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# Education for Responsible Freedom in the Teaching of Karol Wojtyła – John Paul II

#### **Abstract**

The purpose of this article is an attempt to show, based on selected excerpts from the works of Karol Wojtyła – John Paul II, the specificity of education oriented towards discovering the truth about a man as a worthy, free and responsible being, in need of upbringing. The performed analyses make it possible to see in responsible freedom, the axiological category and the basic attributes of human existence in its relation to the essence of education, the mature humanity of a person and the present day. They indicate the unquestionable value of the message of Karol Wojtyła -John Paul II, in this regard.

#### **Keywords**

responsible freedom, education, Karol Wojtyła - John Paul II

Education for responsible freedom is an extremely important issue which requires a multi-faceted approach. The very concept of education for responsible freedom is complex and, at the same time, a highly difficult process to describe and implement, especially in today's reality, which is full of contradictions. The concern of John Paul II was to give the world - and consequently all educators - a clear and unambiguous vision of the Church's position on that subject, considering the confusion of competing educational systems. Karol Wojtyła – John Paul II, appreciating the importance and significance of the integral upbringing of a man, addresses that issue in many of his statements, in many aspects, and does not narrow it down to one dimension or plane. Taking into account the personalistic aspect of looking at a man and his integral upbringing, he does not avoid the philosophical, axiological, normative, religious or socio-cultural approach. At the same time, he creates an attractive model and educational interpretation for the whole of Christian pedagogy. In its essence, that model has a universal character, not subordinated to any ideology or socio-political system.

The purpose of this article is to show, based upon selected excerpts from the works of Karol Wojtyła – John Paul II, the specificity of education oriented towards discovering the truth about a man as a worthy, free and responsible being, in need of upbringing. An attempt to answer the following questions will help in achieving the assumed goal:

- 1. How does K. Wojtyła John Paul II define responsibility and what is its essence?
- 2. What was freedom for him and when did it deserve to be called responsible?
- 3. What are the basic dimensions of freedom and what is its connection with national renewal, state sovereignty and moral order?
- 4. When is freedom creative and builds our humanity?
- 5. What makes freedom contradict itself and what does its falsification lead to?

The theoretical exploration of education for responsible freedom requires philosophical, theological, ethical and pedagogical analyses. It is to be hoped that the performed analyses will make it possible to look at responsible freedom as an axiological category and the fundamental attribute of human existence in relation to the essence of education, mature humanity and modernity.

#### 1. The essence of responsible freedom

Karol Wojtyła – John Paul II was a tireless and authentic defender of responsible freedom of man, understood, above all, as the difficult art of creating oneself and taking responsibility for what reality calls a person to do at any given moment on the scale of one's own humanity, Poland and the whole world. He advocated the statement: "I am free when I choose what is good and true". He taught that a person, due to being free, seeks the truth and by finding it, and living according to it, implements his or her own freedom. He believed however, that saying, "I am free", was not enough, but rather stating, "I am responsible". Already during his pastoral and academic ministry in Kraków, Karol Wojtyła taught and wrote about "Love and responsibility"; "man in the field of responsibility"; and "responsible parenthood." He considered responsibility as something most closely related to a person's act, meaning that persons are responsible for their own acts, also in the case of a failure to act. He taught "that one is responsible for an act that should have been performed (a morally good act) and was not performed, as well as for a performed act that should not have been performed (a morally bad act)." He explained that it was the case because, "responsibility is linked not only to the performance of an act but also to the duty to perform it." However, he treated responsibility not only as a category of duty, but also "as an intrapersonal fact experienced in conjunction with conscience, which indicates a dynamic relationship to the truth and assumes the response of the will to the good, to values."

