The application of the phenomenological method as an element of the analysis of moral experience according to Paolo Valori

Paolo Valori was an Italian Jesuit living in 1919–2003 who, for many years, taught ethics, phenomenology, and metaphysics at the Pontifical Gregorian University, the Pontifical Lateran University, and the Sapienza University of Rome. He was one of the first Italian scholars to become interested in the thought of Husserl. He belonged to the group of researchers of the so-called second wave of Italian phenomenology. He cooperated with Professor Angela Ales Bello in establishing the Italian Centre for Phenomenological Research in Rome. Years of studies, including those spent in the Leuven Archives (where he translated several manuscripts into Italian and French), resulted in several dozen publications on the views of Edmund Husserl (especially the comprehensive monograph of 1959 which was the second in Italy2 and the suggestion for applying them in the studies on ethics of 19713).

1 This text is an extended version of the lecture given at the conference In Search of a Hidden Phenomenology which was held at The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow on 19–20 May 2022. In this text I present a broader analysis of Valori’s concept, which I have recently written about in a different context here: T. Mietelski, Paolo Valori on Searching for Truth Everywhere as a Feature of Christian Philosophy, “Forum Philosophicum” 28 (2023) no. 1, p. 181–195.
2 Cf. P. Valori, Il metodo fenomenologico e la fondazione della filosofia, Città di Castello 1959.
Obviously, the very fact of applying the phenomenological method in analysing ethics was nothing new. Such analyses were already carried out by Husserl, although it was mainly done in unpublished manuscripts, as a result of which some scholars claimed that Husserl was not dealing with such topics. However, the texts by Alois Roth⁴ or Ullrich Melle⁵ revealed the presence of such concepts in Husserl’s views. And the father of the classical concept of phenomenological ethics is, of course, Max Scheler.

What, then, is original about Valori’s approach? The idea of using the phenomenological method as one element of a broader analysis of moral experience. In his approach, this analysis proceeds in four steps, which also mark sections of this text. The first step is to determine the background of the moral fact with the help of human sciences; the second step is a phenomenological analysis of moral experience; the third step marks the search for the ontological foundation of the results obtained. In this way, the analysis reaches an end from the philosophical point of view, but it can be continued within the scope of moral theology, which is an additional, fourth step of the process.

**Studying the background of analysis with the help of human sciences**

The first step in the study of morality is to define the background of the analysis with the help of the sciences which Valori defines (in Italian) as *scienze umane*, commenting that he means those sciences which, in German culture, are called *Geisteswissenschaften*. And he lists such disciplines as sociology, empirical psychology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, linguistic analysis, cultural anthropology, semantics, ethnology, historiography, political economy, political science, and religious studies⁶. Such an ap-

---

The application of the phenomenological method as an element... 69

proach is justified, since a moral act is understood by Valori as “a free and conscious act of a man, aiming at moral value or lack thereof, that is [...] to fulfil or not to fulfil one’s own or another person’s dignity”7. With such an understanding of the moral act, in order to judge a given behaviour, it is necessary to understand it from both the external and internal side. This can be done through social sciences at the external and objective level, and through psychological sciences at the internal and subjective level8. Valori says: “thus, human sciences are not only useful, but necessary for ethics: by changing our view of anthropology, and they cannot fail to influence our axiology as well”9.

Nevertheless, these sciences do not, according to Valori, capture the totality of moral experience, but only its empirical-sensory aspect. They cannot resolve conflicts of values, they do not reveal the drama of moral choices, they do not explain the phenomena of moral life, they do not turn to the future, but they serve to verify the deeds that have already been done10.

According to Valori, the limitation of human sciences is the creation of interpretation keys that are too easy, as a result of which they totalize and monopolize the reality despite its complexity11. Valori particularly reaches for the analyses related to neopositivism, sociology, structuralism, and psychoanalysis in order to show that they reduce the meaning of moral experience. At the same time, their results are worth incorporating into phenomenological analysis. He writes: “there is no doubt that a moral fact is inextricably linked to the dynamics of emotional reactions, social pressures, linguistic-ethnological structures, and the introjection of ancestral

8 Cf. P. Valori, Significato e metodologia della ricerca morale oggi, p. 76.
9 P. Valori, L’esperienza morale, p. 251.
10 Cf. P. Valori, Significato e metodologia della ricerca morale oggi, p. 77.
11 Cf. P. Valori, Il fenomeno e la natura delle scienze umane, p. 357.
and parental prohibitions. Only that from all these conditions it emerges as a specific, irreducible remnant”¹².

