Metaphysics facing the challenge of post-Wittgensteinian quietism. Perspectives of David Macarthur, John McDowell i Thomas Spiegel

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the scope of the anti-metaphysical claims of Wittgenstein-inspired quietism. Such quietism is commonly understood as advocating the reduction of motivation to resolve certain philosophical problems by interpreting them as merely apparent. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the challenge posed by post-Wittgensteinian quietism in its contemporary, diverse formulations, I examine the views of three philosophers who present original, mutually irreducible concepts: David Macarthur (regarding his views on the anti-metaphysical nature of quietism and its dia­gnostic and reconceptualizing moments), John McDowell (I reconstruct his paradigmatic example of “quietist analysis”), and Thomas Spiegel (I analyze his proposed typology and systematizing remarks). Furthermore, I propose an initial delineation of four stances that proponents of traditional metaphysics may adopt towards such understood quietism: ignoring it (quietism requires no response), accepting the strong version (anti-metaphysical stance), accepting the weak version (anti-theoretical stance), or defending it (arguing against quietism or for the value of metaphysics). Finally, I discuss the potential benefits that post-Wittgensteinian quietism may offer to metaphysics.