What If… One Tried Not to Commit a Naturalistic Fallacy?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.3433Keywords:
metaethics, George Edward Moore, naturalistic fallacy, avoidance of naturalistic fallacy, interpersonal communicationAbstract
The paper discusses possible consequences of avoiding naturalistic fallacy (NF) in interpersonal communication. The hypothetical conversation between two subjects (X and Y) about an object (α) is outlined and its variants are specified. In the variant 1, X states that α is good and Y asks question, why it is good. X says that α is good, because, e.g., it is economically effective. This can be regarded, according to basically understood Moore’s view, as an instance of NF. In the variant 2, X avoids answering the Y’s question. X is saying only ‘α is good and that’s it!’, which can be interpreted as a reference to Moorean self-evidence category. Although X avoids NF, it impairs a conversation. One can also avoid NF through: not asking ‘why α is good?’ (variant 3) or not using word ‘good’ (variant 4). Analysis of all variants shows that avoiding NF can have troublesome consequences because of, i.a., common use of the word ‘good’ or frequent need to justify statements about goodness of some object. Those consequences seem to be independent from the mere evaluation of Moore’s argumentation about NF, e.g., a controversy whether NF is a real fallacy or only a consequence of Moore’s assumptions regarding, i.a., definitions.
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