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Roman Ingarden and Karol Wojtyła's Reading of Max Scheler

In 1964 Helen Michejda wondered whether “Ingarden’s *a priori* categories may be used to explain and possibly correct the lack of clarity and inconsistency in Whitehead’s thought”¹. However, she came to the conclusion that without Ingarden’s solutions in the field of metaphysics, in many places the task would be either difficult or even impossible to carry out². It is well known that Ingarden did not present his metaphysical views, though in the last years of his life, he was inclined to reflect on the metaphysics of man and the metaphysics of values. We do not know whether he came to any broader metaphysical conclusions.

Nevertheless, the above two areas of study that, according to Andrzej Póltawski, are “Ingarden’s metaphysical testament”³, support our thesis that as regards philosophical anthropology and axiology, Ingarden’s philosophy needs supplementing or even revising. Therefore, adapting the above idea by Michejda, we advance the following thesis that we will argue for and defend: it is possible to explain, complement, and correct Roman Ingarden’s philosophy (philosophical anthropology and axiology) with that of Karol Wojtyła’s.

1 Originally: “aprioryczne kategorie Ingardena mogą służyć do wyjaśnienia i ewentualnego skorygowania niejasności i niekonsekwencji myśli Whiteheada” (H. Michejda, *Whitehead i Ingarden*, in: *Szkice filozoficzne. Romanowi Ingardenowi w darze*, eds. I. Dąbska et al., Warszawa-Kraków 1964, p. 6).

2 H. Michejda, *Whitehead i Ingarden*, s. 9–10.

3 A. Póltawski, *Metafizyczny testament Romana Ingardena*, in: *W kręgu myśli Romana Ingardena*, ed. A. Węgrzecki, Kraków 2011, p. 13–24.

My thesis is not entirely new as the literature on the subject has already put forward the following problems:

1. Ingarden's anthropology and axiology need clarifying and complementing⁴.
2. In these two areas Ingarden's solutions are at least partially complementary to Karol Wojtyła's philosophy or Thomistic philosophy⁵.
3. Ingarden's philosophical anthropology and axiology should be further developed⁶.

However, apart from indicating these problems, there have been no attempts to go beyond certain postulates or valuable comparisons between a positive part of Ingarden's thought and Karol Wojtyła's or that of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec⁷. These juxtapositions are a rich source of in-

4 See e.g. P. Duchliński, *Tomistyczna krytyka aksjologii fenomenologicznej*, in: *Dziedzictwo etyki współczesnej. Aksjologia Romana Ingardena i jego uczniów*, ed. P. Duchliński, Kraków 2005, p. 292; A. Półtawski, *Człowiek a wartości według Romana Ingardena*, in: *Dziedzictwo etyki współczesnej*, p. 18; A. Półtawski, *Metafizyczny testament Romana Ingardena*, p. 15, 19; A. Półtawski, *Romana Ingardena droga ku personalistycznej metafizyce*, in: *Metafizyka*, vol. 1, eds. S. Janacek, A. Starościc, Lublin 2017, p. 183–184, 186.

5 See e.g. A. Bator, *Intencjonalność sztuki w filozofii Romana Ingardena i Mieczysława Alberta Krąpca*, Wrocław 1999, p. 14, 118, 203; J. Galarowicz, *Etyka intelektualnego wnuka Romana Ingardena*, in: *Dziedzictwo etyki współczesnej*, p. 118; J. Galarowicz, *Roman Ingarden. Etyka wartości*, Kraków 2020, p. 85, 146, 153; J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, vol. 2: *Ukryty blask dobra. Antropologiczno-aksjologiczne podstawy etyki Romana Ingardena*, Kraków 1998, p. 75, 90, 216; C. Karwot, *Romana Ingardena koncepcja człowieka (Studium z metafizyki człowieka)*, Kraków 2011, p. 116; N. Lubnicki, *Sylwetka filozoficzna Romana Ingardena*, in: *Fenomenologia Romana Ingardena*, ed. J. Kuczyński, wydanie specjalne "Studiów Filozoficznych", Warszawa 1972, p. 99; M. Maciejczak, *Od epistemologii do personalizmu — filozofia Andrzeja Półtawskiego*, in: *Dziedzictwo etyki współczesnej*, p. 148; A. Półtawski, *Realizm fenomenologii. Husserl — Ingarden — Stein — Wojtyła*, Toruń 2001, p. 78; D. Radziechowski, *"Jestem siłą na skraju dwóch światów". Przyczynek do antropologii i filozofii kultury Romana Ingardena*, in: *Dziedzictwo etyki współczesnej*, p. 303; D. Radziechowski, *Filozoficzna koncepcja kultury Romana Ingardena i Karola Wojtyły. Studium analityczno-krytyczne*, Kraków 2021, p. 318; W. Stróżewski, *O swoistości sposobu istnienia człowieka*, in: *Roman Ingarden a filozofia naszego czasu*, ed. A. Węgrzecki, Kraków 1995, p. 129; W. Stróżewski, *Wartość jako sposób istnienia*, in: *Dziedzictwo etyki współczesnej*, p. 28; A. Węgrzecki, *Antropologiczna perspektywa etyki Romana Ingardena*, in: *Dziedzictwo etyki współczesnej*, p. 31, 40.