Yet he believed that the mere ability and willingness to respond to values was not enough. A person is responsible "for something", that is, for any value (good) that appears on their path and demands the performance of an act as a recognized and chosen good. That conviction is particularly noticeable in the social encyclicals of John Paul II, in which he stresses that a man is responsible for example, for the growth of authentic freedom<sup>4</sup>, the performed good and the committed bad deeds,<sup>5</sup> the observance of rights of people and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> K. Wojtyła, Miłość i odpowiedzialność, Lublin 1960; 1982; 1986.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> K. Wojtyła, Człowiek w polu odpowiedzialności, Rzym 1991.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> K. Wojtyła, *Rodzicielstwo a "communio personarum"*, "Ateneum Kapłańskie" 84 (1975) no. 1, pp. 17–31; K. Wojtyła, *Odpowiedzialne rodzicielstwo*, Watykan, 17 07 1995.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Veritatis splendor, no. 84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *Veritatis splendor*, no. 61.

nations,<sup>6</sup> the common good, the creation and promotion of decent working conditions<sup>7</sup>, capitalism with a "human face." A man is responsible for genuine development and progress in which all participate,<sup>9</sup> the natural environment,<sup>10</sup> the state and society<sup>11</sup> and various other areas of social life.<sup>12</sup> He taught and emphasised that a person was also responsible "for someone else", i.e. for every "neighbour", due to their participation in common humanity. That responsibility is expressed by, e.g., the preferential option for the poor,<sup>13</sup> protection and support of marriage and family by state institutions and law,<sup>14</sup> responsible fatherhood and motherhood, responsible parental work,<sup>15</sup> parental responsibility for the sexual education of children<sup>16</sup> and adequate preparation of the children for their future life roles.

In the context of what has already been presented, it is worth noting that the book *Love and Responsibility* gives one of the most beautiful definitions of responsibility, referring to the spirituality of St John of the Cross: "The feeling of responsibility for another person can sometimes be full of concern, but it is never distressing or painful. For it is not restriction or impoverishment of a man that comes to the fore, but enrichment and development of a man." Responsibility for others, regardless of their condition or position, was also a clear leit motif of the pontificate of John Paul II.

Bearing in mind the sense of responsibility, he taught that a person, being free from internal and external determinations, is responsible "for himself/herself", that is, for the value born in that person, in a specific "self", together with action. A person performing an act fulfils themselves in that act. In that context, self-determination appears as "the basis of responsibility for one's own

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Sollicitudo rei socialis, no. 36; Centesimus annus, no. 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Centesimus annus, no. 48.

<sup>8</sup> Centesimus annus, no. 42-43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Sollicitudo rei socialis, no. 17; 4, no. 52.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Centesimus annus, no. 37.

<sup>11</sup> Solicitudo rei socialis, no. 46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Centesimus annus, no. 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Solicitudo rei socialis, no. 4; Evangelium vitae, no. 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Familiaris consortio, no. 49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Familiaris consortio, no. 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Familiaris consortio, no. 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> K. Wojtyła, *Miłość i odpowiedzialność*, Lublin 1986, p. 213.

moral value". The responsibility "for" appears most clearly as moral responsibility. It is everyone's responsibility for their own moral development. That type of responsibility is synonymous with the duty of self-determination, self-mastery, self-possession and self-development, that is, self-education.

In the teaching of Cardinal K. Wojtyła – John Paul II, there is another aspect of responsibility to be considered. Apart from the responsibility "for", which is the first one genetically and substantively, there is the responsibility "towards", which presupposes the responsibility "for". The author emphasizes that responsibility "towards someone" is possible due to the personal structure of responsibility towards one's own conscience. Conscience, in its guiding and judicial function, acquires a special authority that "makes it possible to think and speak of conscience as the voice of God". Responsibility "towards someone" is formed and expressed in relation to one's own subject. That "someone", towards whom a person feels responsible, is also that person's own "self". This is an elementary form of responsibility.<sup>20</sup> Responsibility "towards someone" appears and, at the same time, indicates the assignment of a man as a person to the whole world of persons, which "has its own interpersonal and social structure". Within that structure, the need for responsibility "before someone" is one of the bases for the emergence of authority, especially the so-called judicial authority. Within the boundaries of the religious structure, on the other hand, one must speak of responsibility before God. According to Cardinal Wojtyła, responsibility is the sense of truth and the sense of freedom. The experience of responsibility emerges from the recognition of truth. Moreover, the experience of responsibility is the subjective expression of objective responsibility, the recognition of what a man "should" do for others, themselves and God. Co-responsibility, which is based on individual responsibility for the common good, is related to duty. The object of that good may be, for example, the homeland, history, tradition, national culture, religion or education. The common good is the objective reason for joint action. In turn, the subjective reason for such action is the "consideration of the community". Thus, co-responsibility is developed for the sake of the community.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Cf. K. Wojtyła, *Problem teorii moralności*, in: B. Bejze (ed.), *W nurcie zagadnień posoborowych*, vol. 3, Warsaw 1969, pp. 217–250.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, Kraków 1985, pp. 213–214.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Cf. K. Wojtyła, *Perspektywy człowieka – integralny rozwój a eschatologia*, "Colloquium Salutis" – Wrocławskie Studia Teologiczne 7(1975), pp. 133–145; K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, pp. 213–214.

