Popper’s challenges for materialism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.1916Keywords:
K. R. Popper, mind, internationality, materialism, causal relation, explanation, argument, rational justificationAbstract
The paper aims at presenting and analysing two anti-materialistic arguments inspired by Karl R. Popper. An idea of these arguments was originally presented in his short article Language and the body-mind problem and then repeated in the book The self and its brain. The first of these arguments, the argument from rational justification, is intended to show that any materialist theory of mind which assumes a causal interpretation of mind is unable to account for rational justification of thoughts and, therefore, undermines itself. According to the second argument, i.e. the argument from circularity of causal explanation, there does not exist any purely materialistic, non-circular, causal explanation of intentionality what is standardly required by materialism. In the text assumptions of both arguments are clearly specified and commented on. A brief tentative evaluation of the arguments in question is added at the end of the paper.References
Baker L. R., Metaphysics and mental causation, [in:] Mental causation, ed. by J. Heil, A. Mele, Oxford 1993, S. 75−96.
BonJour L., Against materialism, [in:] The waning of materialism, ed. by R. C. Koons, G. Bealer, Oxford 2010, S. 3−23.
Feser E., Philosophy of mind. A beginner’s guide, Oxford 2006.
Feser E., Aristotle on method and metaphysics, New York 2013.
Feser E., Scholastic metaphysics: a contemporary introduction, Piscataway 2014 (Editiones Scholasticae).
Feser E., Hayek the cognitive scientist and philosopher of mind, [in:] The Cambridge companion to Hayek, ed. by E. Feser, Cambridge 2006, S. 287−314.
Feser E., Hayek, Popper, and the causal theory of the mind, [in:] Hayek in mind: Hayek’s philosophical psychology, ed. by L. Marsh, Bingley 2011, S. 73−102 (Advances in Austrian Economy, 15).
Gertler B., In defense of mind-body dualism, [in:] Reason and responsibility. Readings in some basic problems of philosophy, ed. by J. Feinberg, R. Shafer-Landau, Boston 2007, S. 303−315.
Gibb S. C., The causal closure principle, „The Philosophical Quarterly“ 65 (2015), S. 626−647.
Gibb S. C., Defending dualism, „Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society“ 115 (2015), S. 131−146.
Grygianiec M., Steps towards anti-physicalism, „Logos“ 89 (2016), S. 7−20.
Hüttemann A., Einige Bemerkungen zum Prinzip der kausalen Abgeschlossenheit des Physischen, [in:] Die Suche nach dem Geist, Hrsg. J. Michel, G. Münster, Münster 2013, S. 35−53.
Kim J., Mind in a physical world. An essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation, Cambridge, Mass. 1998.
Lowe E. J., A Defence of non-Cartesian substance dualism, [in:] Psycho-physical dualism today. An interdisciplinary approach, ed. by A. Antonietti, A. Corradini, E. J. Lowe, Lanham 2008, S. 167−183.
Lycan W., Giving dualism its due, „Australasian Journal of Philosophy“ 87 (2009), S. 551−563.
Meixner U., The two sides of being. A reassessment of psycho-physical dualism, Paderborn 2004.
Meixner U., Against physicalism, [in:] Contemporary dualism. A defense, ed. by A. Lavazza, H. Robinson, London 2014, S. 17−34.
Montero B., Varieties of causal closure, [in:] Physicalism and mental causation, ed. by S. Walter, H.-D. Heckmann, Exeter 2003, S. 173−187.
Poczobut R., Między redukcją a emergencją. Spór o miejsce umysłu w świecie fizycznym, Wrocław 2009.
Popper K. R., Language and the body-mind problem. A restatement of interactionism, [in:] Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 7, Brussels 1953, S. 101−107.
Popper K. R., Natural selection and the emergence of mind, „Dialectica“ 32 (1978), S. 339−355.
Popper K. R., Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge, London–New York 2002.
Popper K. R., Eccles J., The self and its brain, New York 1985.
Putnam H., Renewing philosophy, Cambridge 1992.
Wachter D. von, Why the argument from causal closure against the existence of immaterial things is bad, [in:] Science – a challenge to philosophy?, ed. by H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko, S. Philström, Frankfurt am Mein 2006, S. 113−124.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
The following rules apply to copyright:
1. The author declares that he or she has full copyright to the work, and such copyright it is not limited to the extent applicable to this declaration, that the article is an original work and that it does not infringe any third-party rights.
2. The author agrees to a free-of-charge, non-exclusive and non-restricted use of the work by Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow i.e.:
- to record and duplicate: make copies of the work by means of printing, reprography, magnetic or digital storage;
- to circulate the original or the copies of the work (disseminate, lend or lease the original or copies thereof, publicly display, screen or make the work publicly available so that everyone is able to access it at the time and in place they wish to do so);
- to include the work in a compilation;
- the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow may grant sublicenses Creative Commons Acknowledgement of authorship-Non-commercial use-Without derivative work 3.0 Poland
- the author and the title of the work will be listed,
- the place of publication (name of the periodical and an Internet link to the originally published work),
- the work will be distributed in a non-commercial way,
- no derivative works will be created.
The UPJPII Press does not waive any of its copyrights to any target group.
If you want to publish the text in Logos and Ethos, you must sign the license. However, the signing takes place at a later stage of publishing. Check the license: [license_en.pdf]
