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**The ideology of rashism as a basis for
the transformation of ethical principles
of journalism during wartime**

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A journalist cannot be required
by an official order to write or do
anything that contradicts his or her
own beliefs or principles.
(Code of ethics of a Ukrainian journalist)

Abstract

The ideology of rashism as a basis for the transformation of ethical principles of journalism during wartime

The article examines the main basis of ethical dilemmas facing journalists in the context of Russia's attack on Ukraine. A comparative analysis of the attitude to journalistic ethical principles of media workers in the two countries is made. The modern standards of Ukrainian journalists are highlighted, which are based on the Code of Ethics of a Ukrainian Journalist (2013 edition) and the regulatory recommendations of the Commission on Journalistic Ethics (2022). The systematic departure from the Code of Ethical Standards of Russian journalists and their involvement and service to the state propaganda machine are also analyzed. This article uses a combination of research methods, including comparative content analysis of Ukrainian and Russian journalistic practices, discourse analysis of selected media materials, and normative analysis of the codes of journalistic ethics in both countries, and documented case studies of media behavior since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This normative-comparative framework makes it possible to identify key ethical principles, examine their (non)application in practice, and highlight the ideological forces that shape wartime journalism in both countries. This should not only cause indignation in the world community of journalists and their complete exclusion from the media field and a ban on any participation in covering events abroad. A brief history and reasons for the ethical decline of Russian journalism are given. The main types of violations of journalistic ethics in the Russian media are listed. In addition to the strong pressure on freedom of speech, the weakening of ethical norms is caused by the involvement of journalists in imperial ideas. It is determined that society and journalists as a part of it largely agree with the ideas of the government. The main reason for the service of Russian journalism to the political regime today is the ideology of rashism, which gives the Russian people a "special civilizational mission," deprives the enemy of human features, and puts propaganda in the place of truth. It is concluded that Russian journalists not only violate ethical norms but also, in cooperation with the regime and the Russian Orthodox Church, become co-creators of a new type of propaganda based on the ideology of rashism. Ukrainian researchers emphasize the concept of "ethical man," which should be the first place for a journalist and every citizen during war. The behavior of Russian journalists in the conditions of Russia's attack on Ukraine is called the cultivation of anti-ethics at the cost of human lives. The author calls such activities genocide against the Ukrainians. The consequences of the main violations are incitement of hostility and the treatment of the Ukrainian military and civilian population as subhuman, the consequences of which are torture and brutal murders. Rashism is called the reason for the transformation of the ethical principles of journalists on both warring sides, the ideology

that leads to war, forces Ukrainian journalists to create principles of self-regulation for new circumstances based on the Code of Ethics, and for Russian journalists become the reason for the rejection of the ethical tenets.

Keywords: ethics, anti-ethics, propaganda, imperial ideology, rashism

Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine poses a challenge for the world, particularly for journalists, to once again address the issue of media ethics during wartime. The media are crucial in shaping public opinion and unifying society during military conflicts. However, they have a special responsibility to adhere to professional standards and ethical norms, as any violations can have serious consequences for society and state security. The primary ethical challenge for the media in wartime is balancing professional standards with the national interests and the interests of each citizen. However, the view of the nature of war as a difficult test for collective and personal conscience raises the issue of journalistic ethics particularly acutely—as something that can save lives. Ukrainian researchers emphasize the concept of “ethical man” (Tolstov & Moskvín, 2023, p. 15), which should be the first place for a journalist and every citizen during war.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, although it forced the adaptation of traditional ethical standards of the media to the new situation, did not reject the observance of professional standards of journalistic ethics. Rashism as the state ideology of the Russian Federation, based on the ideas of the “special civilizational mission” of Russians and intolerance toward other peoples, created unprecedented challenges for the work of journalists around the world, especially for Ukrainian journalists in the combat zone. Issues of information security, protection of public interests, and preservation of professional standards when covering military events with an enemy that does not adhere to international law in waging war are of particular importance.

However, despite all the difficulties of the situation, Ukrainian journalism continues to adhere to ethical standards in reporting information in Ukraine and abroad, which cannot be said about Russian journalism. In both cases, the ideology of rashism is the main reason for the transformation of ethical standards. In the case of Ukrainian journalism, this transformation takes place in compliance with the Code of Ethics of Ukrainian Journalists, and in the case of Russian journalism, with complete disregard for the Code of

Ethical Standards of Russian Journalists. Although both codes define honesty and impartiality as the main ethical requirements in the work of journalists.

