O trzech problemach realizmu naukowego

Autor

  • Michał Pospiszyl

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15633/ss808

Abstrakt

My article consists of five parts. In the first part I concentrate on the problem of realism in its philosophical context, on disputes from which it derives and it corresponds with. Afterwards, I analyze and correct the canonical version of Putnam’s no-miracle argument, viewed as the strongest argument in favour of scientific realism. In the next part, I am trying to confront the objections that can be raised against this type of argumentation. It will relate to an attempt to resolve the three questions, asked from three different perspectives:
1. An empiricist (The Vienna Circle) will ask if the success of the science needs an explanation.
2. Next, a “neutral” anti-realist or a critical realist will investigate: is the presented argument, logically coherent and historically adequate?
3. Finally, a constructionist (The sociology of knowledge / Postmodernism) will ask: is the success (understood as approaching to the truth) of science is a fact, or a (meta)fact?
In the end, I try to explain why I did not succeed in giving unambiguous answer to those three questions.

Opublikowane

2009-12-30

Numer

Dział

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