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Evidence of Karol Wojtyła's thought formation as preserved in archival materials

It is obvious to anyone researching Karol Wojtyła's thought — and particularly his philosophical thought — that there are archival materials hand-penned by the author of *Person and Act*, or copied on his order. It is, therefore, all the more puzzling that no actual research into the archival materials has been undertaken more extensively to date¹. This means that so far Karol Wojtyła's thought has not been considered from the perspective of its formation. Let me then, at this point, put forth a thesis that use of the archival sources might shed some new and important light on the findings made by Wojtyła researchers so far. However, the thing is not to undermine the results obtained thus far, but to explore them further, and in many places to fine-tune them. Here, too, another thesis becomes revealed: Wojtyła's published works are, for the most part, versions that soften or nuance his original thought.

Given the fact that the present considerations are part of the discussion of the postdoctoral thesis by the author of *Person and Act*, I will only be

1 This kind of initiative has recently been undertaken by the John Paul II Institute of Intercultural Dialogue in Krakow, the goal being to publish a critical edition of all of Karol Wojtyła's writings. This means using not only the published texts — though they serve as the main point of reference — but also the archived ones that can be delved into. For instance, the first volume to be published will contain a manuscript of the working translation of Max Scheler's 1921 work *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik* (M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik*, Halle a. [n] d. [er] S. [aale] 1921). Although it was known that Wojtyła had made such a translation for his own use, no effort was made to find this text — the text which sheds much light on Wojtyła's postdoctoral dissertation.

referring to the archival materials related to that work, even though the theses put forward can also be applied to all the other texts by the author in question. Not wishing to take individual passages out of context, I will only mention one terminological change that is repeated several hundred times, and will ultimately focus on discussing the ending of the postdoctoral dissertation, because there are two endings with different tenors — which is not a widely known fact.

Research material

The first edition of Wojtyła's postdoctoral dissertation was published in 1959². It was referred to by later editors who reissued this work³. However, we are most interested in the pre-1959 versions of the text. There are three such texts deposited in the Archives of the Metropolitan Curia in Krakow. The earliest one is dated 1953 — joint ref. no. AKKW⁴ CII-9/110 (hereinafter: M). If we take a closer look at the chronology of events in Wojtyła's life, we can surmise that the M version was the one that served as the basis for awarding the later pope his postdoctoral degree. At an extraordinary meeting of the Council of the Theological Faculty (30 November 1953), the dissertation in question was approved by unanimous vote. On 3 December 1953 Wojtyła delivered his postdoctoral lecture. In view of this, it is unlikely that another version of the postdoctoral dissertation was written between 3 December or 30 November and the end of 1953, which would have contained some

2 K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Makska Schelera*, Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin 1959.

3 K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Makska Schelera*, in: *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, eds. T. Styczeń, J.W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin 1991, p. 11–128 (Źródła i Monografie, 119; Człowiek i Moralność, 2); K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Makska Schelera*, in: *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, ed. T. Styczeń et al., Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin 2001, p. 11–128 (Źródła i Monografie, 119; Człowiek i Moralność, 2); K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Makska Schelera*, in: *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, consultation et comments M. Zięba OP, Katolicka Agencja Informacyjna, Hachette Livre Polska Collection, Warszawa 2008 (Kolekcja Dziel Jana Pawła II, 44).

4 AKKW means: Archiwum Kardynała Karola Wojtyły (Archive of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła).

improvements on the earlier version. We can therefore conclude that the notation “Kraków 1953” featuring on the first page of the M version conclusively proves that this is exactly the version of the dissertation submitted to the reviewers (prof. Stefan Swieżawski from the Catholic University of Lublin, Rev. Prof. Aleksander Usowicz from the Jagiellonian University, and Rev. Prof. Władysław Wicher also from the Jagiellonian University).