To better understand the ethical divergences in journalism under wartime conditions, this article is structured into three distinct parts. The first part focuses on Ukrainian journalism and its ethical self-regulation mechanisms amid the war. It examines how Ukrainian journalists navigate between national responsibility and professional integrity, and how media institutions enforce ethical standards even during martial law. The second part analyzes the ethical collapse of Russian journalism under the influence of rashist ideology—a blend of imperialism, totalitarianism, and religious fundamentalism. This part highlights how journalism in Russia has become an active instrument of state propaganda and moral disinformation.

Such a division helps clarify the contrasting logics of media practice in Ukraine and Russia and avoids conceptual overlap between two fundamentally different journalistic environments. It also allows for a more precise examination of how ethical commitments are either upheld or systematically undermined depending on the political and ideological frameworks in which journalists operate.

The third section is devoted to analyzing how rashism displaces truth and what role journalism plays in this process.

The dilemmas of Ukrainian journalists during Russia's attack on Ukraine: Ethical struggle with unethical rashism

The ethical foundation

Thus, traditional journalistic standards undergo significant changes during wartime. If earlier, even in modern journalism theory, the emphasis was on the balance of opinions as a mandatory element, now giving the aggressor a chance is equated with creating an artificial balance. This means giving a platform to terrorists, which is no longer ethical. At the same time, according to journalistic ethics, even during wartime, journalists must maintain honesty in reporting information. “Lying for the sake of victory, hiding the truth is just as harmful as misleading for the sake of any other goal, no matter how noble it may seem” (Kuz'menko et al., 2023, p. 4).

The a priori involvement of a journalist with some ideological, political, religious, commercial, or other doctrines can be tantamount to lying. An analysis of the activities of Russian journalists shows systematic involvement and service to the state propaganda machine. This should not only cause indignation in the world community of journalists and their complete exclusion from the media field and a ban on any participation in covering events abroad. However, at the same time, one cannot call the activities of journalists from the country that was attacked biased if their materials talk about the aggressor and the victim, and not about two warring parties or two participants in the conflict. Honesty precisely requires a journalist to call all parties to the conflict by their names. From this it follows that journalists (of Ukrainian and foreign publications) should avoid pseudo-involvement, that is, understand the situation well enough to provide reliable information to recipients.

Respect for the public's right to full and objective information about facts and events is the first duty of a journalist, as stated in the Code of Ethics of a Ukrainian Journalist. The reason why it is worth continuing to tell the truth even during the war is the deepening of problems through silence, according to the Commission on Journalistic Ethics of Ukraine, which bases its activities (2001) on the Code of Ethics of a Ukrainian Journalist (two editions—2002 and 2013). It even examines the features of self-regulation of Ukrainian media during the period of martial law in Ukraine in a collection dedicated to the activities of journalists and media in the period after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 (Kuz'menko et al., 2023). The collection examines specific examples and even issues warnings to journalists and their editorial offices for violating the Code (Kuz'menko et al., 2023).

Self-regulation and professional standards

On the one hand, wartime conditions impose objective restrictions on freedom of speech: not to report operational details of the movement of troops, equipment, hits, and destruction after enemy strikes, not to show the faces of fighters, not to talk about planned, postponed or canceled operations, about military units, methods, and tactics of their actions. On the other hand, the problem that requires self-regulation is the attitude toward the enemy and "concern for the safety of the audience" (Kuz'menko et al., 2023, p. 3), especially those who are under occupation. The Commission on Journalistic Ethics

as truthful and timely information that saves lives (Kuz'menko et al., 2023) defines the essence of professional standards. Therefore, the Commission explains the terminology in detail, for example: the concept of "invasion" is narrower and is used to describe an attack by the Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine. The concept of "armed aggression" includes both invasion and actions not directly related to the crossing of the state border by armed forces. The Commission on Journalist Ethics emphasizes the inadmissibility of double standards, even regarding information about the enemy and prisoners of war, and encourages adherence to neutral vocabulary and the use of terms contained in Ukrainian legislation and international law.

Special attention is paid to the issue of human dignity:

Every person deserves respect and dignity even after death. ... A journalist always has an alternative, how to show a tragedy and remain within the limits of compliance with professional ethics standards (Kuz'menko et al., 2023, p. 15).