Thus, it is necessary to move to the second step, i.e. the analysis of moral experience with the use of the phenomenological method.

**Phenomenological analysis of a moral experience**

This second step begins with defining the concept of experience. According to Valori, it is “a direct and receptive contact with the reality captured in its essence and meaning”¹³. Thus, it concerns the extension of the concept of experience, which is typical of phenomenology¹⁴.

The second moment of the phenomenological step is the analysis of the phenomena of a moral experience. The first class of moral phenomena that seem necessary to consider are valuing judgements. Contrary to Kant and some of his successors, Valori recognises that the phenomenon of duty is secondary. The primary phenomenon is that of valuing judgements¹⁵ and, more specifically, judgements related to inner experience, since judgements related to outer experience, although they appear to be universal, would not be able to refer to values if they were not connected to consciousness first. Therefore, Valori adopts the methodological principle of the priority of a personal experience. He says: “philosophical analysis, including the analysis of moral phenomena, is, in a way, a philosopher’s personal fact, even if he is intellectually and compassionately united with the whole human experience in intersubjectivity”¹⁶.

Valori defines the ethical valuing judgement as “an experienced, existential act, rooted in the very human condition, in which the subject — while

¹² P. Valori, *L’esperienza morale*, p. 94.
¹³ P. Valori, *L’esperienza morale*, p. 121.
¹⁶ P. Valori, *L’esperienza morale*, p. 128.
searching for the reason and meaning of his life — expresses the value of those actions which seem to establish or enrich that meaning”17. Moral life is a search for the good, but this search is a free choice of a person: “moral valuing is a free act in relation to a free action, mine or that of others, but such a free act presupposes the affirmation of a value that transcends and normalizes me”18. Thus, ethical valuing is free, personalistic, existential, normative, and objective.

Starting from the analysis of inner consciousness and extending it by intersubjective communication makes it possible to conclude that “the valuing ethical judgement has its own peculiarity, i.e. it expresses a particular recognition of the free conduct of a human being as such; it expresses a relation not to ability, physical strength, external success, or conformity to social, political, family, religious law, etc., but to the dignity of a human person precisely because he is a person”19.

The phenomenon of ethical valuing is related to the acts of preference, choice, and regret, as well as the phenomenon of duty, although, as has been said, Valori does not consider it central even though it often comes to the fore and appears as the guiding motif of morality. In order to grasp moral experience in its entirety, a phenomenology of valuing and a phenomenology of duty are necessary. A valuing judgement has a static, theoretical, and contemplative dimension, while a duty judgement has a dynamic, active, and practical dimension20.

The analysis of value judgements, acts of preference and choice, the phenomena of regret and duty, leads Valori to recognise the existence of a specific moral experience characterised by the perception of the value of “a specific human being as a person, in and for himself […], acting or not acting according to his unique and inalienable dignity, according to a greater or lesser faithfulness to the authentic meaning of his life”21. It

18 P. Valori, L’esperienza morale, p. 132.
19 P. Valori, L’esperienza morale, p. 137.
20 Cf. P. Valori, L’esperienza morale, p. 139–150.
21 P. Valori, L’esperienza morale, p. 161.
is, therefore, not just about the communal dimension (legal-social experience), the relationship with the deity (religious experience), human activity (aesthetic experience), let alone the man in his empirical conditions (psychological, social, biological, and economic ones). A moral phenomenon appears as non-reducible to other types of phenomena, and a moral value emerges “from all its empirical conditioning […] and yet denotes a quality of human action when it is truly in conformity with the dignity of the person”

Therefore, the distinction of moral experience allows us to move on to the third moment of phenomenological analysis, namely the affirmation of the existence of a specific type of value, i.e. moral value.