Apart from the M version, we have two other versions from 1954, which we will designate as M₁ (Ref. AKKW CII-9/110a) and M₂ (Ref. AKKW CII-9/110b). The M₂ version is certainly later than M₁, as it already includes the typewritten version of the corrections handwritten in the M₁ version. Visibly enough, the M₂ version served as the final basis for the first edition of 1959.

In further discussion, I will focus only on the differences between the M versions. It sounds mysterious. Well, we actually have two files with the same reference number (AKKW CII-9/110). Both contain an almost identical text of the postdoctoral dissertation⁵. The layout of the text on the pages of both the M versions proves that they were written simultaneously, i.e. one — which is less clear — is a carbon copy of the other. So as to avoid confusing the versions, let us introduce an additional differentiation into M and M(vI)⁶. In the M(vI) version, one ending of the dissertation is to be found on pages 152–162⁷. Characteristically, it was added (or actually substituted), as evidenced by the paper, which is the same throughout the M(vI) version except for pages 152–156. As we compare this kind of paper with the paper of the M version (where the two endings are preserved), we note that the ending in M(vI) is written on the same type of paper as M. It can therefore be concluded that M(vI) is the actual “version I”, since it required a change of the ending, which the later version did not. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that M(vI) is older than M.

5 Minor differences are concerned with linguistic correction, e.g. corrections related to inadequate carbon copying of the text.

6 M(vI) denotes: typescript “version I [original text: “wersja I”]”, where “version I” is a later addition by the archivist. This annotation appears on the title page.

7 Cf. AKKW CII-9/110, p. 152–162. Throughout the article I provide the numbers of the pages according to the author's original pagination.

However, in the M version we encounter another puzzle. A cursory review of this version reveals that the entirety (both the endings) is written on the same type of paper. There would be nothing strange about this, but why would Wojtyła have two endings? However, if we subject the paper to closer scrutiny, then it becomes clear that two different types of paper were used here as well. The entire work, including the ending, which we also find in M(vI) is written on the same type of paper. A different type of paper (also different from the types used in the M(vI) version) was used for the second (in the order they are arranged in the folder) ending and for the notes⁸. This means that the notes are the same in all the versions of the work⁹. This, however, does not mean that they are arranged in the same way in both the endings.

The base ending¹⁰ has three typewritten note numbers. The other endings have three notes, but only M2 has them typewritten. In the ending of M only the number of note 1 is typewritten. Note 2 is not indicated at all, and note 3 is added by hand. In the M1 version both note 2 and note 3 are annotated by hand.

Although the content of the notes in the ending does not change, the sentences (and entire paragraphs) in which they appear do change. Based on a comparison of the versions and the placement of the notes in them, the following inference can be made.

Due to the fact concerned with the different paper used in the M version on pages 152–175 (ending(b) and notes), and with the fact that the content of the notes is not changed, but in M note no. 2 disappears, and note no. 3 is added later by hand, it can be inferred that the ending(b) version was the one that actually came first. Below you will find (in the following order: M ending(b), M, M(vI), M1, M2) the typed pages with note no. 2. (in M and M(vI) the note is missing), which will make it easier for the reader to find his or her way around the versions of the text¹¹.

8 Cf. AKKW CII-9/110, p. 152–162 (ending), 163–175 (notes).

9 Versions M, M(vI), M1 have endnotes, while M2 has footnotes.

10 Hereinafter “ending(b)”.

11 The overview scans bear red circles in the places where the note reference is present or missing (versions M and M(vI)). When analyzing them, it should be noted that in the M, M(vI), M1




Fig. 1. Page 160 of the M version ending(b) with a reference to note no. 2 (Source: John Paul II Institute of Intercultural Dialogue in Krakow).




Fig. 2. Page 161 of the M version — no reference to note no. 2 (Source: John Paul II Institute of Intercultural Dialogue in Krakow).




Fig. 3. Page 161 of the M(vI) version — no reference to note no. 2 (Source: John Paul II Institute of Intercultural Dialogue in Krakow).




