Superweniencja psychofizyczna

Łukasz Kurek

Abstrakt


The aim of this article is two-fold. First, a critical presentation of the concept of supervenience is carried out. In this context, three basic types of supervenience are presented: weak, strong, and global. It is argued that the most useful types of supervenience are its strong, and global versions. Second, a broader analysis of the usefulness of supervenience is undertaken. It is argued that it is a very „flexible” concept, which allows for a variety of different solutions to the philosophical issue of the mind. However, the aforementioned flexibility can be limited by additional philosophical assumptions. Moreover, supervenience allows to augment traditional philosophical investigations concerning the mind with results of empirical findings of such sciences as psychology, or neuroscience. In this context it is argued that supervenience is a „third way” in the philosophical study of the mind.

Słowa kluczowe


supervenience; mind-body problem; explanation; intentionality; Jaegwon Kim; causation

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Bibliografia


T. Grimes, „Supervenience, Determination, Dependency”, Philosophical Studies, 62, (1991).

J. Kim, „Concepts of Supervenience”, [w:] tenże, Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993.

J. Kim, „Supervenience as a philosophical concept”, [w:] tenże, Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993.

D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1986.

J. MacNamara, Logika i psychologia, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1993.

Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Empirical and Conceptual Questions, T. Metzinger (red.), MIT Press, Cambridge 2000.




Copyright (c) 2015 Łukasz Kurek