Valori suggests a definition of moral value which sees it as “an excellence or quality inherent in the human act (internal or external) when it appears authentically human, consistent with the dignity of a person, and corresponding to the most profound meaning of their existence”

What is good, therefore, is “that behaviour which makes a human being feel valued, whereby the human being is understood here not as an abstract […] but as a real, specific, individual person existing in the intersubjectivity of people” In other words, “the dignity of the human being […] constitutes the essential criterion of any moral judgement. Behaviour or action, whether individual or communal, is honest as long as it fulfils this dignity.”

According to Valori, his concept resolves all the aporias concerning value, especially its ontological status, because his ethics is founded on the most solid and richest reality, i.e. on a person. The philosopher in question regards the person not as what he actually is, but as what he will become if he wishes, following an inner dynamism in order to fulfil himself and live an authentic life. The horizon of ethics is therefore ideal since it cannot

23 P. Valori, *L’esperienza morale*, p. 179.
25 P. Valori, *Significato e metodologia della ricerca morale oggi*, p. 79.
be fulfilled completely. However, it is real because it has as its object the existence of a specific person with his individual biological, psychological, sociological, and economic conditions, and with his supreme qualities such as dignity, rationality, freedom, and capacity to love. This ethics embraces the person as existing in its reality, but open towards the infinite possibility\textsuperscript{27}.

Such a phenomenology of moral experience is, to some extent, autonomous and self-sufficient, intuitive, and direct, and, as such, it does not require proving beyond the intrinsic obviousness\textsuperscript{28}.

The necessity to proceed to moral ontology

Nevertheless, Valori is aware of the fact that phenomenological ethics has serious limitations. It excessively separates value from being and good. Another serious problem is the excessive separation of emotional intuition from the power of reason, and the thesis of the ideal existence of value\textsuperscript{29}. However, the greatest weakness of the phenomenology of moral experience is that, from a cognitive point of view, moral experience and the value of the person can be learned through phenomenology, but their ultimate reason cannot be explained without ontology. Phenomenological analysis, according to Valori, reveals the existence of an unconditioned, inalienable, absolute dignity of the person, but it does not explain the ontological roots of this dignity; “it does not thematize the ontological foundation of such value”\textsuperscript{30}. In other words, on the basis of phenomenological analysis, it is possible to conclude that killing an innocent person is wrong because it is an action against the dignity of the person, but it is impossible to explain why the person has this dignity.

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. P. Valori, L’esperienza morale, p. 188.
\textsuperscript{29} Cf. P. Valori, Lezioni di filosofia morale, p. 53f.
Therefore, ontological justification is needed. However, this raises the question of the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics. According to Valori, strictly speaking, phenomenology “faithful to its methodological canons is not metaphysics, and it cannot be metaphysics without betraying its most authentic inspiration. It is the first step of philosophical knowledge, necessary but not sufficient; and it must remain so in order to be consistent with itself”\textsuperscript{31}. In his opinion, phenomenology did not set itself the goal of being ontology in the powerful meaning of the word, that is, in the classical-realistic sense. Valori concludes, citing Stanislas Brenton, that phenomenology as a method ignores ontology in the strict sense of the word\textsuperscript{32}.

In terms of the construction of a doctrine, i.e. an attempt to understand reality, phenomenology seems not only to ignore (in the sense of remaining neutral), but even to positively exclude ontology. In this sense, says Valori, phenomenology would be transformed into a form of speculative idealism which would be original in that it would be methodological. However, even if traces of such a conviction can be found in Husserl’s texts, according to Valori, it does not seem to represent “the authentic philosophical force of phenomenology and its real interests”\textsuperscript{33}. It is because Valori believes that, while interpreting Husserl’s thought, we should pay more attention to the \textit{ani-mus} permeating his work than to some occasional claims. And the a\textit{ni-mus}, in his opinion, is not the positive exclusion of ontology.