It turns out to be an inevitable consequence of the fact that a person lives and acts in a community of persons. According to Karol Wojtyła, the necessary condition for the existence of responsibility in the interpersonal and social dimension is a bond. It is not only a condition, but also a carrier and guarantor of responsibility for another person. The bond is built through love and in love, a particular expression of which can be found in a poetic drama *The Jeweler's Shop*. <sup>21</sup> Co-responsibility; however, is not collective responsibility in the sense of negating the individuality of a person as the performer of an act Moreover, in that sense, collective responsibility is a negation of co-responsibility.<sup>22</sup>

Summing up that, out of necessity, incomplete analysis, one can agree with the definition of responsibility proposed by W. Starnawski, who, describing the pedagogy of John Paul II, identifies that notion with "a consequence of an obligation to perform and implement an act (causality); responsibility (the experience of responsibility) is associated with conscience and indicates the characteristic feature of the will – responding to values ("I should – I respond"); it is responsibility for value – for the realization of value in some entity; in a particular case, it is responsibility for one's own moral value (responsibility for oneself); responsibility "for value" leads to responsibility "towards someone": it is responsibility in conscience towards oneself, in the ultimate dimension – to God."<sup>23</sup>

### 2. Responsibility vs. education

In this analysis; however, considering the undertaken subject matter, an attempt to show the correlation between responsibility and education cannot be missing. In Wojtyła's teaching, responsibility means the subjective justification of education. The first subject of responsibility in the process of education is parents. Parental responsibility is natural and total; it concerns the integral development of a child. It is, so to speak, a paradigm of all responsibility, since the responsibility of other educators/teachers is contractual and draws its binding force from the contract that parents enter into while entrusting their children to others.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> K. Wojtyła, *Przed sklepem jubilera*, in: K. Wojtyła, *Tutte opere letterarie*, Milano 2001, pp. 762–870.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> K. Wrońska, Osoba i wychowanie. Wokół personalistycznej filozofii wychowania Karola Wojtyły, Kraków 2000, pp. 94–97.

 $<sup>^{23}\;</sup>$  W. Starnawski, *Pedagogia osoby Jana Pawła II. Interpretacja egzystencjalna*, Warszawa 2020, p. 177.

In the process of education, there is a double responsibility: that of the educator and that of the student/pupil. In that context, it can be stated that the goal of education is to develop in the student/pupil an attitude of responsibility. It is responsibility for one's own development through self-education. Education for responsibility should be conducive to forming an attitude of responsibility in the student/pupil, which is a character trait. Such an attitude is characterized by a sense of responsibility and openness to values, as well as readiness to voluntarily take up the responsibility imposed on people by recognized values, along with its fulfilment. D. von Hildebrand, as I wrote in one of my earlier publications,<sup>24</sup> notes that a responsible attitude makes a person's actions predictable, which enables cooperation between people and conditions social life in general. he opposite of a responsible person is a frivolous and reckless person, an unpredictable and untrustworthy one. In the light of the teaching of Wojtyła, it can be said that every human being, by virtue of having reason and free will, is responsible for himself/herself, for another human being and for the whole world. For being a mature man means being responsible. This follows from the fact that for Wojtyła a person was someone, not something. A man is a person by nature, and by nature, a man is entitled to the subjectivity proper to a person. With regard to responsibility as perceived by John Paul II, attention should be drawn to the two ways of understanding it. The first one is responsibility associated with choices made by a man in the light of freedom, and the second one is responsibility for another person, a group of people, a parish community, a diocese and the universal Church. According to Wojtyła, that second way of understanding responsibility is clearly connected with the first one, since every priest, before taking responsibility for the community of people allocated to him, must first make a personal choice, responsibly and in the light of freedom: either he wants to be a priest and pastor or not; either he is capable of undertaking that task or not; either he feels called to handle that task or not.<sup>25</sup>