6 This thesis is present in the majority of works cited above (footnotes 4, 5).

7 See e.g. D. Radziechowski, *Filozoficzna koncepcja kultury Romana Ingardena i Karola Wojtyły*, op. cit.; A. Bator, *Intencjonalność sztuki w filozofii Romana Ingardena i Mieczysława*

formation for further attempts to develop Ingarden's anthropological and axiological thought. We will argue that one of the possible starting points is to compare Ingarden's and Wojtyła's critiques of Max Scheler's ethics and find their "common ground".

My paper has the following structure:

- indicating the position of Scheler's philosophy in our research perspective and justifying this perspective;
- analyzing Ingarden's critical arguments against Scheler's ethics and anthropology;
- analyzing Wojtyła's critical arguments against Scheler's ethics and anthropology;
- Summarizing the results of our analysis. A conclusion and research perspectives.

Max Scheler's standpoint and a justification for our research perspective

In our perspective, Scheler's philosophy, and more precisely his ethical system, plays a secondary role. It is not of interest to us from a substantive point of view, but merely as a point of reference for its critiques⁸. However, the subject Scheler referred to became the framework for the encounter of Ingarden and Wojtyła who, while formulating their critical arguments, did not discuss them with each other, nor did they inspire one another in any other way. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that with his philosophy,

Alberta Krąpcza, op. cit. One can also come across references to the comparisons of Wojtyła and Ingarden's critiques of Max Scheler's philosophy. However, they are merely allusions, and the issue has not been elaborated on as yet. See e.g. J. Galarowicz, *W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności*, p. 90. Jan Galarowicz indicates that both Wojtyła and Ingarden criticized Scheler for his view on the powerlessness of the human spirit. Tadeusz Biesaga alluded to Wojtyła's critique of particular problems in Scheler's philosophy in *Karola Wojtyły krytyka koncepcji osoby Maxa Schelera*, "Logos i Ethos" 47 (2018) no. 1, p. 181–197.

⁸ Therefore, to those who study Scheler's philosophy, our analysis will be of no use or, at most, only marginally indicate certain difficulties that Scheler encountered.

Scheler unwittingly contributed to an intellectual encounter between Ingarden and Wojtyła⁹.

In the final part of this paper, I will compare Ingarden's and Wojtyła's critical arguments of Scheler's theses. We find this juxtaposition (and its conclusions) to be legitimate as critiques often — and this is the case here — contain categories and ideas regarded by their authors to be true and fundamental. By analyzing and collecting such notions, it will be possible to identify “the common ground” between the two, seemingly so different, philosophers. We consider finding this common ground to be crucial for further developing and revising Ingarden's philosophy, his anthropology, and axiology (axiosphere)¹⁰ in particular.

In my analysis, I have used the following sources. In the case of Roman Ingarden, these are the so-called Lviv lectures¹¹. Of course, Ingarden referred to Scheler in many other works, both directly (e.g. in his Krakow lectures)¹² and indirectly, e.g. in his essay *O naturze ludzkiej*¹³.

However, it is only in the Lviv lectures that he broadly, yet quite precisely and systematically critiqued Scheler's ethics and, partially, anthropology¹⁴.

