Gogacz – Judycki. Two concepts of the individuality of a human person

Abstrakt

The aim of the article is presentation of two concepts of human individuality which have arisen in modern Polish philosophy of Mieczysław Gogacz and Stanisław Judycki. It is an attempt to look at the problem from two different philosophical perspectives: Thomistic metaphysics and phenomenological epistemology. Metaphysical approach is searching for an answer to the question about human individuality in their ontic structure, whereas phenomenological approach focuses on the analysis of a direct experience. As reason of individuality, Gogacz indicates potential intellect (passive) subjected in a substantial form (soul). Judycki maintains that this reason is the concept of God, according to whom He creates a soul of every human being as radically different from all other human souls, unique. Presented theories develop from a different way of understanding a human being. Gogacz’s theory has a substantial character, refers to the concept of a human of Aristotle, Boethius and St. Thomas Aquinas. Judycki’s concept is a relational approach, modified by elements of substantialist philosophy. He refers to relational approach of Plato, Saint Augustine and Descartes as well as substantialist theories of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Thomistic and henomenological approaches to individuality introduce fundamentally different and essential substance to philosophy concerning human beings.