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***Impediti* Bishops of the Vilnius Diocese in the Russian Empire Period: A Case of Bishop Adam Stanisław Krasiński**

Following the partition of the Republic of Poland, the diocese of Vilnius, together with the diocese of Samogitia, found themselves under direct supervision of the Russian Empire. In a country where the Orthodox Church enjoyed the status of the national church, from the outset Catholics were treated as infidels. It was the intention of lay authorities that the Catholic Church should be governed according to the same principles as the Orthodox Church. Particular emphasis was put on Catholic hierarchs' loyalty towards the emperor. In fact, during the first years of imperial rule, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in the former Polish territory was faced with a pressure to subordinate to the Russian Emperor rather than the Pope. The study of the history of the Vilnius diocese in the 19th century bring us to a conclusion that the Holy See proved repeatedly helpless in defense of those hierarchs who were inconvenient to imperial authorities, let alone the defense of parish clergy. Bishops' removal from power was part and parcel of the repressions used by the empire to control the Catholic Church. This phenomenon became a real plague in the Vilnius diocese.

The removal of the Vilnius diocese ordinaries from performing functions mandated by the Holy See in accordance with canon law during the post-partition period took place almost invariably at the initiative of imperial authorities. Lack of loyalty towards the authorities of the Russian Empire was almost always the pretext to use such means of oppression. However, each process of this kind had its own unique characteristics. In the following article, I would like to focus on the story of Bishop Krasiński,

who was the first hierarch in the 19th century group of *impediti* bishops¹ of the Vilnius diocese to be unseated from the episcopal throne.

An outline of the historiography of the subject and characteristics of resources

To date, the life and work of Bishop of Vilnius Adam Stanisław Krasiński have not been exhaustively described in any monograph. Obviously, the Vilnius hierarch has not been omitted by all Polish and Lithuanian publishers of encyclopedias. A biographical entry on the bishop printed in the dictionary of Polish theologians deserves attention.² Another entry, written by Rev. Mieczysław Żyliński on the basis of sources from the 1970s,³ was for a long time the only extensive text on this Catholic hierarch, whose fate in many ways appears unusual. A short biography of Bishop Krasiński, emphasizing his work as a poet and translator, alongside a list of his works and sources on his life and activity, was printed in a publication on the bibliography of Polish literature in the late 1960s.⁴ But it seems paradoxical that the editors of the latest Catholic Encyclopedia in Poland did not think it necessary to include an entry on Bishop Krasiński.⁵

Research conducted by the author of this article, commenced in the 2000s, was published only in the form of an article in which the bishop's stance during the January Uprising was subjected to detailed analysis.⁶

1. In the 19th century, lay authorities removed three Vilnius diocese ordinaries from power. Bishop Karol Hryniewiecki was removed after Bishop Krasiński. Enthroned in the position of the head of the Vilnius diocese in 1883, he was removed after several years in 1885. The diocese was then placed under the power of Eduard von Ropp, who was subsequently unseated in 1907.
2. F. Stopniak, *Krasiński Adam Stanisław*, in: *Słownik polskich teologów katolickich*, vol. 2 H–L, ed. H.E. Wyczawski, Warsaw 1982, pp. 410–413.
3. M. Żywczyński, *Krasiński Adam Stanisław (1810–1891)*, in: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. XV/2, book 65, Wrocław–Warsaw–Kraków 1970, pp. 166–168.
4. *Krasiński Adam Stanisław (1810–1891)*, in: *Bibliografia literatury polskiej. Nowy Korbut. Romantyzm*, personal entries K–O, prepared by a team under the supervision of I. Śliwińska, S. Stupkiewicz, Warsaw 1969, pp. 127–129.
5. Successive volumes of the encyclopaedia have been published since 1995 by the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) and the Learned Society of KUL. The volume where a biographical entry on Bishop Krasiński could have potentially been published, was printed in 2002, see *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 9, Kinszasa–Krszymuska, Lublin 2002.
6. A. Prašmantaitė, *Biskup wileński Adam Stanisław Krasiński w powstaniu styczniowym – między lojalizmem a patriotyzmem*, in: „Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie” 1 (251/2006), pp. 89–98.

The subject of Bishop Krasieński also appears in several paragraphs of a monograph written by the author, containing an analysis of the Church's stance towards the January Uprising in Lithuania,⁷ and a broader presentation of his life and work is included in an introductory article to a Lithuanian translation of *Wspomnienia* [Memoirs], which was issued as a separate booklet.⁸ The period of twenty years which Bishop Krasieński was sentenced to spend in exile was presented by Laskowski in a journalistic outline as early as the interwar period. Although the author did not cite any sources, certain dates, which he accurately supplied, allow us to conclude that he may have used the Vyatka archives.⁹ Laskowski did not intend to delve deeper into the details of Krasieński's dismissal from the office of the bishop of Vilnius diocese. However, he suggested that Bishop Krasieński resigned from his office at his own initiative, unable to fulfil his ministerial duties in the diocese under his administration.¹⁰ It is likely that on the basis of Laskowski's conclusion, literature of the subject unquestioningly agrees (and my texts are not an exception in this respect) that Bishop Krasieński resigned from his position at his own initiative.¹¹ Tatiana A. Dworieckaja, author of a short article on Krasieński's years in exile,¹² did not attempt to analyze this aspect of his biography. Dworieckaja's article is valuable in being the first in which data from the archive materials kept in the National Archive of Kirovsk Oblast were used. It is difficult to determine whether documents potentially containing data for the reconstruction of Krasieński's resignation from the office of the head of Vilnius diocese are also kept in this archive complex.