Valori notes that certain elements of the phenomenological method could be a prelude to a pure view of being. Such elements include intentionality, approaching obviousness as presence, discovering eidetic structures, \textit{ep-ochè} or transcendental intersubjectivity. Phenomenology would, therefore, in this sense, be a prelude or preparation for ontology. But how can this be reconciled, Valori asks, with the stated ignoring of ontology? He answers to this question in the following manner: if one accepts phenomenology in

\textsuperscript{33} P. Valori, \textit{Il metodo fenomenologico e la fondazione della filosofia}, p. 199.
its moderate form, that is, leaving aside extreme theses that do not seem to belong to its essence (*epochè* in the gnoseological sense or the too far-reaching distinction between consciousness and being), it can provide privileged access to the truth of apparent existence. After closer analysis, says Valori, it turns out that phenomenology “not only does not exclude ontology, but it is clearly heading towards it, even if it did not want to or could not reach it”\(^\text{34}\). At the same time, however, Valori disagrees with Alwin Diemer who argued that phenomenology is a metaphysical system rather than a method\(^\text{35}\). He admits him to be right in that one cannot speak of methodology without some form of metaphysics, but he thinks that the problem should be formulated differently. Valori asks: is metaphysics in Husserl to serve methodology, or the other way round? And he leans towards the first possibility\(^\text{36}\). Phenomenology, in his view, does not set itself the task of searching for the ultimate reason of reality, even if it opens the way for metaphysics. The first task of phenomenology is the observation and hermeneutics of the data present in intentional consciousness. Even if, says Valori, this will lead to the constitution of the transcendental Self, even if it takes metaphysics into account — it will always be within the function of phenomenology, and not the other way round\(^\text{37}\). Therefore, phenomenology “can build a useful and perhaps necessary propaedeutic of a critical ontology, which, of course, is not explicitly defined, nor easily definable”\(^\text{38}\).

\(^{34}\) P. Valori, *Il metodo fenomenologico e la fondazione della filosofia*, p. 199–201.
From the methodological point of view, it is therefore legitimate to proceed to the third step of analysis, i.e. to ontology, which, however, does not invalidate phenomenological analyses. For Valori the moral fact appears as the first in the epistemological order, although the authentic experiencing of this fact leads to the discovery of metaphysical truths, such as freedom, the person, openness to the Absolute, which are the first in the ontological order. The phenomenological moment and the metaphysical moment are different but not separated from each other; they are two moments of one philosophical process. Valori maintains that “a correct ontology and, a fortiori, metaphysics of ethical life [...] cannot fail to require this radical, phenomenological questioning of order, lest we remain at a dogmatic and pre-critical level.” It is phenomenological analysis that allows the further introduction of the concepts of norm, purpose, law, value, nature, good, and love into the philosophical system. Phenomenological analysis can enrich, explain, and justify metaphysics.

The first moment of ontological analysis is to examine contemporary ethical systems that presuppose the existence of moral value and its transcendence over an empirical fact but assume its foundation on an ontological system that is, in his view, inappropriate. Every modern ethical system is metaphysics, claims Valori, because by absolutizing certain elements of reality it puts them “in place of the old God.” Atheistic humanisms, however, do not protect the fundamental principle of moral life, namely the absolute primacy of the person. Marxism subjects the person to the collective, rationalism to reason, while in Sartre’s existentialism the person is “arbitrary freedom that begins and ends in the case”.

Hence, after examining the wrong solutions, the second moment of ontological analysis is to answer the question of what characterizes phenomenological ethics founded on ontology. In Valori’s opinion, it has the

40 Cf. P. Valori, *Significato e metodologia della ricerca morale oggi*, p. 78.
41 P. Valori, *L’esperienza morale*, p. 11.
44 P. Valori, *Significato e metodologia della ricerca morale oggi*, p. 81.
following features: it is anti-naturalistic in that it does not reduce moral value to a biological, psychological, psychoanalytic, emotive, and sociological fact; it avoids every form of rationalism, whether idealist-Platonic or formalist-Kantian; being objective, it is not objectivist. From the positive side, in turn, it is a personalistic, communal, existential ethics that is open to the Absolute\textsuperscript{45}. It should “fund value, understanding it as a reflection, for human consciousness, of the transcendent structures of being, since they express perfection and therefore appear worthy of respect and love”\textsuperscript{46}. However, from the methodological point of view, it takes into account the contribution of human science, placing its results in the context of the moral ideal; it is based on moral experience; it is inspired by Christianity, but not in order to imitate it, but rather to update this inspiration; it takes into account current ethical discussions, not in order to follow other solutions, but to discern whether they may include some valuable elements which make it possible to grasp the moral ideal better\textsuperscript{47}.

