and properly realizes himself, is morality.” Thinking determines morality, but it is not closely connected with it, just like human will (and freedom). Through his actions (and the act must be conscious and free), man directs his desires towards various goods and makes choices which ultimately define him – make him good or bad.

However, a clear distinction must be made between the effects of human activity and the profiles of *transiens* and *intransiens* (*immenens*) indicated by Wojtyla after Saint Thomas Aquinas. And so through his action profiled in the transient dimension, in the direction of one or another objectivization, one or another product, man becomes good in some respect only (*seundum quit*). Thus, he becomes e.g. a good worker, a doctor, an engineer, a speaker, a writer, a plastic artist, etc. However, none of these qualifications, considered in intransitive dimension (*immanens*) of an act, makes a person good or bad in principle (*simpliciter*), good or bad as a person. Only an ethical qualification – i.e. a moral value or counter-value – constitutes the objective good or evil of an acting subject: it makes man as a good or bad person.

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What is important here is to see and properly interpret the distinction between the two aspects of human action (and consequently between the two types of culture) that are linked to each other. On one hand, there is the efficiency with which man can be the perpetrator of his actions and act according to the criterion of moral good and evil, in which his “culture of person” is expressed. On the other hand, there is the ability to act in accordance with the requirements and rules of the field in which his “culture of works” is expressed. In the first case, the “proper criterion for action” is decisive (\textit{recta ratio agibilium}), while in the latter “the proper criterion for the things that man creates” (\textit{recta ratio factibilium}).

The consequence of such a distinction is to point out that the ability to produce some objects or to cause certain effects (e.g. a chair, a bridge, a work of art, a successful surgical procedure, etc.) in itself does not tell us who the creator is as a human being. This dimension of creativity consists in the use of creative skills, acting strictly according to the “recipe” and causing the intended effects. Only by shaping one’s own personality, creating oneself, can a person be good as a person, not only good as a carpenter, doctor or composer.

This distinction is of fundamental importance, but nevertheless the interconnection of creative and moral skills is something more than Wojtyla’s “pious wish.” These abilities condition each other. By creating a work (whether useful or purely artistic), man expresses himself, who he is and what he is. Not only do works of art express skills, but also in a specific way the personality of the creator. Especially when we enter the field of artistic creativity, this dependence seems to be particularly clear, as “the history of art (…) is not only a story of works produced but also a story of men and women. Works of art speak of their authors; they enable us to know their inner life, and they reveal the original contribution which artists offer to the history of culture.”\textsuperscript{16} It is not possible to build a wall between the artist and the works he creates. Works of art always somehow testify to their creator.

As Wojtyła aptly pointed out, the danger that may appear here is the temptation of “self-deification.” It is realistically possible when a person masters his work technique to perfection and his creations are technically or artistically perfect. Then what is good is defined only by *sequendum quot*, as what is good by *simpliciter*, according to the principle: if I am a good sculptor, I am a good person (regardless of my attitude towards moral values) – which is an obvious falsehood.  

For Wojtyła, the moral dimension was crucial. “For being the performer of an action man also fulfils himself in it. To fulfil oneself means to actualize, and in a way to bring to the proper fullness, that structure in man which is characteristic for him because of his personality and also because of his being somebody and not merely something.” And this is settled in morality: “Being a person man is ‘somebody’ and being somebody he may be either ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ because “human actions once performed do not vanish without trace: they leave their moral value, which constitutes an objective reality intrinsically cohesive with the person, and thus a reality also profoundly subjective.”

While there is a theoretical possibility of “excluding” moral reality from parentheses – as Wojtyła emphasized – “morality is always strictly connected with man as a person.” Hence, “the culture of the person” was for Wojtyła to a certain extent the same as “moral culture.” Morality is “rooted” in man–person as existential, axiological and ontological reality. It is experienced by the human being who fulfils an act and fulfils himself through an act, i.e. realizes his own proper self-control and self-possession through self-determination. Thus, it defines its axiological status, the reference to moral values of good and evil, which in turn is embedded in ontological reality, the reality of fulfilling oneself by the act.