In the present article, based on historiographic findings to date and archives previously missing from academic publications, I would like to

7. A. Prašmantaitė, *1863 metų sukilimas ir Katalikų Bažnyčia Lietuvoje*, Vilnius 2014, pp. 71–74, 81–85 etc.
8. A. Prašmantaitė, *Vilniaus vyskupas Adomas Stanislovas Krasinskis ir jo Atsiminimai*, in: Adomas Stanislovas Krasinskis, *Atsiminimai, parengė Aldona Prašmantaitė*, Vilnius 2013, pp. 7–41.
9. A. Laskowski, *Biskup Krasieński na wygnaniu*, Vilnius 1922. So far I have been unable to identify the author of this short book. Even his full name remains unknown.
10. *Ibid.*, 54–55.
11. E.g. M. Żywczyński, *Krasieński Adam Stanisław (1810–1891)*, p. 167; L. Jovaiša, *Adomas Stanislovas Krasieński*, in: L. Jovaiša, *Vilniaus vyskupai ir jų portretai*, Vilnius 2016, p. 96.
12. T.A. Dworieckaja, *Biskup Adam Stanisław Krasieński na zesłaniu w Wiatce*, in: „Almanach Historyczny”, 3 (2001), pp. 109–121.

discuss Bishop Krasiński's attitude towards the January Uprising, the conditions of his exile, and concentrate on a more detailed analysis of his resignation.

Bishop of Vilnius and the January Uprising

Formulated in the early 1970s by Polish historian Stefan Kieniewicz, author of a classical history of the January Uprising, the conclusion that the attitude of the Catholic clergy depended on their position in ecclesiastical hierarchy has become a permanent part of historiography. According to Kieniewicz, the patriotic movement was generally opposed by bishops, but often supported by lower-ranking clergy.¹³ Analysis of the activity of bishops in the former Republic of Poland based on their officially issued documents does not give reasons to question Kieniewicz's thesis. However, in practice the actual attitude of bishops of Catholic dioceses in the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania towards the January Uprising cannot be clearly assessed. For example, even though no letter was issued by the office of Bishop Krasiński encouraging people to participate in patriotic demonstrations, let alone an armed insurgency, it is without doubt that Bishop of Vilnius did not issue any circulars in condemnation of the uprising or the insurgents, either, despite pressure put on him by imperial authorities.

The literature of the subject makes clear that bishops in the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania were subjected to greater pressure by the authorities, which the researchers specifically call "Russian," and much smaller pressure on part of the patriotic movement.¹⁴ However, it is disputable whether the pressure exerted by the patriotic movement in those territories was smaller. The problem of the pressure put on the bishops by the patriotically-oriented part of the society is yet to be analyzed by scholars in a broader context. At the present stage of research, we may note that both the Catholic clergy and hierarchs in dioceses in the territory of former Grand Duchy of Lithuania were not free of various forms of pressure on part of the leaders of the uprising. It may be exemplified by an episode of a stone wrapped in a note with threats addressed to the bishop, thrown through the window of Bishop Krasiński's palace by participants

13. S. Kieniewicz, *Powstanie styczniowe*, 3rd edition, Warsaw 2009, p. 313.

14. H. Dylągowa, *Duchowieństwo katolickie wobec sprawy narodowej (1764–1864)*, Lublin 1983, p. 137.

of nationalist demonstrations. Later on, the bishop used the same stone as a proof of his and his diocesan subordinates' loyalty towards lay authorities.¹⁵ The appeal of the Lithuanian leaders of the uprising to Church hierarchs was triggered by statements condemning armed action, issued by the latter under pressure put by Governor-General Muravyov. It is doubtful whether the leaders of the uprising were unaware of the fact that the Pastoral Letter by Bishop of Samogitia Maciej Wołonczewski of 6 September 1863, as well as the Circular prepared on behalf of the high clergy of Vilnius diocese of 17 September 1863, was a consequence of Muravyov's coercion, and in the case of the circular to Vilnius diocese, also the work of the clerks in his office. Nevertheless, leaders of the uprising treated such statements as an evidence that Catholic hierarchy started siding with the imperial authorities; this information was spread mostly by insurgent press published in the Kingdom of Poland.¹⁶ In their letters to the highest Lithuanian clergy, they did not spare bitter words, accusing the latter of having surrendered under the enemy's coercion.¹⁷ They also tried to spread information on the submission of Lithuanian Catholic hierarchs so that such information reached Western Europe.¹⁸

The above-quoted Kieniewicz's opinion on greater pressure put by imperial authorities on bishops of Samogitian and Vilnius diocese in Lithuania than in the Kingdom of Poland cannot be challenged. It appears true especially for the Bishop of Vilnius. During the January Uprising, Vilnius was still the seat of Vilnius Governorate-General, which apart from the governorate of Vilnius included the governorates of Grodno and Kaunas. In summer 1862, Dmitry Milutin started a reform of the armed forces, and as a result the country came to be divided into military districts. Each of them

15. On 21 September 1861, Minister of Internal Affairs Pyotr Valuyev put down in his diary that on that day he was visited by Bishop of Vilnius Krasiński, in minister's words, a perfect Père Robin. He brought a stone and a note with a threat, see: *Dnievnik P.A. Walujeva ministra vnutrennich del w dwuch tomach*, vol. 1, 1861–1864 g.g., Moskva 1961, p. 116.
16. A. Prašmantaitė, *1863 metų sukilimas ir Katalikų Bažnyčia Lietuvoje*, pp. 65–68.
17. Doc. no. 506. *Lithuanian Executive Department's protest against the anti-uprising statement of Vilnius consistory*, in: *Dokumenty Komitetu Centralnego Narodowego i Rządu Narodowego 1862–1864*, prepared for print D. Fajhhausz, S. Kieniewicz, F. Ramotowska, W. Śliwowska, Wrocław–Warsaw–Kraków 1968, pp. 536–538.
18. V. Merkys, M. Valančius, *Tarp katalikiškojo universalizmo ir tautiškumo*, Vilnius 1999, p. 495; A. Prašmantaitė, *1863 metų sukilimas ir Katalikų Bažnyčia Lietuvoje*, pp. 67–68.

was governed by a governor-general, commander of all military units in the district.¹⁹ Vilnius became the center of one of such districts. The protest movement in Lithuania started on a larger scale in the first half of 1861. We should also remember that in autumn 1861 martial law was introduced in Vilnius Governorate-General because of the surge of patriotic demonstrations. In mid-January 1863, the emperor issued a decree which conferred special authority on the governor-general of Vilnius. The governor was given discretionary power to use any means necessary to pacify the growing anti-imperial movement in the population of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Accordingly, he had the right to apply penalties set forth in military law.²⁰ Therefore, Bishop Krasieński from the beginning was subjected to constant surveillance by both governor-general and his circle.