Fig. 4. Page 161 of the M1 version with a handwritten reference to note no. 2 (Source: John Paul II Institute of Intercultural Dialogue in Krakow).




Fig. 5. Page 172 of the M2 version with a reference to note no. 2 (Source: John Paul II Institute of Intercultural Dialogue in Krakow).

Establishing which ending came first is important because of the thesis whereby Wojtyła, as a rule, softened or nuanced the versions of the work that were to be published (or later versions of the work)¹².

Let us proceed, then, to point out the differences between the endings. Due to the volume of the versions under comparison, we will adopt, as a method of presentation, pointing to important selected differences in content or significant differences in the “tenor” of the text, the ending(b) being a reference point. However, we will not be comparing successive paragraphs step by step, since the two versions of the ending are too different to do so sensibly without constantly comparing the full body of text. So we will point out, following the order of ending(b), selected moments from the earlier version and their equivalents (more nuanced and over-emphasized) in the later version.

Analysis of the ending

In the end, for the purposes of this study, five differences significantly affecting the tenor of the ending text have been distinguished. Of course, many more differences can be identified, but it was nevertheless necessary to do some sorting, and those indicated below seem to be the most relevant for the verification of the theses.

Difference no. 1 boils down to a change in emphasis placed on defining the very subject matter of the work undertaken in the postdoctoral dissertation. While the fundamental issue was in both cases defined by Wojtyła

and M2 versions the text is the same, while in the M ending(b) version the text to which the note was appended differs from the others.

¹² Of particular note here is one change that on 18 May 2022 at the conference *Karol Wojtyła in search of a new look at Christian ethics*. Discussion of the work *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maxa Schelera*, during a panel discussion Rev. Grzegorz Hołub remarked upon, pointing out that the very frequent change of the term “ethics” to the term “morality” (almost 500 changes) — in the M1 version these changes were made by Wojtyła by hand — was not about mellowing, but in fact sharpening of the original thought. One cannot but agree that that is nuancing of thought, and that this case indeed represents sharpening rather than mellowing. However, that is an exception, at the root of which lie various causes (for more on this subject see: K. Petryszak, “Etyka” a “moralność” — analiza zmiany terminów w maszynopisach pracy habilitacyjnej Karola Wojtyły, “Logos i Ethos” 59 (2022) no. 1, s. 105–132).

in the same manner: “whether and to what extent Max Scheler’s ethical system is suitable for the interpretation of Christian ethics”¹³, the further addendum already presents two perspectives. In M(b) we read: “By posing the question in this way, we have chosen to examine the Schelerian system from a particular angle of view”¹⁴, while in M: “The question thus posed in the introduction determined the entire direction of inquiries in the part of the work proper”¹⁵. Although the difference may seem insignificant, analyzing the entire tenor of the two endings — which will become apparent once our analyses are complete — one can see a significant softening of perspective in the M version. One can say that the revised addition is nothing more than a certain embellishment — perhaps a required one, but an embellishment nonetheless — whose meaning is clear without exposing it in a separate sentence. For if — as Wojtyła was certainly aware — we pose a certain issue as a research problem, it follows that the way it is posed essentially determines the direction of further inquiry. Thus, there is nothing important in the addendum contained in M.

The M(b) version, on the other hand, seems to have a sharpened perspective. For we know that Wojtyła provides a serious critique of Scheler’s “ethical system”¹⁶, but also of phenomenology as a method that ultimately proves to be an insufficient way of doing philosophy in order to be able to develop a comprehensive view of the world or even to constitute ethics. This criticism, of course, comes from Thomism and the classical philosophy of

13 Original text: “czy i o ile system etyczny Maksza Schelera nadaje się do interpretacji etyki chrześcijańskiej”; M(b), p. 52; M, p. 152.