The opportunity to continue the analysis within moral theology

In ontology, the analysis of moral experience in Valori’s concept reaches an end from the philosophical point of view. The ontological discourse does not, on the one hand, release us from the preceding scientific and phenomenological analysis of moral value and fact, as well as their practical content, i.e. laws, norms, customs, rights, and obligations\textsuperscript{48}. On the other hand, the discourse may be continued in theology. Also, moral theology does not wipe out the results of scientific and philosophical analyses, nor is it a gap-filler.

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. P. Valori, \textit{L’esperienza morale}, p. 239f.
\textsuperscript{46} P. Valori, \textit{Per un discorso ontologico concreto}, Roma 1967, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{47} Cf. P. Valori, \textit{L’esperienza morale}, p. 240f.
\textsuperscript{48} Cf. P. Valori, \textit{Può esistere una etica laica?}, p. 27.
Valori believes that the philosophical opening to the Absolute will remain incomplete if it is not fulfilled in a real, existential, supernatural, and supra-rational encounter with God. It is a qualitative leap made by faith, and it transcends science and philosophy. Valori argues that, in order to accept the Revelation, there is no need to go through previous degrees of moral reflection, but, at the same time, the response of faith does not make scientific, phenomenological, and ontological analysis redundant\(^{49}\). The philosopher in question believes that “value is based on being, so the affirmation of absolute moral value cannot fail to include a reference to the ontological Absolute”\(^{50}\). Secular ethics, i.e. autonomous ethics that disregards the existence of God, is, according to Valori, possible at the gnoseological-phenomenological level and at the ontological — direct and proximate — level. It is not possible, however, at the indirect and ultimate ontological level. He argues that the phenomenological analysis of moral experience leads to showing that “moral value finds its gnoseological criterion and closer ontological foundation in human dignity”\(^{51}\). However, it finds its ultimate foundation in the reference to the Absolute\(^{52}\).

In Valori’s view, ethical analysis is thus situated at the intersection of different points of view: human sciences, the phenomenology of experience, moral ontology, and, as the final horizon, faith, and its reflective analysis, i.e. theology.

It is worth noting briefly at the end some of the objections that can be made to Valori’s concept, in particular those traditionally made to both phenomenological method and material ethics. These include the following doubts: What exactly is the object of phenomenological analysis? Does it capture real reality, or rather its representation in consciousness? What is the ontological status of values? Do they exist realistically, ideally, intentionally or in yet another way? What is the ontological status of the person? What is human dignity? What is its definition? Valori is aware of

\(^{49}\) Cf. P. Valori, *Significato e metodologia della ricerca morale oggi*, p. 71, 81.

\(^{50}\) P. Valori, *Può esistere una etica laica?*, p. 23.

\(^{51}\) P. Valori, *Filosofia morale: questioni conclusive*, p. 16.

\(^{52}\) Cf. P. Valori, *Significato e metodologia della ricerca morale oggi*, p. 81.
some of these objections, and he tries to provide an answer, but he fails to notice all of them. He is aware of the difficulties involved in phenomenological reduction and in bracketing the data of the natural approach. He is also aware of numerous aporias concerning values and he attempts to solve them in an original, though not always sufficient, way. He does not address the definition of dignity or the ontological status of the person in a broader manner. Valori’s adoption (following Scheler) of a kind of updating concept of a person makes it possible to ask the questions: what if the development of a person does not take place? As a free subject, he may not want to fulfil his or her dignity. What happens then with their personal status? What about the people who, with no fault of their own, fail to update their worth?