It should be noted that a large number of priests from Vilnius diocese were involved in the protest movement. In addition to processions, services were held during which patriotic songs were sang.²¹ On the basis of documents created in the office of Vladimir Nazimov, the then governor-general of Vilnius, it may be concluded that imperial authorities repeatedly tried to force the bishop to condemn such priests. It was only after several warnings from Nazimov that the bishop issued a circular in which, among other things, he denied that the clergy had engaged in singing patriotic songs. He pointed out that hymns were sung by lay people not only in churches but also in the streets of Vilnius, clearly suggesting that lay authorities were unable to control the situation.²² There is no indication that Nazimov's threats were effective or made the bishop follow guidelines on penalizing the priests. On the other hand, the bishop's conduct did not allow the imperial authorities to accuse him of supporting the patriotic protest movement.²³ As the emperor's subject, he tried to behave in a way which would not cause

19. For more on the repressive administrative apparatus in the Vilnius diocese during the January Uprising, see A. Prašmantaitė, *1863 metų sukilimas ir Katalikų Bažnyčia Lietuvoje*, pp. 147–153.

20. Emperor's order for Vilnius Governor-General of 14 January 1863, no. 39161, in: *Polnoje sobranie zakonov*, vol. 38, part 1, 1863; accessed online: www.nlr.ru/e-res/law_r/search.php.

21. The attitudes of both the Catholic clergy and bishops on the eve of the January Uprising in Lithuania were the subject of a monograph, see: I. Šenavičienė, *Lietuvos katalikų dvasininkija 1863 metų sukilimo išvakarėse*, Vilnius 2010.

22. A. Prašmantaitė, *Biskup wileński Adam Stanisław Krasieński w powstaniu styczniowym – między lojalizmem a patriotyzmem*, pp. 92–93.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

any suspicion of disloyalty. Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from adamantly opposing the lay authorities' plans to use him as a tool of imperial policy. His attitude seemed to express that he was a bishop of the Catholic Church, who deserved respect also from local officials of the Empire, primarily on account of his function.

There is no evidence that the armed operations which started in 1863 brought about any radical changes in the behavior of the Bishop of Vilnius. The circular addressed by the bishop to deans, dated 31 January 1863, containing a message to be communicated to priests in each deanery in which they were instructed to strictly adhere to their spiritual responsibilities and steer clear of politics²⁴ only emphasized his intention to follow the path he had already chosen. Priests of the Vilnius diocese were arrested as early as in February 1863, the reason usually being the Manifesto of the National Government read out during services in the church. Deans kept Bishop Krasieński up to date in the matter. He was also aware of priests who joined insurgent forces, either because they decided to do so or at the insistence of the commanders. It should be emphasized that the basic duty of the vast majority of priests in insurgent forces involved pastoral service. This seems natural, as the faithful from their parishes served in the forces they joined.

Note that at the start of the armed conflict, the leaders of the uprising in Lithuania took advantage of the administrative network of the diocese as a communication channel. The leaders used the clergy to call upon people to join the uprising and offer any assistance required. When the conflict broke out, various uprising-related manifestos were announced from the pulpit at the initiative of the insurgents.²⁵ Bishop Krasieński avoided exposing such cases. No disciplinary measures were used in reference to priests who joined the insurgent forces and those who supported the uprising in various ways or read out the Manifesto from the pulpit. On the basis of correspondence and diaries of imperial officials, it may be concluded that when voicing his opinion, the Bishop of Vilnius tried to understate the extent of insurgent activities, contrary to the lay government's view of the uprising as a movement particularly dangerous to the Empire.

24. Bishop Krasieński's circular to deans dated 31 January 1863, in: *Powstanie na Litwie i Białorusi 1863–1864*, Moscow–Wrocław 1965, p. 106.

25. This aspect was analysed in greater detail in: A. Prašmantaitė, *1863 metų sukilimas ir Katalikų Bažnyčia Lietuvoje*, Vilnius 2014.

In hindsight, the attitude of Bishop Krasieński both during the protest movement and after the commencement of armed action was in line with the stance of the Holy See. Pope Pius IX was against an armed uprising, just like he was against a revolution of any kind. Studying Pius IX's attitude towards the January Uprising on the basis of an analysis of Vatican documents and diplomatic correspondence, Krzysztof Lis SDB found that the Pope "... clearly expressed his view that Poles were fighting in defense of their religion, but he considered the uprising as a calamity for the Church and the Polish nation."²⁶ On the other hand, the Pope did not publicly condemn the uprising or the insurgents. No encyclical or breve denouncing the January Uprising was issued. However, according to Lis, such possibility was considered in the Holy See when in late 1862 the Vatican became aware of a secret organization established by the priests of the Podlasie diocese.²⁷ Lis quotes a letter from Cardinal Antonelli to Bishop of Podlasie Benjamin Szymański, dated 10 January 1863, in which the cardinal reprimanded the bishop, emphasizing that the latter, like other bishops, was obliged to persuade priests to withdraw from the action. In the cardinal's opinion, priests should be mindful of their obligations and "conscientious fulfilment of the duties of their sacred vocation."²⁸ Loyalty towards the Holy See, arising from canon law, was not generally perceived as incompatible with loyalty towards the authorities of the Russian Empire. The Bishop of Vilnius, like the heads of other dioceses in the former Republic of Poland, was forced to tread a narrow path. He stuck to the same tactic when hostilities began. Obviously, Governor-General Nazimov was not happy that Bishop Krasieński ignored his orders, but he preferred not to make matters worse. The situation began to change quickly when the emperor dismissed Nazimov and appointed Mikhail Muravyov as his replacement on 1 May 1863. Reminiscing on his visit in Vilnius in mid-May that year, Muravyov wrote after several years that right on the next day he had summoned "all officials, clergy and representatives of all professions in Vilnius."²⁹ He wanted everyone to know that upon his arrival the local system of the imperial officials would change dramatically.

26. K. Lis SDB, *Pius IX a Polska w dobie powstania styczniowego*, Lublin 1996, p. 333.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

28. Letter of 10 January 1863 from Cardinal Antonelli to Bishop Szymański, quoted in Krzysztof Lis SDB, *Pius IX a Polska w dobie powstania styczniowego*, p. 110.