Since both versions are under the same reference and page numbers, I will not be using the reference number, but the notations M(b) (i.e. AKKW CII-9/100 ending(b)) and M with the indication of the pages.

14 Original text: “Stawiając zagadnienie w taki sposób, zdecydowaliśmy się na badanie systemu schelerowskiego pod szczególnym kątem widzenia”; M(b), p. 152.

15 Original text: “Tak postawione we wstępie zagadnienie zadecydowało o całym kierunku dociekań w części właściwej pracy”; M, p. 152.

16 The “ethical system” has been put in quotation marks, as it is the expression included in the versions of Wojtyła’s postdoctoral dissertation under discussion, but it is an inappropriate (or at least inaccurate) expression. For more on this subject see K. Petryszak, „Etyka” a „moralność” — analiza zmiany terminów w maszynopisach pracy habilitacyjnej Karola Wojtyły, “Logos i Ethos” 59 (2022) no. 1, s. 105–132.

being. Therefore, it seems reasonable to understand the addendum in M(b) about “a particular angle of view” as simply an angle of critical viewing, coming from without, but also — at certain points in the analysis of Scheler’s philosophy — from within¹⁷.

And so the first difference lies primarily in the fact that Wojtyła abandons the emphasis on the “specificity” of his approach in favour of couching in a sentence the information that is already obvious to the reader. This can be seen as a softening of the emphasis presented in the ending.

Difference no. 2 — found in the same paragraph — bolsters the thesis about the softening of the tenor in the M version. This is evidenced by the fact that in the M(b) version Wojtyła explicitly points out: “This comparative critical study [...] in which by way of analysis”¹⁸, while in the M version he emphasizes only the fact that the study has been “analytical and comparative”¹⁹. In this case, unlike Difference 1, criticality of the approach is not necessarily inherent in the nature of the work²⁰, so mentioning it would be appropriate, especially because it would agree with the actual method and approach used in the work. However, Wojtyła — perhaps in a conciliatory spirit — tempers his thought not by depriving it of criticality, but by not mentioning it explicitly in the ending.

Difference no. 3 concerns the emphaticalness of the evaluation of Scheler’s system in relation to Christian ethics. In the M(b) version Wojtyła states:

Scheler, therefore, takes a completely different view of the very principle of his ethical personalism from the teaching of the revealed sources. The reason

17 For instance, showing that there can be no talk of any systemicity or normativity with the adoption of emotionalist assumptions, or more broadly: ones designating the subject as the ultimate touchstone of “objectivity”. One can see in this a meticulously conducted critique of the internal cohesiveness (or coherence) of Scheler’s views.

18 Original text: “Owo porównawcze badanie krytyczne [...], w której drogą analityczną”; M(b), p. 152.

19 Original text: “analityczno-porównawcze”; M, p. 152.

20 There is no shortage of uncritical apologetic works in science.

for this different account is primarily due to the phenomenological assumptions of the Schelerian system²¹.

The noteworthy thing is the categorical nature of Wojtyła's thesis whereby he points to a **completely different** approach to personalistic issues, which supposedly results not from the Schelerian approach itself, but rather from phenomenology as such, of which Scheler's philosophy is a variant.

The M version, on the other hand, contains information related to the issue at hand in two separate places. First comes a brief recapitulation of Scheler's view on the person and his relation to values, which Wojtyła concludes: "Such an approach to the person's relation to ethical values is afforded by phenomenology's epistemological assumptions"²². Several sentences further on, the author of *Person and Act* writes:

Thus, the fundamental truth of Christian ethics, which states that the human person is the author of the ethical good and evil of his acts, cannot be properly grasped and objectified with Scheler's system. This is a consequence of the phenomenological assumptions²³.