9 There is yet another *quasi*-argument for juxtaposing the two Polish philosophers and choosing Scheler's philosophy as their “venue” (though we treat it more as a curiosity bordering on counterfactual history). We may conjecture what Ingarden would have written in his review of Wojtyła's habilitation thesis. Had the communists not suspended Ingarden in his academic activity, he would have been a perfect reviewer of Wojtyła's work on Scheler. However, Wojtyła defended his thesis at the end of 1953 (though, for political reasons, the communist authorities did not consider this sufficient to confer a degree) and Ingarden returned to his academic work only after the Polish thaw, i.e., three years later.

10 See A. Borońska, *Aksjmosfera w rozważaniach Romana Ingardena*, in: *Spór o istnienie świata. W 40. rocznicę śmierci Romana Ingardena*, ed. W. Słomski, p. 127–143.

11 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, in: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, Warszawa 1989, p. 9–117.

12 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady krakowskie*, in: R. Ingarden, *Wykłady z etyki*, p. 119–401.

13 R. Ingarden, *O naturze ludzkiej*, in: R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, Kraków 1972, p. 23 (par. 4.).

14 It should be noted that also in his essay on responsibility (see R. Ingarden, *O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych*, in: R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, p. 126), Ingarden points to remarks relevant to our topic in relation to Scheler, which would coincide with Wojtyła's remarks. However, we cannot, within the framework of the article, overextend the texts under analysis, especially since the indicated essay is ambiguous from the side of philosophical anthropology — so it would require clarification, which would require a separate paper.

We need to note that Ingarden's later comments on Scheler (i.e., after the Lviv lectures) are basically consistent with his critique made in Lviv in 1931. While studying his critical remarks, we do not want to examine Ingarden's positive ideas regarding axiology or an ethical system that, ultimately, he did not devise. We do not mean to say that these are trivial issues. We merely do not intend to include them in our argumentation as we want to focus on the similarities present in the critiques, and not the similarities evident in their positive statements in ethics, axiology, and anthropology. Even though comparing Ingarden and Wojtyła's positive programs is undoubtedly valuable, in this article we find it irrelevant. Also, until now, such attempts have not borne satisfying results that would contribute to developing Ingarden's ethical, axiological, and anthropological thought.

In the case of Wojtyła, there are more systematically compiled written sources available. However, they are narrower thematically and examined from a different methodological perspective. A broader critique of Scheler that included both what Wojtyła valued in his ethics and what he found to be its flaws, was part of Wojtyła's lectures in Lublin¹⁵. As regards the thematic scope of interest to us, the content of these sources is consistent with critical remarks regarding Scheler's philosophy that one can find in other philosophical works by Wojtyła from the 1950s¹⁶.

15 K. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures. Wykłady lubelskie*, transl. by H. McDonald, Lublin–Roma 2020.

16 Above all, these are: K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maxa Schelera*, Lublin 1959 (in part. *Tezy końcowe*); K. Wojtyła, *Ewangeliczna zasada naśladowania. Nauka źródeł Objawienia a system filozoficzny Maxa Schelera*, "Ateneum Kapłańskie" 55 (1957) issue 1, p. 57–67; K. Wojtyła, *O metafizycznej i fenomenologicznej podstawie normy moralnej (w oparciu o koncepcję św. Tomasza z Akwinu oraz Maksa Schelera)*, "Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne" 6 (1959) issue 1–2, p. 99–124; K. Wojtyła, *Problem oderwania przeżycia od aktu w etyce na tle poglądów Kanta i Schelera (Studium)*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 5 (1955–1957) issue 3, p. 113–140; K. Wojtyła, *System etyczny Maksa Schelera jako środek do opracowania etyki chrześcijańskiej*, "Polonia Sacra" 6 (1935–1954) issue 2–4, p. 143–161; K. Wojtyła, *W poszukiwaniu podstaw perfekcyjizmu w etyce*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 5 (1955–1957) issue 4, p. 303–317 (in part. p. 309 et seq.); K. Wojtyła, *Zagadnienie woli w analizie aktu etycznego*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 5 (1955–1957) issue 1, p. 111–135. See also the unpublished text by K. Wojtyła, *Nauka św. Tomasza z Akwinu o miłości (Referat wygłoszony w KUL, na akademii ku czci św. Tomasza 7.III.1954)* in the Archives of the Metropolitan Curia in Krakow, reference number:

Ingarden's critical remarks

We shall present Ingarden's critical remarks according to their division in his works, i.e., the order of the lectures he delivered. Ingarden discussed Scheler's views in lectures IX to XX that he delivered from 20th February 1931 to the 7th May 1932.