Starting from that second aspect of taking responsibility for other people, Wojtyła affirmed with his life, the servile character of the priestly ministry. Throughout all the years of his life, he was aware that, while being a servant of servants, he was always responsible for the faithful entrusted to him at the same time. Therefore, he sought to reach out to all his "parishioners", for whom

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Cf. A. Rynio, Wychowanie do odpowiedzialności. Zarys teorii i praktyki pedagogiki integralnej, Lublin 2019, p. 250.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> A. Rynio, Wychowanie do odpowiedzialności, p. 251.

he felt responsible before God. Some accused him of acting like an ordinary parish priest while being the Governor of Christ. In view of the fact that John Paul II indeed felt that he was "a parish priest whose parish is the whole world", as he admitted, such an accusation must be considered unjustified. <sup>26</sup> It should be noted that it was out of the sense of responsibility that all the apostolic journeys of John Paul II, which were a defining feature of his pontificate, resulted. In retrospect, one gets the impression that such responsibility was not a burden for him. That "extension and enrichment with another person" gave him strength and gave meaning to his priestly life. The gift of considering responsibility as enrichment allowed him to carry out pastoral ministry with unprecedented quality.

# 3. Correlation between responsibility and freedom understood as a gift and task

While responsibility was for John Paul II "the indispensable culmination of the fulfilment of freedom", he understood freedom as the Catholic Church sees it, that is, as an integral part of human nature, the right of a man to a free choice, something to which a man has been called. In life, it is expressed according to one's conscience. It is linked to truth and goodness. Moreover, it grows out of truth and is oriented towards the good. It is far from any type of formalism. Nor is it identical to the absence of any norms. It is not only a value for a person, but, similarly to dignity, it is an essential property and indelible attribute testifying to the subjectivity of a man: it is rooted in the interior of a person, it belongs to the nature of a human being and it is a man's hallmark.<sup>27</sup> It is given to a man by God as a measure of their dignity. However, it is also expected of a man. Freedom indicates the qualitative difference of a person from other creatures, which are guided by laws of nature, instincts, etc.

However, not every human being has the ability to grasp the gift of freedom with reason. Freedom is a gift which most people find difficult to recognize and define in depth. Usually, people limit themselves to recognizing the gift of freedom in terms of wanting or not wanting something. Such a way of making choices, in the perspective of shallowly understood freedom, may lead to solutions contradictory to the *Decalogue* and conscience. People are often not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> A. Rynio, Wychowanie do odpowiedzialności, p. 252.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> World Day of Peace 1981, no. 5.

aware of the mechanisms that determine all decisions. In his book *Memory and Identity*, John Paul II demonstrated that people were guided by different criteria every time they made a choice for freedom. Therefore, he tried to sensitize his listeners to the ethical participation of a category of good, which takes place in a human being at the moment a choice is made. Following St. Thomas, John Paul II presented the distinction of good into the decent, useful and pleasurable good. He created an awareness of different motivations guiding a man in the process of approaching the moment of making choice. It all depends on whether people, while making choices in the light of freedom, pursue a decent good, which does not assume personal gain, or whether they make choices presupposing the experience of pleasure or personal gain, not taking into account the decent good which serves the public.

Only responsible choice-making can be a source of human happiness. Reflecting upon the issue of responsibility while making choices, the Pope warned against primitive liberalism as an extreme manifestation of the orientation towards a pleasurable good, beneficial only to the person making the choice, without considering the good of other people and sometimes even against Christian love for another person. It is also difficult not to notice that such liberalism is not a path towards achieving the good even by the person choosing the so-called pleasurable good. John Paul II pointed out that the thought process of utilitarians, assuming the good pleasant for the greatest number of people, could easily obscure the value of a human being, within itself, without the need to achieve benefits. Therefore, referring to Immanuel Kant, he advocated responsible choice in terms of good – the disinterested good.

