Urojenia jako rodzaje naturalne: problem homeostatycznych klastrów własności

Bartosz Janik

Abstrakt


The purpose of this article is to analyze the issue of delusions as natural kinds in the context of the problem of scientific basis of psychiatry. In the analysis the author points out that the claim that delusions are a natural kind (perceived rather classically) cannot be maintained and delusions should be analyzed rather as a homeostatic property clusters. This concept is very popular recently in philosophy of psychiatry and will be the subject of analysis of the second part of the article.

Słowa kluczowe


delusions; natural kinds; philosophy of psychiatry; homeostatic property clusters

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Bibliografia


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Copyright (c) 2016 Bartosz Janik