The M version also stresses the variant nature of Scheler's philosophy relative to phenomenology. However, the indication of the differences or even the impassable gulf separating Christian ethics from the phenomenological method is softened, and significantly so. For let us remember that originally Wojtyła points to a "completely different approach," while in the later version he adopts a conciliatory stance again, as it were, pointing no longer to the categorical "completeness," but to the sheer impossibility of

21 Original text: "Scheler zatem zupełnie inaczej ujmuje samą zasadę swego etycznego personalizmu niż nauka źródeł objawionych. Powodem tego innego ujęcia są w pierwszym rzędzie założenia fenomenologiczne schelerowskiego systemu"; M(b), p. 153.

22 Original text: "Na takie ujęcie stosunku osoby do wartości etycznych pozwalają fenomenologiczne założenia teorio-poznawcze"; M, p. 153.

23 Original text: "Tak więc podstawowa prawda etyki chrześcijańskiej, która głosi, że osoba ludzka jest sprawcą etycznego dobra i zła swoich aktów, nie daje się właściwie ująć i uprzedmiotwić przy pomocy systemu Schelera. Jest to następstwo założeń fenomenologicznych"; M, p. 153–154.

a “proper approach”²⁴ using Scheler’s system. This change is momentous, as it nevertheless opens up the possibility of applying phenomenology to the study of the subject of Wojtyła’s discussion — albeit somewhat more peripherally — which will be evidenced by further examples. They will also testify to the fact that Wojtyła, in the M version, was more favourably inclined towards phenomenology than in the formulations used originally.

Difference no. 4 lies in the different ways emphasis is laid with regard to ethos in Scheler’s philosophy. In the M(b) version Wojtyła states: “Thus, virtually all ethical life is in this [Scheler’s] system reduced to ethos”²⁵. And it is known that ethos is not universal, which would imply its immutability and metaphysical objectivity. The author of *Person and Act* was well aware of this²⁶, so without the risk of overinterpretation it can be pointed out that by formulating, in the conclusion of his discussion, the thesis of reducing the whole of ethical life to ethos, he thereby criticizes Scheler, accusing him of subjectivism or even ethical (or axiological) relativism²⁷.

In the M version, Wojtyła does not abandon the criticism indicated, but presents it in a different light. He points out as follows: “The phenomenological system allows us to grasp ethical value, but it does not lead us to

24 “Proper” is to be understood here as simply “read” (or cognized) in the fullness arising from cognized being itself.

25 Original text: “Tak więc, całe właściwie życie etyczne zostaje w tym systemie [Schelerowskim] sprowadzone do etosu”; M(b), p. 154.

26 As evidenced, for example, by the content of the subsection of his postdoctoral dissertation entitled “System Schelera jako próba etyki obiektywistycznej [Scheler’s system as an attempt at objectivist ethics]” — see: K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Makska Schelera*, in: *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, eds. T. Styczeń, J. W. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin 1991, p. 56ff (Źródła i Monografie, 119; Człowiek i Moralność, 2).

27 In addition, the validity of such an understanding is evidenced by a passage found slightly further on: “Thus, [recognizing Scheler’s thought as justified] the basis of Christian ethics would be Jesus Christ’s ethical experience entailing, by way of imitation, different people’s ethical experiences under changing environmental and historical conditions. In this way, the tradition of experience would have to stand above any tradition of teaching” (original text: “A zatem [uznając za słuszną myśl Schelera] podstawą etyki chrześcijańskiej byłoby przeżycie etyczne Jezusa Chrystusa pociągające za sobą w drodze naśladowania przeżycie etyczne różnych ludzi w zmieniających się warunkach środowiskowych i historycznych. W ten sposób tradycja przeżycia musiałaby stanąć nad wszelką tradycją nauczania”; M(b), p. 154.

grasp the very sources of its existence, which are found precisely in a person's causality"²⁸ and — a page and a half further on — “The very essence of ethical life is [in Scheler] a person's ethos”²⁹. The second quotation is further explained (or elaborated) by Wojtyła not in the direction of criticism levelled from metaphysical objectivity, but coming from the comparison with the Gospel and the anthropology contained therein, which points to the causative rather than purely experiential (or receptive) character of the person in moral actions. It is only this anthropological vision that metaphysical objectivity is underlying. Ultimately, then, in terms of content, both endings offer substantively the same indications, but emphasize them differently. In the M(b) version it is criticism on the part of metaphysical objectivity that is underpinned by anthropology, while in the M version it is metaphysical objectivity that provides the necessary background for anthropological issues.

