Popper’s challenges for materialism

Authors

  • Mariusz Grygianiec Universität Augsburg

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.1916

Keywords:

K. R. Popper, mind, internationality, materialism, causal relation, explanation, argument, rational justification

Abstract

The paper aims at presenting and analysing two anti-materialistic arguments inspired by Karl R. Popper. An idea of these arguments was originally presented in his short article Language and the body-mind problem and then repeated in the book The self and its brain. The first of these arguments, the argument from rational justification, is intended to show that any materialist theory of mind which assumes a causal interpretation of mind is unable to account for rational justification of thoughts and, therefore, undermines itself. According to the second argument, i.e. the argument from circularity of causal explanation, there does not exist any purely materialistic, non-circular, causal explanation of intentionality what is standardly required by materialism. In the text assumptions of both arguments are clearly specified and commented on. A brief tentative evaluation of the arguments in question is added at the end of the paper.

Author Biography

  • Mariusz Grygianiec, Universität Augsburg
    Pracownik naukowy Instytutu Filozofii Uni­wersytetu w Augs­burgu, absolwent filozofii Uniwersytetu War­szaw­skiego oraz resocjalizacji Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogiki Specjalnej w Warszawie. W latach 1994–1996 asystent w Zakładzie Filozofii WSPS. Od roku 2001 adiunkt w Zakła­dzie Filo­zofii Nauki Instytutu Filozofii UW. Zajmuje się głównie badaniami z zakresu współ­czesnej metafizyki analitycznej i filozofii umysłu. Jest autorem monografii Identyczność i trwanie. Studium onto­logiczne (2007).

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Published

2017-01-01

Issue

Vol. 22 No. 2 (2016)

Section

Articles

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