29. *Pamiętniki hr. Michała Mikołajewicza Murawiewa ("Wieszatela") (1863–1865) pisane w roku 1866*, Kraków 1890, p. 36.

Representatives of the Roman Catholic clergy, headed by the Bishop of Vilnius, were received by Muravyov at an audience on 15 May in a separate room of the of the Governor-General palace. From the Governor-General's memories, we find that at that time he noticed that neither the bishop nor any of the clergymen believed that he was able to put down the uprising (which Muravyov called a rebellion) and reinstate order in Lithuania. Such attitude towards the person appointed to the honourable position of Governor-General, entrusted by the imperial authorities with an important mission to suppress the uprising, seemed to him an offence to his dignity and an impertinence on part of the clergy. It seems reasonable to conclude that this particular audience at the Governor-General's palace sealed the fate of the Vilnius diocese. Muravyov remembered the words of the bishop. In his memoir, he wrote that "Bishop Krasieński was so sure that my plans were non-feasible that he smiled and replied, 'What uprising is this? It is merely chasing a few dozen of miserable insurgents; they are hunted like hares by the army in the forest.'"³⁰ It would be unreasonable to suspect that he bishop intentionally wanted to trivialize the situation, or even to annoy the new Governor-General. A more rational view was expressed by Walery Przyborowski, who took part in the uprising and authored a study on its history. According to Przyborowski, Bishop Krasieński's sarcastic smile "might not have been intentional, but rather innate, typical of his expressive and twitchy physiognomy."³¹ On the other hand, Muravyov's recollection of the meeting does not allow us to conclude that Bishop Krasieński genuinely wished to make a good impression on the new Governor-General. Muravyov's demand that the bishop should keep "his herd and subordinates from rebellion" was met with the assurance that the diocesan clergy was loyal to the Russian Empire. As previously, in conversations and letters exchanged with Nazimov, Krasieński bravely declared that it was not in his power as a diocesan bishop to remove all discontent from the country.

We may conclude that the bishop, accustomed to Nazimov's style of government, did not even suspect what Nazimov's successor was be capable of. Perhaps he was hoping that his own authority as a bishop, and at the same time a subject of the emperor, would be sufficient to remove any allegations

30. Ibid., p. 38.

31. [W. Przyborowski], *Dzieje 1863 roku przez autora "Historji dwóch lat"*, vol. 3., Kraków 1902, p. 145.

of direct participation of the clergy in the uprising. In hindsight, it seems that it was precisely this meeting that in a sense reinforced Muravyov's intentions to promptly put his plans into action. History confirms the proposition that the bishop's courage in his first meeting with Muravyov became a pretext to make fundamental changes, regarding both Krasiński's private life and in the Vilnius diocese.

The story of the exile of the Bishop of Vilnius

Muravyov could not allow the hierarch to keep denying the scale of the uprising or the participation of the clergy in the insurgency. His attack on the bishop started with a particularly painful blow. A week after the audience, on 22 May at the Lukiškės Square in Vilnius (at the time, a marketplace; now one of representative squares of the city), Rev. Stanisław Iszora, a young vicar of Żoludek parish in Lida powiat, was executed by a firing squad. He had been arrested and court-martialed under Nazimov's administration for reading out the National Government Manifesto from the pulpit. After examining the case, the court sentenced him to death when Nazimov was still Governor-General. The sentence was to become final only on approval of the Governor-General. Nazimov clearly delayed his decision. As a result, the case was passed to Muravyov, who acted without undue delay. The day of the execution was set to Wednesday, a market day. The city was particularly crowded, because this was the time of an annual farmers' market³²

Several days later, Rev. Rajmund Ziemacki, 70-year parish priest from the parish church in Wiewiórka in Lida powiat was shot dead in the same place. He had been charged with the same offence, i.e. reading out the Manifesto from the pulpit.³³ Note that the two priests were not the only ones who were charged with reading out the Manifesto and held in custody. It was pure coincidence that they were selected for execution. Undoubtedly, the Governor-General's main intention was to terrorize the society. He succeeded in this. After the execution of the two priests, nobody doubted that Nazimov's successor would stop at nothing.

On 26 May, a few days after the bloody execution at the Lukiškės Square, Muravyov sent a letter to the bishop. He regretted that he was

32. The story of Rev. Iszora was presented in more detail on the basis of newly found data in: A. Prasmantaitė, *Kunigas Stanislovas Išora 1863 m. sukilime: istoriografinio vaizdinio korekcijos*, in: "Soter" no. 67 (95/2018), pp. 21–45.

33. W. Przyborowski, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 161.

forced to give an order to execute the priests for their crimes. Muravyov assured that he did not want to resort to such penal measures in the future, especially in reference to clergy. Therefore, he insisted that the bishop issue a circular condemning the uprising and the insurgents and send it to his subordinates. We cannot rule out the possibility that Bishop Krasieński learned about the letter from the Governor-General in the press. Muravyov's letter to the bishop was published in "Kurier Wileński," at that time the government's official paper.³⁴ In the instruction attached to the letter, there was a clause which anticipated that the clergymen would be "immediately arrested and judged on the spot strictly according to martial law. Common excuses, such as being forced to participate in the uprising, will not be taken into account since the servants of the altar should not surrender to such threats as others tend to."³⁵ The letter addressed to the bishop and published in the governmental newspaper leaves no room for doubt that the executions of both priests were only the beginning of harsh repressions.

It seemed that the bishop had no option but to send the circular condemning the uprising to the clergy and the faithful, as demanded by Muravyov. However, the bishop delayed complying with the order. He spread the news that he was ill. It is unclear whether the hierarch really became ill or this was part of intentional procrastination. In his *Wspomnienia* [Memoirs], Bishop Krasieński tersely described the circumstances in which his idea of 'rest' appeared. In his words, "Doctor Adamowicz, formerly a professor of Vilnius University, a friend of mine for almost thirty years, and Doctor Stanisław Wikszemski, a friend from school, one of Vilnius's brightest minds, told me to give up my official duties for a few weeks and go somewhere for the waters"³⁶ According to Muravyov, Bishop Krasieński was frightened because of the execution of the priests. In his opinion, "He feared for himself and his chapter, and when I summoned him to issue a circular to order the Roman Catholic clergy to oppose the uprising, he feigned illness and delegated consistorial power to someone else. I ordered him to be sent to Vyatka with a policeman."³⁷ Neither the bishop nor his immediate circle expected this subterfuge; he decided to go to a mineral springs resort.