Moreover, in this context, another sentence from the M(b) version should be quoted to even more strongly emphasize the significance of the difference between ethos and ethics for Wojtyła: “whether ethic can be substituted for ethos”³⁰. Essentially, in the context of Wojtyła's postdoctoral dissertation as a whole it is a rhetorical question. However, posing the question, through the lens of the emphasized features and character of the ending in the M(b) version, all the better indicates the edge of criticism aimed at Scheler more acutely than we know from the M version and later editions.

Already at this point it should be noted that this change is an expression of a certain breakthrough that was evidently taking place in Wojtyła's philosophy in the 1950s. He turned from primarily metaphysical positions to anthropological ones (in the context of ethics, of course) with strong metaphysical underpinnings. One might venture a proposition that Wojtyła's

28 Original text: “System fenomenologiczny pozwala nam ująć wartość etyczną, ale nie prowadzi nas do ujęcia samych źródeł jej istnienia, które znajdują się właśnie w sprawczości osoby”; M, p. 154.

29 Original text: “Samą istotą życia etycznego jest [u Schelera] etos osoby”; M, p. 155.

30 Original text: “czy etosem można zastąpić etykę”; M(b), p. 154. In the M version such a question or even such a clearly stated alternative is absent.

anthropological concept matured in this period enough for him to leave the safe haven of Thomistic metaphysics and pursue his own anthropological direction based precisely on that metaphysics.

Difference no. 5 concerns the other one of the theses defended by Wojtyła³¹. Namely, the question is whether, despite its incompatibility with Christian ethics, Scheler's philosophy can be of any help in examining it. While Wojtyła gives an affirmative answer in both versions, he once again shifts the emphasis. In the M(b) version he writes:

We can therefore study good and evil not in their principle, but only in the way they are experienced. This is a separate task of great significance for the totality of ethical knowledge. We can agree that the significance is secondary³².

It is clear that in this passage Wojtyła takes the position of a metaphysicist who starts from the first philosophy in order to evaluate the possibilities of another philosophical position.

Wojtyła presents the issue in a slightly different way in the second version:

For the establishment of this principle [of ethical good and evil] we must break away from the phenomenological method. That moment of the issue which compels us to move from the phenomenological method to the metaphysical method in our ethical inquiries lies still within the domain of phenomenological experience. Thus, phenomenologically we affirm the

31 Namely: "Although the ethical system created by Max Scheler is not essentially suitable for interpreting Christian ethics, we can find it incidentally helpful in our scientific work on Christian ethics. This is because it makes it easier for us to analyze ethical facts on a phenomenal and experiential plane" [original text: "Jakkolwiek system etyczny stworzony przez Maksa Schelera nie nadaje się zasadniczo do interpretacji etyki chrześcijańskiej, to jednak może on nam ubocznie być pomocny przy pracy naukowej nad etyką chrześcijańską. Ułatwia on nam mianowicie analizę faktów etycznych na płaszczyźnie zjawiskowej i doświadczalnej"] (M, p. 158).

32 Original text: "Możemy więc badać dobro i zło nie w ich zasadzie, ale tylko w ich przeżyciu. Jest to osobne zadanie, które dla całokształtu wiedzy etycznej posiada wielkie znaczenie. Zgodzimy się na to, że jest to znaczenie wtórne"; M(b), p. 160–161.

normative character of ethical values in the analysis of the act of conscience, which itself as a lived experience still belongs to the field of phenomenological experience³³.