Moreover, responsibility should go hand in hand with awareness and knowledge. Few people, however, consider motivations while making choices. In that case, a lack of knowledge almost always has negative consequences. Therefore, care should be taken to recognize and respect the gift of freedom of persons. After all, cognition and discernment are burdened with responsibility for the known truth. Yet there is no freedom without responsibility and without love of truth. Hence, if people wish to be free, they must build their freedom on the foundation of objective truth, knowing how to consciously make use of everything that is true good. Following Christ, the Pope reiterated many times that the greatest fulfilment of freedom was love realized through devotion and service. He also often commented that the truly free persons were those who knew how to set limits for themselves and lived according to their conscience. He taught that freedom required generosity and readiness to make sacrifices. It required

vigilance and courage. At the same time, it was an extremely precious value for which one sometimes had to pay a high price.

For John Paul II, freedom was not just "some" kind of value, but an essential property and an indelible attribute testifying to the subjectivity of a person. In 1981, he wrote that freedom was rooted in the interior of a man, it belonged to human nature and is its hallmark. It was a structural ontological element of a man. Authentic freedom was "a special sign of the image of God in a man." <sup>28</sup> The source of freedom. understood in such a way. was the transcendent dignity of a person.<sup>29</sup> He taught that freedom had individual and social dimensions. He called for its respect and responsibility while making use of it in social life. He pointed to its connection with national renewal, state sovereignty and moral order. For John Paul II, freedom was a value conducive to national renewal and true sovereignty of a state. This was particularly emphasized during the Jubilee Mass at Jasna Gora on 19 June 1983, during which he made the listeners aware that "a nation is truly free when it can shape itself as a community defined by the unity of culture, language, history. A state is truly sovereign when it governs society and serves the common good of the society at the same time, and when it allows the nation to realize its proper subjectivity and identity. The above entails creating the right conditions for development in terms of culture, economy and other areas of life of the social community, inter alia. The sovereignty of a state is deeply related to its ability to promote the freedom of the nation, that is, to create conditions to allow it to express its entire historical and cultural identity, i.e., to be sovereign through the state."

He argued that freedom could be creative in social life as long as it was "contained within the framework of a legal system that requires from it service to integral human freedom" and was realized within the limits of the common good and public order.<sup>30</sup> For authentic freedom should build the social order.<sup>31</sup> In the context of contemporary controversies concerning the concept of freedom, he made clear distinctions between genuine freedom and its appearance. While valuing freedom in personal and social life, he mentioned the issue of the criteria of true freedom and its deepest meaning. On 5 October 1995, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, he articulated that problem

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Veritatis splendor, no. 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Fides et ratio, no. 80.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Centesimus annus, no. 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Centesimus annus, no. 13.

very clearly during his speech, saying that "freedom is the measure of human dignity and greatness. Living in the conditions of freedom to which individuals and nations aspire is a great opportunity for the spiritual development of a man and the moral revival of nations."

#### 4. Responsible use of freedom

John Paul II taught that the fundamental issue to be addressed was the responsible use of freedom, both in personal and social dimensions. Freedom is not simply the absence of tyrannical power and oppression, nor does it mean the freedom to do whatever one feels like. He taught that freedom had its inner "logic" that defined and ennobled it: "it is subordinated to truth and is realized in the search for truth. It is detached from the truth about a man; in individual life, freedom degenerates into arbitrariness, and in political life, into the violence of the stronger and the arrogance of power". Treating freedom as a gift and a task, he pointed to its creative dimension in relation to oneself and others, the relationship between freedom and truth, goodness and responsible love, as well as to the exposure of freedom to self-denial. He emphasized that "freedom, disregarding the logic of the moral order, is exposed to self-denial, favouring the process of self-destruction of an individual and whole societies."32 For when "freedom denies itself, it tends towards self-destruction and destruction of the other person, when it ceases to recognize and respect the constitutive bond which binds it to the truth. Whenever freedom, wishing to free itself from any tradition and authority, closes itself even to the original and most self-evident certainties of objective and universally acknowledged truth, which constitute the basis of personal and social life, then a man no longer accepts the truth about good and evil as the sole and unquestionable point of reference for their decisions, but is guided solely by their subjective and changeable opinion or simply by their selfish interest and fantasy."33

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> II M. Sztaba, *Jan Paweł o wolności jako darze i zadaniu w życiu społecznym*, https://www.niedziela.pl/artykul/8200/Jan-Pawel-II-o-wolnosci-jako-darze-i (29.05.2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Veritatis splendor, no. 19.