34. "Kuryer Wileński-Виленскій вестник" (1 June 1863).

35. Ibidem.

36. *Wspomnienia biskupa Adama Stanisława Krasieńskiego*, Kraków 1900, p. 114.

37. *Pamiętniki hr. Michała Mikołajewicza Murawiewa ("Wieszatiela") (1863–1865) pisane w roku 1866*, p. 42.

Contrary to expectations, the Governor-General did not oppose the bishop's travel. He only required that administration of the diocese should be transferred to "one of the senior hierarchs." In accordance with canon law, Krasiński delegated running the diocese in his absence to the prelate of the Vilnius Cathedral Chapter Józef Bowkiewicz as vicar general. A day prior to his departure, Krasiński handed over his episcopal circular to the Governor-General through Bowkiewicz. In Muravyov's opinion, the circular, hastily written before his journey, did not meet the requirements. According to him, the bishop's appeal to the diocesan clergy was meant to sustain the chaos rather than appease the outrage.³⁸ However, he did not take any steps to prevent the bishop from leaving. Passports were issued for the bishop and the persons who were to accompany him.

There were no incidents of the day of departure, either. In early June, accompanied by doctor Adamowicz, chaplain Rev. Wiktor Frąckiewicz, footman Zenon Jaźwiński, and cook Adam Kuczyński, he left on a train to Riga. His destination, Kemmern, was at the time quite a popular holiday resort near Riga. From the late 1830s, it had the status of a national health resort in the Russian Empire.

In bishop's *Wspomnienia* [Memoirs], we find that the company of an officer delegated by the Governor-General for the duration of the journey was treated as a mere formality. It was only at the station in Daugavpils [Dyneburg], where they were supposed to change trains, that the bishop learned he was under arrest and would be sent deep inland into the Russian Empire.³⁹ The place of his exile was Vyatka (since 1934 Kirov), a city 900 kilometers east of Moscow. At this point, we may wonder whether the very plans to send him to a resort originated in the Governor-General's office, too. There is no evidence to support this hypothesis in available sources, i.e. nothing suggests that the Governor-General could rely on the assistance of anyone in the bishop's closest circle, let alone his friends Adamowicz or Wikszemski. It is most likely that Muravyov cleverly took advantage of the situation. For the Governor-General, the bishop's departure for a treatment, advised by his doctors, was a perfect opportunity to get rid of him.

38. Muravyov' letter of 11 June 1863 to Pyotr Valuyev, Minister of Internal Affairs, in: *LVIA*, fond 378 /p.s., year 1863, ref. 293, sheet 11–12.

39. *Wspomnienia biskupa Adama Stanisława Krasińskiego*, pp. 114–115.

Notifying the Minister of Internal Affairs of the exile of the Bishop of Vilnius, Muravyov wrote that from the very beginning, he had suspected the hierarch of secret, tacit support of the uprising. The decision to exile the bishop was made only when he failed to issue a statement in condemnation of the uprising and the insurgents, as requested by the Governor-General.⁴⁰ Note that Bishop Krasiński was exiled on the basis of Muravyov's personal decision. As head of Vilnius military district, the governor had such powers. Usually, however, people charged with participation in the uprising were sentenced by courts which applied specific articles of martial law. It was up to Governor-General to approve the judgement entered by the court. Not only was Muravyov certain that Bishop Krasiński was acquiescent to the idea of the uprising but also convinced that the latter had a great influence on the insurgents. Thus, he chose not to waste time on court trials and immediately removed the hierarch, who he perceived as an obstacle to his own mission of crushing the rebellion. The Vilnius diocese had to face many years of rule by administrators.

An outline of the reconstruction of the bishop's resignation

It appears that for a long time Bishop Krasiński believed his arrest and exile to be only a gross misunderstanding or purely a mistake. He started to apply for his release as early as in the first years of his exile. Krasiński wrote to Count Pyotr Shuvalov, who was the head of military police in 1871, that he could have been falsely denounced, since he had never supported any demonstration, let alone an armed uprising.⁴¹ According to the bishop, he expected an approval rather than punishment for his conduct. He also complained about the harsh climate in Vyatka, which proved particularly harmful to his already fragile health, and asked the count to intercede for him with the emperor.⁴² If Shuvalov had taken any steps in the bishop's case, they must have been ineffective. After a few years, Krasiński again tried to seek protection with the count. At that time, he was almost desperate that Vyatka's harsh climate had brought about a deterioration in his health. He bemoaned that his condition requires constant medical care, which was impossible in the back

40. Muravyov's letter of 11 June 1863 to Valuyev, in: *L VIA*, fond 378/ps, year 1863, ref. 293, sheet 11–12.

41. Bishop Krasiński's letter of 1 May 1871 to Count Shuvalov, in: *GARF*, fond OTΔ, III 1ЭКП. 109, оп.38, л. 23 ч. 212, sheet 43.

42. *Ibid*, sheet 43v.

of beyond. Thus, he asked Shuvalov to request the emperor for permission for him to move to Petersburg.⁴³ This particular request reached the Ministry of Internal Affairs. After consideration, and personal negotiations with count Shuvalov, who in that year changed his role from head of military police to a diplomat, the request was denied.⁴⁴ Note that all bishop's pleas for permission to relocate to at least a town of milder climate were supported by the governor of Vyatka governorate. Even though the support from the local authorities was acknowledged in Petersburg, it failed to have any effect on the bishop's fate. He was not allowed to leave Vyatka.

Nevertheless, the bishop did not cease to appeal to the highest authorities to change his place of exile. In February 1877, he again asked for permission either to go abroad or move to Jelgava [Mitau].⁴⁵ At that time, imperial authorities decided to handle the bishop's case. They, however, were far from making his life easier. Note that as early as the beginning of 1877, there were signs of positive changes in the policy of the Russian Empire towards the Holy See. Both sides were interested in the renewal of diplomatic relations. It transpired that the bishop's case could have been a useful tool in negotiations with the Holy See.