Lecture IX was a general introduction to Scheler's axiology. Ingarden obviously classifies Scheler as a representative of idealism and objectivism in axiology or, broadly, in ethics¹⁷. Moreover, the following statement is worth mentioning as it is consistent with Wojtyła's views:

Theories that relativize ethical values are usually put forward in order to show that so-called "objective" ethics, i.e., to be more precise, a system of legitimate and universally binding ethical norms, is impossible. Therefore, it is crucial for normative ethics to prove that relativistic theories of values in general, and ethical values in particular, are wrong¹⁸.

In lecture IX, Ingarden also states indirectly that according to Scheler values exist in an ideal way¹⁹, which he repeats in the next lecture²⁰. While attempting to determine the way values exist and placing them between intentional and real modes of being (his ontology did not allow for a specific mode of existence), Ingarden necessarily rejected the standpoint that values can exist ideally.

AKKW CII-3/59-AKKW CII-3/59c. In this text, Wojtyła compares the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas with Scheler's views and expresses various critical remarks regarding the latter. Even though *Wykłady lubelskie* are our main point of reference, we give a list of other works by Wojtyła as they correspond with each other. In the case of Ingarden we could follow suit. However, his criticism of Scheler is not laid out in his works clearly enough to make it possible for us to refer to it without additional analysis and explanation of the context.

17 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 51.

18 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 51.

19 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 51. He directly speaks of it in lecture XV: "Scheler distinguishes a) values as ideal qualities, i.e., something that exists ideally, b) values executed in goods, that is those that exist in a real manner" (p. 70).

20 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 53, 54 (lecture X).

However, Adam Węgrzecki, an expert in Scheler's philosophy, disagrees with the interpretation that to Scheler values exist in an ideal manner²¹. As we have already said, we do not intend to discuss Scheler's philosophy. However, Węgrzecki's opinion confirms Ingarden's repeated objection to Scheler's philosophy that it is vague and based on imprecise terms.

It is only in lecture XI that Ingarden clearly formulates his charges against Scheler:

1. Scheler's is either unclear or inconsistent as regards the meaning of the term "a substrate of a value"²².
2. Scheler does not put forward arguments to prove his thesis that values differ from emotional states or from volitional-appetitive urges²³.

In the case of "substrate of values" Ingarden says that Scheler does not define this term precisely, which leads to the two mutually exclusive "solutions": either a value is a property of things (which Scheler rejects) or, as Ingarden puts it:

the relation between a valuable thing and a value remains unclear. Moreover, it is difficult to grasp why a thing is valuable if a value does not appertain to it and is merely a kind of ideal quality²⁴.

The above remark is important as it does not refer only to Scheler's system nor is it merely a methodological allusion. When we look at the whole lecture, we can notice that Ingarden seems to leave the field of ontology, still unspecified by him at that time, and enters the area of metaphysics. This is analogous to the situation in the essays that make up his *Książeczkę*

21 A. Węgrzecki, *O absolutności wartości etycznych i estetycznych*, in: *Fenomenologia Romana Ingardena*, p. 422.

22 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 55. These statements are based on the following excerpts: M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, in: *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* Hrsg. E. Husserl, Bd. 2, Halle a.d.S. 1916, p. 40.

23 Ingarden was also against identifying values with such states or attitudes. Nonetheless, he claims that Scheler's views are groundless. R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 56.

24 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 55.

o człowieku. This is also the basis of Póltawski's thesis about "Ingarden's metaphysical testament"²⁵.

Objection 2. is part of a broader, already mentioned, critical remark that in the subject area of specific interest to us Scheler was imprecise and unclear.

In lecture XII, apart from minor remarks about the lack of examples or minor ambiguities that can be explained, there are no critical remarks.

