Dianoia in Aristotle’s Ethics
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.3432Keywords:
lo, goj – reason, dia, noia – discursive thinking, proai, resij – purposive choice, commitment, e`kou, sion – voluntary, ovrqo.j lo, goj – correct reasonAbstract
The article attempts to shed light on the meaning of the term dianoia in Aristotle’s Ethics. The analysis of Aristotle’s texts leads to the conclusion that dianoia is the application of thinking (to noein) of being (to einai). Therefore dianoia is the act of affirmation (kataphasis), “that it is,” or negation (apophasis), “that it is not.” Considering the fact that dianoia is the property of the soul containing logos, Aristotle wonders what is his [her] meaning for human action (praxis). The term dianoia plays an important role in Aristotle’s account of purposive choice (prohairesis) and voluntary action (hekousion). In case of purposive choice, which is the cause of action, the dianoia grants reason (logos), if it affirms the proposition, and denies reason, if it negates. The action, whether good or bad, has to be voluntary. The action is voluntary, if it is action through oneself (eph’ heauton). This is possible through thinking (dianoian). Voluntary action can be good through practical wisdom (phronesis), which is intellectual virtue. Such action is therefore in accordance with the correct reason (kata ton orthon logon).
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