’Aκρασία and desire

Autor

  • Timothy Hynes St. John’s Seminary, Brighton, MA

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.1914

Słowa kluczowe:

Ἀκρασία, desire, practical syllogism, socratic intellectualism, backsliding

Abstrakt

Although he does not use the phrase, in Book VII of the Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle contends with the philosophical problem of socratic intellectualism, attempting to unwind the apparent paradox of the ἀκρατής, the man who knows what he ought to do and who fails to do it. As part of this project, he examines the mechanism of the practical syllogism, knowledge in terms of potency and act, as well as ignorance and knowledge. In this essay, I will briefly review Aristotles’ endeavor, emphasizing the role of desire in the practical syllogism. By taking apart the example syllogism he uses, I will argue that desire plays a fundamental role in the deliberative process and functions as a kind of implicit universal premise. In doing so, I will show the interaction between reason and desire and the way in which the latter plays a pivotal part in the conclusion of the practical syllogism. Finally, insofar as desire can be understood as one of the premises of the syllogism and thus a kind of ‘knowledge,’ I will conclude by arguing that moral development consists in reason determining the proper mean for each of the virtues, and that it has an important role in cultivating the emotions, ordering them to the principles of practical wisdom.

Biogram autora

  • Timothy Hynes - St. John’s Seminary, Brighton, MA
    Timothy Hynes is a seminarian studying for the Archdiocese of Boston. He holds bachelor of arts degrees in philosophy and computer science from Assumption College in Worcester, Massachusetts. Prior to entering seminary he spent time working as a software engineer, punctuated by a short two year hiatus as a Catholic missionary in Lima, Perú with the French ecclesial movement Points-Cœur. He is currently pursuing a master’s degree in philosophy from Boston College in addition to master’s degrees of divinity & theology at St. John’s Seminary in Boston, Massachusetts.

Bibliografia

Aristotle, De Anima, [in:] Aristotle: the complete works. Electronic edition, ed. by J. Barnes, Charlottesville 1992.

Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, transl. M. Ostwald, Upper Saddle River 1999.

Euclid, The first six books of the Elements of Euclid, in which coloured diagrams and symbols are used instead of letters for the greater ease of learners, transl. O. Byrne, London 1847.

Garrocho Salcedo D. S., La dimensión cognitiva de las pasiones : La vigencia de Aristóteles en la psicología moral contemporánea, „Éndoxa: Series Filosóficas” 31 (2013), p. 15–30.

Henry D., Aristotle on pleasure and the worst form of akrasia, „Ethical Theory and Moral Practice” 5 (2002), p. 255–270.

Plato, Protagoras, [in:] The collected dialogues of Plato, ed. B. Jowett, Charlottesville 1993.

Rivera M. L., Voluntad y akrasia, „Saga” 11 (2005), p. 59–67.

Sherman N., Is the ghost of Aristotle haunting Freud’s house?, [in:] Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, ed. by J. J. Cleary, G. M. Gurtler S. J., vol. 16, Boston 2000.

Stoyles B. J., Aristotle, akrasia, and the place of desire in moral reasoning, „Ethical Theory and Moral Practice” 10 (2007), p. 195–207.

Studies on Plato, Aristotle, and Proclus: collected essays on ancient philosophy of John J. Cleary, ed. by J. Dillon, B. O’Byrne, F. O’Rourke, Boston 2013 [Ancient Medi­terranean and Medieval Texts and Contexts, 15].

Pobrania

Opublikowane

2017-01-01

Numer

Tom 22 Nr 2 (2016)

Dział

Artykuły

Licencja

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