It is important to note that the current legislation does not contain separate norms regarding professional and ethical standards of journalists' activities in the war zone, which emphasizes the importance of the work of professional organizations and the expert community in establishing and monitoring such standards. In war conditions, the role of self-regulation of the media community increases, and "imposing certain restrictions contributes to the fulfillment of professional duties" (Kuz'menko et al., 2023, p. 2).

Limits and responsibilities

The Commission on Journalistic Ethics emphasizes that in times of war, as in times of peace, compliance with journalistic ethics is a condition for high-quality professional journalism: it is unacceptable to justify violations of the Code of Ethics by wartime circumstances (Kuz'menko et al., 2023), and even vice versa, to adhere to journalistic ethics even more carefully during wartime:

- Use correct terminology when covering offenses; do not spread assumptions or unproven accusations under the guise of facts.
- In publications about offenses, do not mention signs that determine the identity of a person or group of people (race, nationality, region of

residence, disease, etc.). Crime has no nationality or “attachment” to a specific region.

- It is unacceptable to divide Ukrainians into “us” and “them,” especially in times of war. The media should refuse to rebroadcast stereotypes that incite interethnic, interregional, religious, and other enmity; and form a biased negative attitude toward a certain group of people.
- Comprehensively cover the lives of certain social groups, giving a voice to the representatives of these communities.
- Avoid simplified options, analyze facts and phenomena that concern the audience in more depth, and help them understand the real reasons for events.

Russian journalism during Russia’s war against Ukraine: ethical decline as complicity with the regime

From censorship to total control

The Russian constitution theoretically provides for freedom of speech and the press. However, the Russian government has introduced numerous laws that make it difficult for journalism to be independent. Although the history of Russian journalism over the past century has repeatedly experienced the oppression of freedom of speech and has chosen to serve as propaganda. The first legislative act of the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution in Russia was V. Lenin’s “Decree on the Press,” according to which newspapers were closed that “called for disobedience to the government,” “sowed unrest by slanderous distortion of facts,” “called for actions of a criminal nature.” That is, any objectionable media could be accused and closed. The basis of Soviet propaganda was the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, and the nature of propaganda changed with the historical development of the USSR.

Since the early 2000s, anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda in Russia has been carefully developed and implemented through journalism, film production, songs, humor and satire, and the printing of propaganda books. A telling example of this “democratic”—as international geopoliticians called it—period is the films “Brother” and “Brother-2,” which contain propaganda of Ukrainophobia, terrorism, and rashism.

Since 2012, at the beginning of Vladimir Putin's third presidential term, legislative measures have been introduced to ease censorship, which has led to a situation in which journalists must carefully navigate between professional ethics and potential legal consequences. Since 2014, Russian propaganda has become openly totalitarian. At the same time, a document regulating the professional activities of media workers in Russia exists. The Code of Professional Ethics of a Russian Journalist, approved by the Congress of Journalists of Russia on June 23, 1994, in Moscow, establishes clear requirements for professional standards. According to this document, as well as most codes in the world, a journalist is obliged to disseminate and comment only on information of which he is confident, making every effort to avoid causing harm due to incompleteness, inaccuracy, or deliberate concealment of socially significant information.

State media and war propaganda

The systemic deterioration of professional standards and ethical norms reached its peak after the full-scale invasion of 2022. In modern conditions, propaganda in Russia is always openly used in tandem with censorship: censorship cuts off any dissent, and propaganda forces people to think about the interests and goals of the ruling elite. In particular, the status of "foreign agent" has been introduced, which can be applied to anyone who is under "foreign influence," and the definition of this influence is very vague in the law (Radio Svoboda, 2025). The control system has led to the development of a media environment where journalists either face significant pressure to align their coverage with state interests or serve the system at the expense of ethical journalistic principles. Even social media in Russia is under tight control. Roskomnadzor (Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media) requires owners of social media accounts with an audience of more than 1,000 people to provide identification data. Russian lawmakers are discussing a bill that would force owners of accounts with more than 10,000 followers to provide personal data to the federal censor, and failure to comply with the requirements will result in the channel being blocked (Ukrinform, 2024). These measures are part of the Kremlin's broader efforts to eradicate criticism and strengthen control over the Russian information space, where not only media outlets or individual journalists will be subject to censorship but also ordinary citizens.