However, Ingarden's critique can be found in lecture XIII. Here again, he emphasizes the insufficient explanation of what is meant by "greater" or "lesser" in the case of values²⁶; also, what is the status of and what kind of acts are those that Scheler calls "*das Vorziehen* (I prefer this than that)"²⁷.

There are two reasons for the above remarks. First, it is simply a lack of clarity of Scheler's viewpoint. The second refers to the actual existence of values that are hierarchical. In his lectures (IX–XX), Ingarden never enters the field of ontology. Let us then move slightly with Ingarden toward metaphysics.

Ingarden makes a remark that is of interest to us:

By personal values Scheler means all values that appertain directly to a person. On the other hand, values of things appertain to tangible goods (Scheler overlooks the difference between the broader and the narrower understanding of "good")²⁸.

We can see above that the good and values are differentiated and that the good itself varies. We shall not attempt to define the problem of good in Ingarden's philosophy. However, in the perspective of Ingarden and Wojtyła's philosophies, the distinction Ingarden makes is important to us.

In lecture XIV, Ingarden develops his critique of the ambiguities of the hierarchy of values that Scheler proposes, or to be more precise, of the principle that governs the position of values in this hierarchy. He explicitly

25 A. Póltawski, *Metafizyczny testament Romana Ingardena*, op. cit.

26 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 63–64.

27 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 64.

28 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 64–65.

states that “*all these* statements about the ‘superiority’ or ‘inferiority’ of one group of values in relation to another are unclear and inaccurate”²⁹.

It is similar in the case of lecture XV. However, here Ingarden also discusses the problem of the existence of values. On the basis of the whole lecture, one may conclude what he means by actual existence. What is more, he remarks that depending on existential solutions (ideal existence, real existence, or both), the optics regarding the realization of values (that is the optics regarding an ethical act) change. This is important to us in light of the critique made twenty years later by Wojtyła.

In lecture XVI, Ingarden indicates difficulties related to the solution adopted both by George Edward Moore and, independently, by Scheler as regards the term “good” — they consider it to be a quality that is absolutely simple and, as such, indefinable³⁰. Ingarden does not perceive Moore’s approach as problematic, for the British analytical philosopher merely says that so far all attempts to define the term have failed, and he does not draw any positive conclusions from it. Scheler, on the other hand, claims that even though it is impossible to define the term “good”, its designatum, that is “the value quality of ‘good’ can be grasped in direct a priori cognition”³¹. Even though Ingarden does not say it explicitly, it is clear that he wants to point to the problematic character of Scheler’s approach. For if I do not know what “good” means, how can I claim that I have found the designatum of this term or of its derivative? Ingarden continues his critique in this direction in lecture XVII³². However, he does not add anything important enough for us, therefore, we will not discuss it.

Lectures XVIII, XIX and XX are in principle entirely devoted to criticism of Scheler. We shall elaborate on two critical remarks that are relevant. Ingarden asks about the scope of the terms “appertaining” and “revealing itself” in relation to values and being, i.e., does a value reveal itself in a thing or does it appertain to it? Ingarden rejects the possibility that these two expressions are equivalent. Nevertheless, he claims that they may

29 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 66.

30 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 73–74.

31 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 74.

32 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 75–77.

intersect³³. Here practical and metaphysical layers of Ingarden's critique manifest themselves as he elaborates on problems related to ethical life, i.e., to actual ethical acts and good that is executed (Scheler does not determine their definition, mode of manifesting themselves, or appertaining to things).

Nor does Scheler determine the foundations of practical ethical choices. Ingarden remarks that if we accept Scheler's understanding of the process or act of executing values, it is possible to interpret it in such a way that the scope of ethical acts is highly narrowed or they are almost unfeasible³⁴. Moreover, Ingarden spots a difficulty related to this unclarity (which Wojtyła elaborated on): cognizing values does not have to be rational according to Scheler. However, Ingarden does not point to emotional cognition (which Wojtyła precisely does), but says that what we have here are *Scheler's statements that are somewhat unclear*.

Ingarden does not mean simply unclarity and possible misunderstanding that may arise, but ethics as practical philosophy, that is a human being in a real world. Ingarden, as if, underlines our conclusion, and states that it is exactly the problem of actual ethical choices and actual experience of values that is, due to theoretical vagueness, "Scheler's weakest point"³⁵.