The report of 28 April 1877 submitted to the Emperor by Minister of Internal Affairs Alexander Timashev is an interesting example. According to the minister, if an exiled bishop was still a bishop according to canon law, as in the case of the Vilnius diocese, such a situation was especially inconvenient for the government. He emphasized that the clergy and the people of the diocese did not cease to treat the exiled hierarch as their shepherd. The report suggested that the situation was a pretext for exerting concealed influence on the diocese, which compromised ecclesiastical discipline and undermined the authority of the diocese's administrator, not to mention that the very appointment of the administrator at the meeting of the cathedral chapter was not treated as valid by Catholics.⁴⁶ Timashev postulated that in

43. Bishop Krasinski's letter of 3 November 1873 to Count Shuvalov, in: *GARF*, fond oтд. III 1эксп. 109, оп.38, д. 23 ч. 212, sheet 51–51v.
44. Report of the Department of Enforcement Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Head of the 3rd Unit, in: *GARF*, fond oтд. III 1эксп. 109, оп.38, д. 23 ч. 212, sheet 53.
45. A note of 15 February 1877 on the bishop's request, in: *GARF*, fond oтд. III 1эксп. 109, оп.38, д. 23 ч. 212, sheet 109, sheet 55.
46. Report of the Minister of Internal Affairs of 28 April 1877 to the Emperor, in: *RGIA*, fond 821, op. 11, year 1877, ref. 52, sheet 20–22 v.

order to remove the obstacles in governing the Vilnius diocese, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, through the governor of Vyatka governorate, should make a certain offer to the exiled Bishop of Vilnius. The authorities specifically demanded that Bishop Krasieński submit to the Holy Father his resignation from the mitre of Bishop of Vilnius. In return, he was promised to be released from the exile. He would be allowed to regain his freedom only if certain conditions were met. Firstly, it was decided that after the Pope's approval of his resignation from the position of Bishop of Vilnius, Krasieński would receive a lifelong pension of 4 thousand rubles from the Russian imperial treasury. Secondly, he would be released from police supervision and allowed either to choose a place of residence in Russia or go abroad. However, it was stressed that he would not be allowed to choose freely a location within the Empire. It was unclear which specific towns would not be available to him, but obviously Vilnius was at the top of the 'blacklisted' locations. The bishop was warned that the offer would be open only if he refrained from engaging in anti-governmental activity as well as ecclesiastical matters in the Russian Empire after he was permitted to leave his place of exile.⁴⁷

We do not know if Bishop Krasieński questioned any of the proposed conditions. Rather, he did not hesitate to accept the offer. He was already sixty seven years old and of ill health. The minister wrote his report to the emperor in April 1877, having received Bishop Krasieński's letter to the Pope in which the bishop asked for the permission to resign from his position. The minister informed the emperor that the bishop sent the original letter through Vyatka governor, and that the letter contained a request to the Pope to be relieved from the duties of the head of the Vilnius diocese, together with a copy in the Russian language. The bishop wished to spend the last years of his life in Switzerland and preferred to collect the 4 thousand rubles allocated by the government through the Russian ambassador.⁴⁸ On that occasion, Switzerland appears for the first time as the bishop's potential country of residence. An interpretation of his choice is difficult, as at the current stage of research, there is no information on any contacts which Krasieński may have had in Switzerland. The emperor approved the Ministry of the Interior's report in 1877 with no comments. The fate of Bishop Krasieński was sealed.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

Although the emperor's positive resolution gave the green light to the case of Bishop of Vilnius, his status did not change automatically. Krasieński's letter to the Pope was not sent immediately, as tensions started rising between the Romanov empire and the Holy See. A meeting of cardinals was held in Vatican on 1 July 1877. Adrien Boudou believes that the meeting involved a discussion of the stance that the Vatican should take towards the Russian Empire. The cardinals tried to decide how to save the Church from decline and total obliteration it was facing in the lands belonging to the empire.⁴⁹ News from the Vilnius diocese were particularly disconcerting. Russification in the diocese was progressing rapidly. Therefore, the cardinals held that the Vatican should demand that Russia provide an explanation of the matter.⁵⁰ A Memorial was drawn up on the basis of the guidelines set during the July meeting, stating among other things that the Holy See did not accept the policy of the Russian Empire towards the Church. Even though the Memorial was submitted to the Embassy of the Russian Empire in Rome, its reception was never confirmed.⁵¹ This provided additional grounds for exacerbating already tense relations.

Only after Pope Leo XIII's accession to the throne in February 1878 did the Holy See start to reconsider a renewal in the relations with the Russian Empire. Based on archive material and an analysis of the situation, Boudou concludes that the new pope did not think it appropriate to oppose Russia.⁵² In 1880, negotiations were held in Vienna between representatives of the Russian Empire and the Holy See; they lasted several months. As a result, in October of the same year a preliminary agreement was signed between the Holy See and the Russian Empire.⁵³ A decision on the fate of exiled bishops was set forth in separate articles of the agreement. The first article of the instrument concerns the case of Bishop Krasieński and the Vilnius diocese, namely: "Considering the request of Bishop Krasieński made in 1878, His Holiness decides to remove him from the office of Bishop of

49. A. Boudou, *Stolica Święta a Rosja: stosunki dyplomatyczne między nimi w XIX stuleciu*, vol. 2., 1848–1883, translated from French Z. Skowrońska, Kraków 1930, pp. 545–546.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 546.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 549.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 556.

53. Arrangement Préliminaire entre le St. Siège et la Russie, art.1–14, in: *Les accords de Vienne et de Rome entre le Saint-Siège et la Russie 1880–1882 par Sophie Olszawska-Skowrońska*, Roma 1977, pp. 337–340.

Vilnius, conferring upon him a different ecclesiastical title. A new Bishop of Vilnius will be appointed. Monsignor Krasiński will receive a pension."⁵⁴ Whether the Holy see was aware that Bishop Krasiński's request was a part of a well-thought out plan of the imperial government rather than an expression of the hierarch's own will remains an open question.

