John McDowell’s theory of moral sensibility

Authors

  • Weronika Wojtanowska The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.1794

Keywords:

John McDowell, moral reasons, sensibility, values, ethics

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present and analyze John McDowell’s theory of moral sensibility, which successfully grounds ethics in moral reason and values. McDowell’s concept of secondary qualities, serving as a model for values, is one of the most interesting attempts to understand the phenomenon of values and the objectivity of moral requirements.
In his considerations McDowell emphasizes the cognitive nature of moral sensibility, which is defined as the ability to recognize the moral requirements imposed by a given situation, accompanied by the capacity of silencing the non­‑moral reasons. McDowell attempts to combine his reflections on the ontology and epistemology of value with a theory of motivation. He presents a plausible model of motivational internalism, supported by the analyses of the process of upbringing, which plays a vital role in shaping moral practices.
However, McDowell’s theory is faced with serious difficulties, connected with his rejection of the existence of external standpoint and general principles. There might be some doubts whether McDowell’s conception can be regarded as a successful defence of moral realism and cognitivism in meta­‑ethics, since he offers a specific understanding of certain basic philosophical concepts, such as objectivity or knowledge.

Author Biography

  • Weronika Wojtanowska, The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow
    PhD student at the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow. Research field: meta­‑ethics and con­temporary Anglo­‑American philosophy.

References

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Published

2016-10-10

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