Problem samodzielności stanowiska strukturalizmu czasoprzestrzennego

Autor

  • Damian Luty

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15633/ss.1775

Słowa kluczowe:

structuralism, substantivalism, relationism, spacetime, General Relativity

Abstrakt

The aim of this paper is to place the considerations provided by a philosophical family of positions called “spacetime structuralism” in the context of the debate between classical views: substantivalism and relationism in the philosophy of spacetime. Altough this task was somehow tackled in the past by other researchers, they never stated most generally, what exactly the problem with spacetime structuralism as a standpoint was. I view that problem as the problem of its autonomy and potential reducibility to both of the classical views. I modestly suggest a general viewpoint on spacetime structuralism: as a purely interpretative endeavour.

Biogram autora

  • Damian Luty
    Damian Luty – doktorant w Zakładzie Filozofii Nauki Instytutu Filo­zofii na Uniwersytecie im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu. Przygotowuje rozprawę doktorską Ontologie strukturalne czaso­przestrzeni. Publikował m.in. w „Studiach Metodologicznych”, „Internetowym Magazynie Filozoficznym Hybris”, „Filo­‑Sofii” oraz w kilku wydawnictwach zbiorowych. Kontakt: damian.luty@amu.edu.pl.

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Pobrania

Opublikowane

2016-09-20

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