In a broader perspective, the above objections reveal a general flaw of Scheler's ethical system (of which Ingarden implicitly speaks in lecture XX)³⁶: Scheler creates a "theory" of ethical actions determining the *a priori* conditions of its realization. Ingarden claims that ethical actions would be almost impossible under such conditions. For Scheler does not begin with a fact, but with structures that are to *a priori* condition our future acts.

To sum up, Ingarden's main criticism of Scheler refers to:

- difficulties regarding definitions and terms;
- existential status of values;

33 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 78.

34 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 79–80, 81–82.

35 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 82.

36 R. Ingarden, *Wykłady lwowskie*, p. 83–84.

- translating problems 1. and 2. into practice, i.e., the lack of clarity regarding ethical acts³⁷;
- the very possibility of performing ethical acts by real people.

Wojtyła's critical remarks

Let us now turn to Wojtyła who raises three fundamental objections to Scheler's ethics, axiology, and anthropology. According to the author of *Person and Act*, Scheler does not begin with the actual ethical act. Wojtyła thus comments on this:

Now, here the phenomenologist comes forth with a qualification which would seem either to place man's real ethical life entirely beyond the competence of his system, or else would lead to a revision of precisely this concrete presupposition of the system. Namely, Scheler holds that the efficacy of the person cannot be affirmed on the basis of phenomenological experience³⁸.

When we compare this quotation from *Wykłady lubelskie* with the conclusions that Wojtyła drew in his habilitation thesis, it is clear that Scheler's phenomenology as a method and system seems unsuitable for examining ethical acts and can only **marginally** be used in ethical studies³⁹, as it

37 It is obvious that for Ingarden the foundations of practical ethics were: 1. Theoretical ethics and 2. Normative ethics. On their basis he even made drafts of certain positive solutions. However, we think it a bit exaggerated to argue that "he managed to develop an outline of theoretical ethics and normative ethics" (P. Duchliński, *Epistemologiczne i ontologiczne założenia wypowiedzi normatywnych w etyce teoretycznej Romana Ingardena. Analiza semiotyczno-fenomenologiczna*, in: *Oblicza doświadczenia aksjologicznego. Studia i rozprawy*, eds. P. Duchliński, G. Hołub, Kraków 2011, p. 265). On the other hand, one can refer to a scathing, though not unjustifiable, critique by Andrzej Niemczuk that can be summarized as follows: Ingarden never solved problems to which he pointed in his text *Czego nie wiemy o wartościach* [What we do not know about values] (see. A. Niemczuk, *Ingardenowska koncepcja wartości: analiza i krytyka*, in: *Spór o Ingardena. W setną rocznicę urodzin*, ed. J. Dębowski, Lublin 1994, p. 125–138; R. Ingarden, *Czego nie wiemy o wartościach*, in: R. Ingarden, *Przeżycie, dzieło wartość*, Kraków 1966, p. 83–127). In this paper, however, we are interested in Ingarden's remarks regarding practical ethics.

38 K. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures. Wykłady lubelskie*, p. 52.

39 We think that special attention should be paid to this "marginality" as there are some who think that *according to Wojtyła, a phenomenological method is an indispensable tool in*

opens one up to the experience of values. Wojtyła adds that “Thus, however, the conception gives the lie to experience instead of taking experience into account and serving the interpretation of experience”⁴⁰. This inability to see a person’s efficacy in the ethical act seems to be the main objection to Scheler’s proposal⁴¹. In Wojtyła’s eyes, this flaw discredits it as far as further ethical studies are concerned.

Wojtyła also says that Scheler should not be accused of intentional reductionism that results from e.g. phenomenological assumptions. Nevertheless, what Scheler does postulate is separating “the ethical experience”, i.e., a problem from the field of the psychology of values — from “the ethical act”⁴².