In addition to Bishop Krasiński, the agreement of 1880 contained a memorandum on other bishops exiled by the Russian Empire. Metropolitan Bishop Zygmunt Szczęśny Feliński (sent to Jarosław during the January Uprising) and Warsaw Suffragan Paweł Rzewuski (in exile in Astrakhan) were both deprived of the episcopal throne.⁵⁵ The imperial government saw the Pope's consent to remove diocesan bishops from their positions as one of its great diplomatic successes.⁵⁶

The article of the preliminary agreement in which Bishop Krasiński's fate was decided, did not immediately become the basis for his release. The Bishop still had to stay in Vyatka, waiting until the Pope dismissed him in writing from the office of Bishop of Vilnius and confers another title on him. It was decided that if the process became protracted, the bishop may ask to be relocated to a more suitable place for medical reasons.⁵⁷ The Holy See's approval of the dismissal of Bishop of Vilnius, made under pressure from the Russian diplomats, became a pretext for the bishop's release from police supervision. The Department of Religious Affairs for Foreign Denominations sent a letter on the matter to the Minister of Internal Affairs,⁵⁸ and the minister did not voice any objections. Accordingly, Bishop Krasiński was released from police supervision on

54. The text of the agreement was published as an appendix to Boudou's monograph cited above, translated into Polish, see *Preliminary agreement between the Holy See and Russia in Vienna, made in two copies on 19(31) October 1880*, in: A. Boudou, *Stolica Święta a Rosja: stosunki dyplomatyczne między niemi w XIX stuleciu*, vol. 2, pp. 657–659.

55. Arrangement Préliminaire entre le St. Siège et la Russie, art.2–3, in: *Les accords de Vienne et de Rome entre le Saint-Siège et la Russie 1880–1882 par Sophie Olszawska-Skowrońska*, Roma 1977, p. 337.

56. A copy of the note on Catholic works presented to the emperor on 25 November 1880, in: *GARF*, fond 109 Ц/а, оп. 3 а, д. 1556, sheet 4–34.

57. Letter from the head of the Department of Religious Affairs for Foreign Denominations of 29 November 1880 to the Minister of Internal Affairs, in: *GARF*, fond отд. III 1эксп. 109, оп.38, д. 23 ч. 212, sheet 64–65.

58. Letter from the Department of Religious Affairs of Foreign Denominations of 24 November 1880 to the Minister of Internal Affairs, in: *GARF*, fond отд. III 1эксп. 109, оп. 38, д. 23 ч. 212, sheet 64–65.

6 December 1880.⁵⁹ He did not use the opportunity to change the place of his exile to a location of milder climate. This could have been caused by his deteriorating health. On the basis of archive material kept in the archives in Kirov, Dworieckaja writes that the bishop's health in 1882 worsened so much that the governor did not hesitate to ask the Minister of Internal Affairs how to proceed if the illness had tragic consequences. The minister replied that in the event of the bishop's death, the governor should arrange an appropriate funeral.⁶⁰ This, however, did not prove necessary. The Bishop made a recovery.

In early April 1883, the Ministry of Internal Affairs received a notice from the Holy see that the Pope conferred the title of Bishop of Esbo to Krasieński, at that time still in Vyatka, thereby relieving him of the duties of Bishop of Vilnius.⁶¹ At that time, the imperial authorities complied with the agreement. The bishop was allowed to leave Vyatka and choose any place of residence except for the territory of Northwestern Krai.⁶² Dworiecka argues that Bishop Krasieński was released from his exile on 21 April 1883. Expressing his gratitude for the release, he asked for consent to go to Krakow.⁶³ So far, nothing can be said on how the idea originated. Oddly, the bishop had not mentioned Krakow in his previous requests. Subsequent course of events allows us to conclude that his choice of the place of residence upon his return from the exile was approved by the imperial authorities.

Bishop Krasieński left Vyatka on 6 June 1883⁶⁴. In a secret note of 20 July of the same year, the head of the military police of Minsk governorate wrote that on 15 July "the former Roman Catholic bishop Krasieński [returning] from his exile in Vyatka [to which he was sent] for participation in a Polish rebellion" travelled on a train via Minsk.⁶⁵ People gathered to bid farewell to their shepherd, first at the station in Brest, then in Vilnius. Since there was

59. A note of the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Pyotr Cherevin of 6 December 1880 to the Department of Religious Affairs for Foreign Denominations, *GARF*, fond oтд. III 1эксп. 109, оп.38, д. 23 ч. 212, sheet 66.

60. T.A. Dworieckaja, *Biskup Adam Stanisław Krasieński na zesłaniu w Wiatce*, p. 120.

61. Report of Minister of Internal Affairs for 1883, in: *RGIA*, fond 821, op. 11, ref. 58, sheet 20–21.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 121. According to Laskowski, Bishop Krasieński left Vyatka on 6 July – A. Laskowski, *Biskup Krasieński na wygnaniu*, p. 60.

65. Chief military policeman of Minsk governorate on 20 July 1883, in: *GARF*, fond oтд. III 1эксп. 109, оп.38, д. 23 ч. 212, sheet 68–69.

no official announcement of his journey, the commander of the military police suggested several ways in which the public could have been informed.⁶⁶ The former Vilnius hierarch spent the last years of his life in Krakow.

In conclusion

Bishop Krasieński's stance during the January Uprising was a pretext to remove him from the office of the head of the Vilnius diocese. There is no evidence that he sided with the insurgents or supported the idea of the uprising. With regard to the uprising, he followed the path laid down by the Holy See. However, faced with the requirements of the Russian officials, he did not relent and refused to issue a public circular condemning the uprising. Krasieński paid for preserving his own dignity, as well as the dignity of the office of the head of his diocese, which he was not afraid to defend resolutely, with long years he had to spend in exile. Blind obedience to imperial authorities was alien to him.

Bishop Krasieński's place of exile was Vyatka, where the climate proved too harsh for his health. Several requests to be released from the exile, or at least allowed to move to a town of milder climate, proved ineffective. His situation changed only in 1866, when the Russian Empire decided to renew relations it had broken off with the Holy See. The analysis carried out in this study does not confirm the dominant view in historiography that Bishop Krasieński resigned from his office at his own initiative, unable to fulfil his ministerial duties in the diocese he had been entrusted with. The idea of Krasieński's letter to the Pope with the request to accept his resignation from the office of the head of Vilnius diocese originated in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1877.