With such activities, Russia dropped from 155th place to 164th in the Press Freedom Index in 2024 alone. In a record-short time, it created new media outlets designed to spread Kremlin propaganda in the occupied territories of Ukraine. In addition, after the start of the “special operation,” the Russian authorities “cracked down on the last independent media outlets” more severely than ever (Slovo i Dilo, 2024).

The main channels for spreading propaganda today are the largest television channels. Among them, the Rossiya-1 channel occupies a special place as it is a mandatory all-Russian state television channel and the main mouthpiece of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VDTRK). The second most influential is the NTV channel, which belongs to the media division of the state gas giant Gazprom. These channels are actively used to disseminate the official position of the authorities and shape public opinion, demonstrating examples of anti-ethics and complete involvement in pro-government politics not only in matters of Ukraine (Džanpoladova, 2016). However, after a full-scale invasion, they do this with particular systematicity. It can be said that since the Russian economy is put on military rails, the media are focused on propagandistic complicity in the war. In the Russian budget for the first year of a full-scale war, 114.8 billion rubles or 1.7 billion dollars were allocated for financing state media (“Russia-1,” “Russia Today,” TASS, the Ministry of Defense channel “Zvezda”), and for 2025, 1.4 billion dollars (Slovo i Dilo, 2024).

Significantly, at the same time, those Ukrainian journalists believe that the ethical principles of journalism in wartime require significant rethinking, by the new circumstances, but in no way abandoning basic professional standards. Russian journalists, under pressure or knowingly, abandon basic ethics in the service of propaganda.

Ethical codes ignored

Russian journalists violate professional ethics by directly justifying and legitimizing the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, inciting hatred on ethnic, religious, racial, or other discriminatory grounds, blackmail, and threats. Calls to encroach on the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine (and other European states, former Soviet republics) and to violate the borders and state borders of Ukraine, calls to forcibly change or

overthrow the constitutional order and seize state power (Mova i vijna, 2024) became particularly relevant during the war.

Other serious violations of journalistic ethics are as follows:

- deliberate distortion of facts and dissemination of false information, manipulation of content, reuse of old footage to create fake news, staging with actors instead of real people,
- disrespect for human dignity—publishing the names of the deceased before the relatives are officially notified, the consequences of violence, demonstrative mockery of interrogations of prisoners,
- neglect of the standard of separating facts from comments and value judgments,
- unfounded generalizations and conclusions, not supporting them with any evidence or results of sociological research, “pseudo-references” or materials without indicating the sources of information,
- incorrect terminology, assumptions, or unproven accusations,
- division according to the characteristics that determine the identity of a person or group of people (race, nationality, region of residence, disease);
- opposition of “us” and “them,” retransmissions of stereotypes that incite interethnic, interregional, religious, and other enmity,
- depersonalization of the victim by journalists—which can be considered the worst violation against humanity—according to the “logic”: since the Nazis are in power in Ukraine, they are guided by an inhuman ideology; therefore, they do not deserve human treatment, and therefore they cannot be treated as people, that is, they are inhuman.

Due to such violations, Russian journalists become accomplices in the crimes of Russian soldiers and those Russians who support the so-called “special operation,” which in reality is genocide against the Ukrainians.

Tragically, violations of professional standards of journalistic ethics in the Russian media are global, since until recently Russian propaganda was distributed in at least 40 languages of the world in 160 countries.

Ideology instead of truth in the Russian media: rashism as the basis of anti-ethics

Historical and ideological roots

Noting the systemic violations of journalistic ethics and understanding the historical reasons for the constant precarious position of the media in Russia, the question still arises, what can force a person who chose the mission to serve the truth and knows at least about the existence of a professional Code of Ethics to serve the anti-human policy of the government.

Monitoring of the Russian media shows that the Russian Federation uses the same mechanisms and interpretations and produces the same meanings as Nazi propaganda during World War II (Petrenko, 2023).

As we can see, the main problem of Russian journalism is not the lack of relevant codes of journalistic ethics, but “the complexity of their practical implementation and the problems of the quality of ethics in the media and its real impact on human actions” (Drożdż & Drag, 2018, pp. 97–98). Considering the reasons for this situation, we can conclude that the main one that forces us to abandon the mission of journalism is the implementation of the ideology of rashism in Russian journalism in both the ideological and applied sense.