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Ontologically, every act of a person is some kind of fulfilment, but axiologically, fulfilment of oneself can only come about through goodness. Man fulfils himself through the moral goodness of the act (the fulfilment of himself in evil is de facto an unfulfillment). Thus, it must be stressed that man is a kind of incidental being, he can use his own freedom well or badly, which is not “pure independence” but “self-dependence” and ultimately dependence on the truth which constitutes the person in his own transcendence. This reveals the “spiritual dynamism of the person” who, in an ethical sense, “is fulfilled by the ‘true’ good, but not by the ‘un–true’ good.”

4. Mortality & Immortality

Thomas’s distinction between two dimensions of the human act, invoked by Wojtyła: “transient” and “not transient” when confronted with human mortality takes on a special meaning. This “transitivity” of the works seems to speak in their very name as Wojtyła drew attention to their “finiteness,” “transitoriness” or “mortality.” “Every action – as the author of The Acting Person analysed – has in some respects the existential status of a transitory reality, which has a beginning and an end in either of its dimensions, the external and the internal.” Man shapes the outside world through his actions, for example through the construction of buildings or machines, but also through works of art. Works, regardless of whether they are utile or unutile, “for a while they sparkle in the arena of the human word, and then they grow dim and wither away.” The former is clearly subject to consumption and are doomed to die with use. The latter – as they are the fruit of disinterested communion of man with truth, goodness, and beauty – have the mark of “works that cannot be used up.”

In them [i.e. in the intransitive works] – as Wojtyła emphasized – not only to their creators live on, whose names are remembered for generations on end, but also, and more importantly, men and woman of different generations continually rediscover the intransitive within themselves: “intransitive” means, in a sense, “immortal.”

Of course, this “intransitive,” too, has “passed on” with those who managed to capture the transcendental dimension of goodness, truth, and beauty in works of culture. In dying, these men and women have taken with them whatever was strictly internal and intransitive in all their activity. And yet not only to the traces of it that have remained in human culture themselves defy death, for they live on and enliven ever new men and women, but they also seem to call for the immortality – and perhaps even testify to the personal immortality – of the human being, precisely be reason of what is intransitive in the human being.27

This is possible because

in the inner dimension of the person, human action is at once both transitory and relatively lasting, inasmuch as its effects, which are to be viewed in relation to efficacy and self-determination, that is to say, to the person’s engagement in freedom, last longer than the action itself. The engagement in freedom is objective – because of its lastingly repetitive effects, and conformably to the structure of self-determination – in the person and not only in the action, which is the transitive effect.28

Man is not only the perpetrator of acts which result in specific external products, but man is in the ability to fulfil himself, to realize who he is as a person. Man’s self-determination includes in nucleo some of his “auto-teleology” (from the Greek télos for “end,” “purpose” or “goal”). However, it cannot be understood as some form of solipsism enclosing man in himself, as if man as a subject in his actions was for himself an object, a goal and an end.

Self-teleology – as Wojtyła emphasized – assumes teleology; man does not become an end to self-determination, an end to his choices and wishes, regardless of all values to which these choices and wishes turn to. Man’s self-teleology (…) means (…) a living contact with the whole reality and a dynamic exchange, characteristic of the structure of self-determination, with the world of values, hierarchized and differentiated within itself.29

The mere human turning to an objective value (action, choice, desire), regardless of the judgment of conscience, expresses his horizontal transcendence, the possibility of “transcends himself” towards objects. However, only in the “transcending” anchored in the “reference to truth,” which is expressed in the settlement of conscience, does “man as person achieves a peculiar domination over his action, his choosing and his willing. He takes his position as it were ‘above them.’”30 And what is important, this “reference does not remain as an abstracted dimension of the human spirit, but enters into the real structures of the acting and existing of a person.”31 According to Wojtyła, it constitutes a specific personal structure of human self-determination: the courts of conscience express “the truth about the moral value of action,” but also the courts expressing “the truth about the value of thought” or “the aesthetic value of production and creativity.”32