Another fundamental objection to Scheler’s ethics, an objection that supports what we have just said, is a value’s indifference to existence⁴³. When we bear in mind the metaphysics that Wojtyła adopts, this metaphysical difficulty makes it impossible for him to treat Scheler’s system as applicable to ethical studies. His system is therefore reduced to a theory of values. Also, it makes it impossible to derive a norm of conduct from it, which leads us to the third main objection: the lack of a normative system

the philosophical inquiry (A. Póltawski, *Po co filozofować? Ingarden — Wojtyła — skąd i dokąd?*, Warszawa 2011, p. 190). Wojtyła explicitly stated that Scheler’s ethical system based on the phenomenological method may indeed be useful in ethical studies (of both Christian ethics and ethics in general). However, “it can only **marginally** [underlined] be used in developing research on Christian ethics” (K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera*, in: *Karol Wojtyła. Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, ed. T. Styczeń et al., Lublin 1991, p. 123; K. Wojtyła, *Zagadnienie woli w analizie aktu etycznego*, p. 135). In principle, Wojtyła does not speak of methods of philosophical inquiry in general. However, if we were to point to tools he would find indispensable in such an inquiry, it would be methods of Thomism, not phenomenology. The juxtaposition of the views of St. Thomas and Scheler in Wojtyła’s texts proves our point (esp. see *ibid.*, p. 134; K. Wojtyła, *Nauka św. Tomasza z Akwinu o miłości*, part 4. subpt. a-b).

40 K. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures. Wykłady lubelskie*, p. 54. See also: K. Wojtyła, *W poszukiwaniu podstaw perfekcjonizmu w etyce*, p. 312.

41 See more of this argumentation in: K. Wojtyła, *O metafizycznej i fenomenologicznej podstawie normy moralnej*, p.114–115; K. Wojtyła, *Problem oderwania przeżycia w etyce*, p. 125 et seq.; K. Wojtyła, *Zagadnienie woli w analizie aktu etycznego*, p. 119, 132.

42 See K. Wojtyła, *Problem oderwania przeżycia w etyce*, p. 125 et seq.

43 K. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures. Wykłady lubelskie*, p. 367–368.

makes it impossible to issue sensible statements about ethical acts. Relying on the experience of values does not — and cannot — lead to norms. And Scheler makes no such claims. However, he argues that values demand to be executed, which does not translate into the existence or the shaping of norms⁴⁴.

Wojtyła proceeds to analyze in detail the above difficulties and shows on what planes they occur:

a) The conception of *materiale Werte* constitutes an explicit attempt to restore the objective character of the philosophy of the good, but this is a timid objectivism that remains within the boundaries of the theory of cognition without passing over to the positions of the philosophy of being. b) Hand in hand with this weak objectivism goes the intentionalism of Scheler's philosophy of value, which upon closer investigation turns out to be a certain form of idealism. In this case, the primary concern is not the irreducibility of values to "things", but rather indifference to existence. On this account, values are irreducible to being. c) From the point of view of ethics, the weakest point of Scheler's system is the complete divorce of values, of the good, from truth. The purely emotionalistic intuitionism precludes the person's rational, efficacious and creative role in the formation of the morality of his actions⁴⁵.

Summing up Wojtyła's critical remarks, we should note that in principle they belong only to the philosophy of being and to the practice of the ethical life of a person.

Apart from the above critical arguments, Wojtyła directed more remarks against Scheler's ethics and anthropology. However, a detailed examination of this issue would require a separate study. For the purposes of this paper, the above arguments suffice.

44 See more of this argumentation in: K. Wojtyła, *Ewangeliczna zasada naśladowania*, p. 64–66; K. Wojtyła, *O metafizycznej i fenomenologicznej podstawie normy moralnej*, p. 114, 116–117, 124; K. Wojtyła, *System etyczny Maksa Schelera*, p. 160–161.

45 K. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures. Wykłady lubelskie*, p. 367–368.

Summary of both critiques and conclusions

Let us recall the four critical issues that Ingarden raises against Scheler:

- difficulties regarding definitions and terms;
- existential status of values;
- translating problems 1. and 2. into practice, i.e., lack of clarity regarding ethical acts;
- the very possibility of performing ethical acts by real people.

As we can see, Ingarden and Wojtyła raise similar issues that Scheler's philosophy must encounter if it is to be the basis of examining actual ethical acts or building a system of norms. It is worth underlying that what Ingarden has in mind is a real, actual human being. In places where Ingarden could not find solutions to terminological problems in Scheler, Wojtyła tried to explain them; in this regard it would be difficult to find similarities in their critiques.