The subsequent paragraphs of the M version agree in principle substantively and in terms of the tenor and emphasis with the M(b) version. Nonetheless, it is significant that there is no indication in the M(b) version that the beginning of the path towards recognizing the objectivity and normativity of values still lies within the limits of phenomenological inquiry. Here Wojtyła invokes the issues concerned with the act of conscience. In fact, every inner act can be treated as a field of phenomenological experience. However, it does not appear from Wojtyła's work as a whole — nor does it from his later writings³⁴ — that such a transition from cognition of the content of experiences to the conclusion about the normativity of some of them is fully justified. The author of *Person and Act*, while referring to the objective role of conscience, seems to mix (or combine) philosophical orders for the sake of appreciating phenomenology. The role of conscience he presents is drawn from the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas on conscience. Thus, a fundamental question arises, which we will not consider here, but only signal it: whether the Thomasian (or Thomistically construed) act of conscience and its lived experience can be reconciled with the presuppositions of phenomenology, and whether — as Wojtyła suggested — it is contained within them³⁵. Thus, it can be seen that comparing the two versions of the ending opens one of the fundamental research problems concerning

33 Original text: “Dla ustalenia tej zasady [dobra i zła etycznego] musimy oderwać się od metody fenomenologicznej. Ten moment zagadnienia, który nas zmusza do przejścia od metody fenomenologicznej do metody metafizycznej w dociekaniach etycznych leży jeszcze na terenie doświadczenia fenomenologicznego. Fenomenologicznie mianowicie stwierdzamy normatywny charakter wartości etycznych w analizie aktu sumienia, który sam jako przeżycie należy jeszcze do zakresu doświadczenia fenomenologicznego”; M, p. 161.

34 Cf. K. Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie*, ed. T. Styczeń et al., Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II, Lublin 2006, p. 26–38, 50–52, 59–61, 259–270 (*Źródła i Monografie*, 302; *Człowiek i Moralność*, 3).

35 For instance, by way of Étienne Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity (cf. E. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1950, Chapter XII).

Wojtyła's inclusion of phenomenology in his research and the justification of such inclusion.

As indicated above, one might mention at least several dozen differences between the discussed versions of the ending. However, we have limited ourselves to five, since the purpose of the article was only to outline the research perspective, and to point to some preliminary clues and hypotheses. Moreover, presenting and discussing all the differences would require a small monograph, while the examples selected and discussed above are sufficient to achieve the goals set here.

Conclusion

The aim of the present text is to provide a preliminary glimpse, primarily to researchers of Wojtyła's philosophy, of how many as yet undiscovered threads of the thought of the author of *Person and Act* remain hidden in the archival materials. The differences indicated also make it possible to follow the formation of the future pope's increasingly mature thought. The article's main thesis whereby Wojtyła's thought, in the most basic of the extant versions of the ending of his postdoctoral dissertation (M(b)), was less subdued and less nuanced seems to have been defended in light of the analyses presented.

Let us again emphasize that in the M(b) version, the author of *Person and Act* set out with a decidedly metaphysical position, and it was from this perspective that he examined Scheler's philosophy, which at the time perforce had to be evaluated as a useful, albeit at best an ancillary method of working on ethical issues. In the M version, on the other hand, he softens his position and takes a more positive view of phenomenology. Due to the nature of the text, we could not present any broader-viewpoint material that would unequivocally indicate that the ending in the M version is also more nuanced and more likely to adopt Scheler's viewpoint³⁶. This is not to say that Wojtyła adopts a phenomenological viewpoint. On the contrary,

36 In the sense that he tries to present the issue discussed in the main part of the postdoctoral dissertation precisely from the perspective of the phenomenological assumptions.

despite his later, even more significant appreciation of the phenomenological method — where the reason for this shift is itself an important issue to explore — Wojtyła is very clear about its place not only in the philosophical hierarchy, but also (perhaps more importantly for us) in his research method. Despite actually seeing significant research potential — especially in the M version — for the phenomenological method, Wojtyła indicates in both cases that it is a method only peripherally capable of providing answers to the questions that trouble him.