Ultimately, through the transcendent reference to truth (as well as to goodness and beauty) “man not only ‘transcends’ the horizontal limits of his subject, but also ‘outgrows himself,’ thus attaining simultaneously a profound conformity with himself.”33 In such self-fulfilment – as Wojtyła put it – there is a “moment of the absolute,” because it takes place on the basis of an absolute good. At the same time, however, man remains aware of his existence contingency. Man does not stand “beyond good

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30 K. Wojtyła, The Transcendence of the Person in Action and Man’s Self-Teleology, op. cit., p. 208.
31 K. Wojtyła, The Transcendence of the Person in Action and Man’s Self-Teleology, op. cit., p. 208.
32 Vide K. Wojtyła, The Transcendence of the Person in Action and Man’s Self-Teleology, op. cit., p. 208.
33 K. Wojtyła, The Transcendence of the Person in Action and Man’s Self-Teleology, op. cit., p. 209.
and evil,” but only – and even more so – “outgrows himself” in order to control his wish and fulfil himself through his attitude to the truth. This cannot be done once and for all, but “man is constantly an assignment to himself; he is imposed upon himself as a task, and each time, in every action, willing, choice, and decision are imposed upon himself anew.”34

The culture that promotes only utile works, which is oriented first of all towards consumption, Wojtyła called ‘the civilization of death of humanity.’”35 For it promotes only what is “transitive” and “consumable,” forgetting that “we are by nature creators, not just consumers.”36 The authentic “culture” – as Wojtyła said after Karl Jaspers – is a “cipher pointing to the Transcendent,”37 a symbol of what “cannot be used up” and what is “immortal.”

**Bibliography**


“Culture of the Person” and “Culture of Works”…


Abstract

“Culture of the Person” and “Culture of Works”
According to Karol Wojtyła

This article presents basic features of the philosophical concept of culture in the thought of Karol Wojtyła. In particular, it aims to highlight the distinction between the “culture of the person” and “culture of works,” which seems to be fundamental for the whole anthropology and ethics of the philosopher from Wadowice.

On one hand, the designators of culture are the works and creations of man, on the other hand, the value of man himself as a person, his inner life, and who he is as a man. As Wojtyła emphasized, the latter is the most internal and profound dimension of culture because it is expressed in morality. The very ability to produce certain objects or produce certain effects, e.g. a work of art or a technical device, does not determine the “culture” of its creator. The decisive factor is acting according to the criterion of moral good and evil, which shapes the personality of the creator, who he is “as a person,” and not only “as an engineer or a composer.”

Keywords

Wojtyła, culture, human act, morality
Abstrakt

Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia zasadnicze rysy filozoficznej koncepcji kultury Karola Wojtyły. Szczególnie zaś zmierza do podkreślenia rozróżnienia na „kulturę osoby” (culture of the person) i „kulturę dzieł” (culture of works), które wydaje się być fundamentalne dla całej antropologii i etyki filozofa z Wadowic.

Z jednej strony desygnatami kultury są dzieła i wytwory człowieka, z drugiej – wartość samego człowieka-osoby, jego życie wewnętrzne, to, kim jest jako człowiek. To drugie znaczenie jest, jak podkreślał Wojtyła, najbardziej wewnętrznym i głębokim wymiarem kultury, gdyż wyraża się w moralności. Sama umiejętność wytwarzania określonych przedmiotów czy wywoływania określonych skutków, np. dzieło sztuki czy urządzenie techniczne, nie przesądza o „kulturze” jej twórcy. Rozstrzygające jest działanie zgodnie z kryterium dobra i zła moralnego, które kształtuje osobowość twórcy, to kim jest on „jako człowiek”, nie zaś wyłącznie „jako inżynier czy kompozytor”.

Słowa kluczowe
Wojtyła, kultura, czyn, moralność