The second similarity between Ingarden and Wojtyła's critiques refers to the metaphysics of values. Wojtyła raises the following objection:

The conception of *materiale Werte* constitutes an explicit attempt to restore the objective character of the philosophy of the good, but this is a timid objectivism that remains within the boundaries of the theory of cognition without passing over to the positions of the philosophy of being⁴⁶.

Interestingly, it is at the same time an objection to Ingarden who drew from the axiologies of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann and is also considered to be a representative of the materialistic philosophy of values. However, Ingarden himself saw this part of his philosophy to be problematic.

Due to our perspective, we could show a similar or sometimes even identical direction and scope of these two critiques. This allows us, in line with Étienne Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity⁴⁷, to draw conclusions regarding similarities in the philosophies or views on reality of these

46 K. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures. Wykłady lubelskie*, p. 367.

47 I have discussed this principle in: K. Petryszak, *The Perspective of Archival Discoveries in the Study of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy*, "The Person and the Challenges. The Journal of

two philosophers. We do not want to settle ultimately if it is possible to show similarities and, if so, of what kind. We think that certain tensions noticeable in Ingarden's essays on anthropology and axiology mean that he might have noticed the insufficiency of his ontology and phenomenology as regards man and values. Consequently, he perceived more than he could explain in the world with his methodological framework. His intuitions in this regard could be consistent with the outlook on reality that Wojtyła displayed in his work and life. Alas, due to Ingarden's death, his inquiry would come to a halt. It is, therefore, our duty to further develop the challenges that he left behind. My objective in this paper has been to show one of the possible starting points of such research. It is with Wojtyła's philosophy that we can attempt to supplement (which has already been suggested by scholars of Ingarden and Wojtyła) and correct issues (anthropological in particular) that Ingarden left incomplete.

As regards a future research perspective, it is important that Wojtyła created a complete anthropology, while Ingarden's is an outline with a few crucial issues that remain vague⁴⁸. The anthropological clarifications, i.e., those regarding the metaphysics of man and metaphysics in general, will make it possible to attempt to complement and correct Ingarden's ethics, axiology, and anthropology.

In the above juxtaposition of these two philosophers, it is clear that not simply a comparison of their critiques of Scheler is legitimate. Their common ground, seen in the context of the whole philosophical thought of Ingarden and Wojtyła, gives hope that with the ethics, axiology (or agathology), and anthropology of the latter, we can complement Ingarden's philosophy, elevating it from the cold and static realms of ontology to the world of living, dynamic beings.

Theology, Education, Canon Law and Social Studies Inspired by Pope John Paul II" 13 (2023) no. 2, p. 122–126.

48 It is worth mentioning that some scholars perceive Ingarden as a continuator of the post-Cartesian tradition, while others think that he overcomes this tradition. Zob. np. J. Ciszewska, *Osoba ludzka a świat wartości w filozofii Romana Ingardena*, in: *W kręgu filozofii Romana Ingardena*, eds. W. Stróżewski, A. Węgrzecki, Warszawa–Kraków 1995, p. 185.

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Abstract

Roman Ingarden and Karol Wojtyła's reading of Max Scheler

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the criticism that Roman Ingarden and Karol Wojtyła made of the ethical system proposed by Max Scheler. On the basis of the indicated similarities in the two critiques, the article defends the thesis that the anthropological and ethical solutions proposed by Wojtyła can complement or develop the anthropology proposed by Ingarden.

Keywords: Karol Wojtyła, Roman Ingarden, Max Scheler, ethics, anthropology, philosophy of man, phenomenology

Abstrakt

Odczytanie Maks Schelera przez Romana Ingardena i Karola Wojtyłę

Celem artykułu jest analiza krytyki Romana Ingardena i Karola Wojtyły wobec systemu etycznego zaproponowanego przez Maks Schelera. Na podstawie wskazanych podobieństw w obu krytykach artykuł broni tezy, że zaproponowane przez Wojtyłę rozwiązania antropologiczne i etyczne mogą uzupełniać lub rozwijać antropologię proponowaną przez Ingardena.

Słowa kluczowe: Karol Wojtyła, Roman Ingarden, Max Scheler, etyka, antropologia, filozofia człowieka, fenomenologia

