The pursuit of the good life in the philosophical explorations of Immanuel Kant, Jean Nabert and Paul Ricoeur

Abstract

This article will present the concept of “good life” in the ethics of I. Kant and its criticism by the representative of the philosophy of consciousness J. Nabert and P. Ricoeur. The identification of the pursuit of the “good life” with the pursuit of happiness comes from Greek eudaimonism. In Kant, the achievement of happiness was reduced to obedience to the law. The source of evil is immorality, identified by him as disobedience to the law. The limitations and erroneous assumptions of this formalistic concept were demonstrated by J. Nabert and P. Ricoeur. Nabert accused Kantian ethics of using an abstract notion of freedom and not considering the inner experience. On the basis of Kant’s criticism, Nabert developed his own concept of evil as the unjustifiable and the possibility of overcoming evil through the desire for justification. Ricoeur, in turn, criticised, among other things, the Kantian reduction of all forms of emotionality to the sphere of desire, which closes the way to a meaningful discussion of happiness, suffering or evil. Moreover, he pointed out the flaws in the very reduction of happiness to the “good life.” Against the background of these remarks, we discuss the contemporary limitations of philosophical reflections on good and evil and happiness and unhappiness.