Since 2014, and especially after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the political ideology and social practice of the Russian regime of the late 20th and early 21st centuries has increasingly been called “rashism” (from Russia, “Russia” and “fascism”) or Russian fascism. Indeed, all previous names—Russian imperialism, Russian chauvinism, Russian world—do not reflect the professed ideology and post-civilizational state of Russian society today. The ideology of rashism is built on the idea of a “special civilizational mission” of Russians, a single righteous “elder brother,” the liberation of “brotherly peoples,” intolerance to elements of the culture of other peoples, totalitarianism, and imperialism of the Soviet model, and the use of Russian Orthodoxy as a moral doctrine in geopolitical instruments of influence (Hado, 2022).

Since Russia’s imperial ambitions date back to its founding, society has been shaped for centuries by the ideology of the messianism of the Russians. Ignorance of history or deliberate distortion of facts leads to an unquestioning belief in the idea of the superiority of the Russian “older brother” over the Ukrainians. The Muscovite and later Russian tsars understood well that

without a great past, it was impossible to create a great empire, so they chose the strategy of rewriting their historical past and even appropriating someone else's.

Therefore, undoubtedly

the secret of media manipulation lies not in creating a new language of lies, but in appealing to previously cultivated beliefs. The dream of Russian imperialism, the revival of the great Church, and the fulfillment of a historical mission are enough to justify crimes, rape, aggression, and hatred (Zwoliński, 2024, p. 40).

Media as tool of imperial manipulation

Russian consciousness loses its identity without the imperial component, which has been built up over centuries, and which is the essence of Russian patriotism (Zwoliński, 2024). The unifying factor for the national heterogeneity of Russia is an ideology built on myths and a complete distortion of the history of Rus-Ukraine. The very existence of Ukraine historically crosses out all the foundations of imperial ideology as an older brother, as the cradle of Christianity, and as the founder of the geopolitical order of Eastern Europe.

That is why “the main motive for the actions of the modern Russian state turned out to be the restoration of the empire, in the Soviet version or the times of Peter the Great” (Zwoliński, 2024, p. 40) with the addition of elements of fascism and Nazism, which Russian propaganda ardently condemns. Serving the imperial idea was the main driver of public life in Russia for centuries. For the sake of the desire to live in a new great empire, not only journalists but also religious leaders renounced the truth. Therefore, two significant social forces have long agreed to call what was beneficial to propaganda true (Hado, 2022).

In addition to the strong pressure on freedom of speech, ethical norms have weakened due to the involvement of journalists in imperial ideas. Society and journalists largely agree with the ideas of the government, “giving them a new, effective content—following traditional cultural codes” (Zwoliński, 2024, p. 40). The influence of the Russian government's propaganda on society and journalists is so strong that society and the same journalists themselves “add” the necessary stories to a specific idea. Propaganda simply applies to people's historical experience and allows them to express aggression, anger, and humiliate others, as Russian television hosts do. The ideology

of rashism has become a litmus test for contemporary journalistic ethics not only in Russia. After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it was apparent that international media outlets were under the influence of the charm of Russian imperial ideology. Russia's imperial ambitions, promoted by the propaganda machine, made even supporters of democratic societies admire the great Russian culture and history. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that within the "empire" those who should have been impartial and served the truth as their calling lived by this idea.

Conclusions

The lack of journalistic ethics in the Russian media is not just a professional problem, but a systemic phenomenon that has serious consequences for society and the international community. In the context of Russia's attack on Ukraine, the price of cultivating anti-ethics by Russian journalists is human lives. The consequences of the main violations are incitement to hatred and the treatment of the Ukrainian military and civilian population as subhuman, the consequences of which are torture and brutal murders.

Russian journalists, in cooperation with the regime and the Russian Orthodox Church, are becoming co-creators of a new type of propaganda based on the ideology of rashism. The goal of such propaganda is not to convince, as in classical propaganda, but to create a new information field where the government has a monopoly on the truth, so the truth and history can be rewritten under new political needs. In this case, neither journalists nor society knows which will be the "truth" tomorrow. This makes Russian propaganda especially dangerous and makes Russian journalists accomplices in crimes.

It can be concluded that rashism is the reason for the transformation of the ethical principles of journalists on both warring sides. It is this ideology that leads to war, forces Ukrainian journalists to create principles of self-regulation for new circumstances, and for Russian journalists becomes the reason for the rejection of ethical principles.

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