Conclusion

The analyses carried out in this text led to the following conclusions. First, Valori understood Husserl’s phenomenology mainly as a method of philosophising that allows one to accurately and faithfully capture and describe the reality, and to take into account the many factors that define it. For this reason, he concluded that the phenomenological method could be applied to the study of morality, and he made it one of the elements of the analysis of moral experience. In Valori’s view, phenomenology understood in this way can also serve as an introduction to metaphysics.

Second, by moving to moral ontology, Valori wanted to complement phenomenology with a metaphysical system. He does not say that he is referring to classical metaphysics, but his suggestion of ontology based on phenomenology shares many features with this suggestion. Without going into detail, as this exceeds the subject of this text, it can be said that similar theses on phenomenological method and metaphysics were put forward in Poland by Karol Wojtyła and Tadeusz Styczzeń53. Such a juxtaposition is in-

---

teresting insofar as it is unlikely that at the time they published their texts, Valori on the one hand and Wojtyła and Styczeń on the other knew each other’s views. Therefore, one can therefore speak of a parallelism between the Italian and Polish interpretations of Husserl’s thought and its application to the study of morality.

Third, Valori modifies the requirement of the presuppositionlessness of phenomenology. The lack of assumptions seems to be the absence of certain specific presuppositions. However, for Valori, presuppositionlessness is the absence of the presuppositions of classical metaphysics in the epistemological order, since starting from the establishment of a system closes the possibility of dialogue. Therefore, in this approach, presuppositionlessness is a way of questioning other views and means that, at the starting point, the background for phenomenological analysis is provided by the results of the human sciences. Then the analysis should then be complemented by an ontological justification, taking into account the fallacies of rationalism, collectivism, and existentialism. The final stage may also include the incorporation of the theses of moral theology into the analysis. This procedure by Valori can be described as a modification of the postulate of presuppositionlessness towards interdisciplinarity, which is an original development within the phenomenological method.

Fourth, this framing of interdisciplinarity also establishes an interesting research perspective. Valori did not explicitly talk about including the results of neuroscience and cognitive science into his analysis. This is obvious, as he was writing in the last century, when these disciplines were not yet ultimately defined. However, the development of neuroscience is undoubtedly a challenge for today’s philosophy and, in particular, ethics. While it is clear that the results achieved in the study of the human brain can be incorporated into the analysis of moral experience, it seems necessary to define stricter rules regarding interdisciplinarity, especially its role and place in the normative framing of ethical issues.

To summarise these considerations, it can be said that Valori understands phenomenology first and foremost as a philosophical method. He appreciates this method because it allows for a comprehensive and faithful description of reality. For this reason, he makes this method one of the most important elements of his conception of the analysis of moral experience.

References


Abstract

The application of the phenomenological method as an element of the analysis of moral experience according to Paolo Valori

The purpose of this article is to present the application of the phenomenological method as one of the elements of the analysis of moral experience in the view of Paolo Valori (1919–2003). In his approach, such analysis proceeds in four steps. The first is the identification of the background of a moral fact with the help of human sciences; the second step is the phenomenological analysis of moral experience; the third step marks the search for the ontological foundation of the results obtained; in this way, the analysis reaches an end from the philosophical point of view, but it can be continued within moral theology, which is the fourth step of the process.

Keywords: Paolo Valori, phenomenology, ontology, ethics, moral experience

Abstrakt

Zastosowanie metody fenomenologicznej jako element analizy doświadczenia moralnego według Paolo Valori

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie zastosowania metody fenomenologicznej jako jednego z elementów analizy doświadczenia moralnego w ujęciu Paolo Valoriego (1919–2003). W jego ujęciu analiza taka przebiega w czterech krokach. Pirmowym jest identyfikacja tła faktu moralnego za pomocą nauk humanistycznych; drugim krokiem jest fenomenologiczna analiza doświadczenia moralnego; trzeci krok oznacza poszukiwanie ontologicznego fundamentu uzyskanych wyników; w ten sposób analiza dobiega końca z filozoficznego punktu widzenia, ale może być kontynuowana w ramach teologii moralnej, która jest czwartym etapem procesu.

Słowa kluczowe: Paolo Valori, fenomenologia, ontologia, etyka, doświadczenie moralne