## 5. Contemporary threats to education for responsible freedom in the dimension of individual and social life

Taking into account the contemporary context of the lack of education for responsible freedom manifested by the screaming crisis of education, subjectivity and the tragic consequences of thoughtless conduct on the part of young people and adults, as well as the lack of respect for the dignity of a person and the value of human life, or the fact of belonging to a family, culture and religion, one should ask about the main cause of the wild-scale escape from true freedom and educational responsibility characteristic of modern times.

In my opinion, that escape is the consequence of a disregard of the essence and importance of freedom, responsibility and education, and wasting time on meeting the challenges of modern social reality. By limiting the influence of school and family on the education of children and young people, with the use of sham reforms, an attempt is made to form a human being suitable for the times in which we live, without taking into account the consequences of neglecting education and blurring the boundaries of freedom and responsibility for others.

However, as rightly noted by Ilona Gołębiewska, "the greatest sin against the principles of responsible education of young generations is the ubiquitous moral permissiveness."34 It is an educational and social attitude in which freedom is treated on an equal footing with consent to any choice, there is unlimited tolerance towards the behaviour of others, and "freedom from" is the main motive for action. The quoted author notes that the basis for educational permissiveness is the desire to overcome the previous authoritarianism and rigorism in the education system, but the changes taking place currently have the opposite effect: the degradation of the role of school and family as educational institutions. Permissiveness understood in that way also affects teachers. More and more often, they do not set requirements, do not support students in their life choices, do not protest against the demanding attitude, fulfil whims, avoid taking the responsibility for the upbringing and education of the young people. However, fortunately, those tendencies are not universal, as a significant proportion of educators fulfil their responsibility for themselves and for their students. Yet, the increasing indifference to values related to the work of teachers and educators has negative consequences. One of them is the formation of a selfish

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> I. Gołębiewska, Kryzys odpowiedzialności pedagoga, "Wychowawca" 10 (2013), p. 16.

young person who, on the threshold of adult life, reveals narcissistic attitudes and is unable to take responsibility for himself/herself and for others.<sup>35</sup> A simple correlation can be noticed: a lack of responsibility of a teacher and educator translates into a lack of responsibility of a student.

At the root of those demoralizing attitudes, there is the interdependence of the crisis of education and responsibility with the crisis of the family and the school. To add to this, if the destructive influence of the media (which more and more often ridicule traditional moral norms and values, justify various forms of violence, destroy true authorities and promote hedonistic values relating to the most primitive human needs) is taken into account, it is no longer surprising that the greatest educational challenge is to sensitize students to values and a proper understanding of fundamental concepts such as truth, good, freedom, dignity, love, subjectivity, education or responsibility.

This was very well understood by St. John Paul II, who warned against the falsification of freedom. He showed his contemporaries the consequences of depriving freedom of responsibility in the dimension of individual and social life, which was aptly described by Fr. Mariusz Sztaba. In his opinion, "The external threat to freedom manifests itself in, e.g., limiting freedom of conscience and denomination, freedom of religion. An external threat to freedom is also the "culture" of moral relativism that falsifies the moral truth and blurs the boundary between the good and evil. It is also any kind of coercion and violence, both physical and psychological, in the form of manipulation of the truth and abuse or misuse of the word "freedom." Finally, intolerance and various forms of ideological discrimination in public life (for example, the so-called public opinion, fashion trends, etc.) also destroy authentic freedom.<sup>36</sup> In turn, the internal threats to freedom arise, in the Pope's view, from ignoring the inner order and logic of freedom. Due to the size limitation of this publication, I omit a detailed characterization of those threats, which take the form of primitive liberalism, a "creative concept of conscience", as well as a mystified authenticity consisting in axiological coherence and faithfulness only to oneself. In addition to this, the method of effective education for responsible freedom and recommendations for contemporary educators will be discussed in my next paper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> I. Gołębiewska, Kryzys odpowiedzialności pedagoga, p. 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> M. Sztaba, *Jan Paweł o wolności jako darze i zadaniu w życiu społecznym*, https://www.niedziela.pl/artykul/8200/Jan-Pawel-II-o-wolności-jako-darze-i (29.05.2021).

Summing up the analyses performed for that article, it is worth noting that the Pope's message clearly shows that responsible freedom is given to us and expected of us, and since it has to be constantly acquired, it implies a gift and struggle.

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