We may conclude that the imperial government adeptly used the case of the exiled bishop in negotiations with the Holy See. The fate of Vilnius bishop was decided in one of the articles of the preliminary agreement from 1880 concluded between the Russian Empire and the Holy See. The Pope's consent to relieve Krasieński from the duties of the head of the Vilnius diocese was seen by the Russian Empire as a victory in its negotiations with the Vatican. Bishop Krasieński's dismissal from the office of the head of the Vilnius diocese, as well as his exile, was in line with the policy of the Russian government towards the Roman Catholic Church.

66. Ibid.

The belief that upon his arrival in Krakow Bishop Krasinski travelled to Rome to hand in his resignation from the office has so far prevailed among historiographers. The present analysis does not confirm such findings and proves a different sequence of events.

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Abstract

Aldona Prašmantaitė

Impediti Bishops of the Vilnius Diocese in the Russian Empire Period:

A Case of Bishop Adam Stanisław Krasiński

Keywords:

Vilnius diocese;
Bishop Adam
Stanisław
Krasiński;
Russian Empire;
impediti bishops

Following the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Vilnius diocese, together with the Samogitian diocese, found itself under the direct supervision of the Russian Empire. It was the intention of lay authorities that the Catholic Church should be governed according to the same principles as the Orthodox Church, which enjoyed the status of the national church in the Russian Empire. Disobedience frequently became a pretext to remove the disloyal hierarch from power over the diocese. This phenomenon became a real plague in the Vilnius diocese. Under the pretext of disloyalty, lay authorities prevented three bishops ordinary of the Vilnius diocese: Adam Stanisław Krasiński (1863), Karol Hryniewiecki (1885), Eduard von Ropp (1907) from performing their duties, exiling the hierarchs.

Based on the literature of the subject and analysis of sources, the article presents the history of the removal of Bishop Krasiński from the episcopal throne. His stance during the January Uprising was a pretext to remove the bishop from the Vilnius diocese. The analysis led to the conclusion that Bishop Krasiński's stance towards the uprising was in accordance with the statement of the Holy See. However, faced with the requirements of the Russian officials, he did not relent and refused to issue a public circular condemning the uprising. Bishop Krasiński was alien to servile obedience towards imperial authorities. The exile to Vyatka (called Kirov since 1934) in inland Russia was the price he paid for his personal dignity and the dignity of his office of the bishop of the Roman Catholic diocese.

Bishop Krasiński was released from his exile in 1883. However, the analysis does not confirm the currently prevalent view that he resigned from his office of his own initiative. It was determined that the idea of Krasiński's letter to the Pope with the request to accept the bishop's resignation from the office of the head of the Vilnius diocese originated in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1877. The Russian government adeptly used the case of the exiled bishop in their negotiations with the Holy See. The fate of

the Vilnius bishop was sealed in one of the articles of a preliminary agreement from 1880 between the Russian Empire and the Holy See. Bishop Krasin'ski's dismissal from the office of the head of the Vilnius diocese and his exile was in line with the policy of the Russian government towards the Roman Catholic Church.

Abstrakt

Aldona Prašmantaitė

Biskupi impediti diecezji wileńskiej w okresie porozbiorowym:

przypadek bpa Adama Stanisława Krasińskiego

Słowa kluczowe:
diecezja wileńska;
bp Adam Stanisław
Krasiński;
Imperium
Rosyjskie;
biskupi *impediti*

W skutku rozbiorów Rzeczypospolitej diecezja wileńska razem ze żmudzką okazała się pod bezpośrednią egidą władz Imperium Rosyjskiego. Władzom świeckim zależało na tym, żeby Kościół katolicki był rządzony na takich samych zasadach jak i Kościół prawosławny, który w Imperium Rosyjskim miał rangę Kościoła państwowego. Brak lojalności nieraz stawało się pretekstem do odsunięcia nielojalnego hierarchy od rządów diecezją. Zjawisko to stało się istną plagą w diecezji wileńskiej. Pod pretekstem braku lojalności władze świeckie przez zesłanie pozbawiły możliwości pełnienia swoich obowiązków trzech biskupów ordynariuszów diecezji wileńskiej: Adama Stanisława Krasińskiego (1863), Karola Hryniewieckiego (1885) i Eduarda von Roppa (1907).

Na podstawie literatury przedmiotu i analizy źródeł została przedstawiona w artykule historia usunięcia z tronu biskupiego bpa Krasińskiego. Pretekstem do odsunięcia bpa Krasińskiego od kanonicznie zleconych rządów diecezją wileńską stała się jego postawa w czasie powstania styczniowego. Przeprowadzona analiza pozwala wnioskować, że bp Krasiński trzymał się pozycji nakreślonej wówczas przez Stolicą Apostolską wobec powstania. Wymaganiom urzędników imperialnych władz lokalnych jednak nie uległ i nie wydał okólnika do ludu potępiającego powstanie. Służalczą uległość wobec władz imperialnych była bp. Krasińskiemu obca. Za poczucie godności własnej i piastowanego urzędu pasterza diecezji Kościoła rzymskokatolickiego bp. Krasiński zapłacił zesłaniem w głąb Imperium Rosyjskiego, do Wiatki (od r. 1934 Kirow).

Bp Krasiński został zwolniony z zesłania w 1883 r. Przeprowadzona analiza nie potwierdza dominującego jak dotąd w historiografii poglądu, że bp Krasiński rzekł się urzędu biskupiego ze własnej inicjatywy. Ustalono, że idea listownego zwrócenia się bpa Krasińskiego do Ojca Świętego z prośbą o przyjęcie jego rezygnacji z rządów diecezją wileńską, powstała w ministerstwie spraw wewnętrznych Rosji w 1877 r. Rząd imperialny po

mistrzowsku wykorzystał przypadek przebywającego na zesłaniu bpa Krasieńskiego w czasie pertraktacji ze Stolicą Apostolską. Los biskupa wileńskiego został określony w jednym z artykułów wstępnej umowy z roku 1880 między Imperium Rosyjskim a Stolicą Apostolską. Pozbawienie bpa Krasieńskiego mitry pasterza diecezji wileńskiej, jak i jego zesłanie, leżało w planach polityki rządu Imperium Rosyjskiego, prowadzonej względem Kościoła rzymskokatolickiego.