The differences in emphasis — especially evident in the last example — allow us to trace the beginnings of Wojtyła's turn towards a broader inclusion of phenomenology in his deliberations. One should not, however, forget that despite some search for justifications for the method used by, among others, Scheler, Wojtyła is ultimately willing to use it insofar as it stands in line with the method of metaphysical inquiry, i.e., in this case, Thomistic metaphysics.

The present article does not claim to unravel the issue regarding the “strength” of Wojtyła's affiliation with the users of the phenomenological method. It is only intended to indicate in this regard that the answer to a problem at least thus presented lies hidden at the very beginning of the philosophical path chosen by the author of *Person and Act*. Further studies of the differences between the two endings might bring more detailed solutions in this subject matter. It seems, however, that one should not limit oneself to the postdoctoral dissertation alone, since Wojtyła's entire philosophical output from the 1950s shows a certain tendency to use also some experimental psychology data rather than the phenomenological method *sensu stricto*. How much Wojtyła's approach to the practical use of phenomenology would change later on is a non-obvious question that requires further research — primarily based on archival materials that will allow us to trace Wojtyła's reasoning much more closely than the later editions show, and will also allow us to look at the way in which the ultimately publicized thought took shape, which the later editions do not allow. It is precisely the tracing of this formation of thought that is a prerequisite for posing relevant questions about Wojtyła's philosophy, at which the present article is one of the first attempts.

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Abstract

Evidence of Karol Wojtyła's thought formation as preserved in archival materials

The purpose of the present article is to present selected differences between two versions of the endings of Karol Wojtyła's postdoctoral dissertation "Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera". The endings are available in the archival materials deposited in the Archives of the Metropolitan Curia in Krakow. On the basis of the differences indicated, the author defends the thesis that in the later version of the ending Wojtyła softened and nuanced his attitude to Max Scheler's philosophy as well as to phenomenology as a research method. The article also takes up clues pointing to a change in philosophical attitude that took place in Karol Wojtyła's philosophy in the 1950s. This change shifts from a strictly metaphysical attitude — based on Thomistic metaphysics — to a strictly anthropological attitude. In the anthropological attitude, Wojtyła finds much greater application capabilities for the phenomenological method, but ultimately the results obtained through it depend on their compatibility with the metaphysical background of his philosophy.

Keywords: Karol Wojtyła, Thomism, phenomenology, postdoctoral dissertation, archival materials

Abstrakt

Dowody na formowanie się myśli Karola Wojtyły zachowane w materiałach archiwalnych

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie wybranych różnic pomiędzy dwiema wersjami zakończeń rozprawy habilitacyjnej Karola Wojtyły pt. „Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera”. Zakończenia te są dostępne w materiałach archiwalnych przechowywanych w Archiwum Kurii Metropolitalnej w Krakowie. Na podstawie wskazanych różnic autor broni tezy, że w późniejszej wersji zakończenia Wojtyła złagodził i bardziej znuansował swoje podejście do filozofii Maksa Schelera oraz

do fenomenologii jako metody badawczej. Artykuł podejmuje również tropy wskazujące na zmianę nastawienia filozoficznego, która dokonała się w filozofii Karola Wojtyły w latach 50. Zmiana ta polegała na przejściu od nastawienia ściśle metafizycznego — opartego na metafizyce tomistycznej — do nastawienia ściśle antropologicznego. W nastawieniu antropologicznym Wojtyła znajduje znacznie większe możliwości zastosowania dla metody fenomenologicznej, ale ostatecznie wyniki uzyskane za jej pomocą zależą od ich zgodności z metafizycznym tłem jego filozofii.

Słowa kluczowe: Karol Wojtyła, tomizm, fenomenologia, habilitacja, materiały archiwalne