Pleasure and good in Plato’s Protagoras

Authors

  • Wojciech Kleofas Gródek Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.3936

Keywords:

h`donh,  – pleasure, avgaqo, n – good, evpisth, mh – knowledge, metrhtikh. te, cnh – art of measuring, swthri, a – preservation

Abstract

The article attempts to explain why Plato in his Protagoras promotes the idea – expressed in this dialogue by Socrates – that pleasure (hedone) is good (agathon). The scholars are not unanimous in their assessment of the thesis and its justification by Socrates. Furthermore, it seems to be in conflict with what Plato expresses in other dialogues. Some commentators maintain that it is the actual view of Socrates or of Plato from the time when the dialogue was written. Other say that this thesis is actually the premise for another thesis, namely that virtue is knowledge. An opinion was also voiced that only a cursory reading of Protagoras might lead one to the opinion that Socrates treats the relationship between pleasure and good seriously. However, if he doesn’t, then why does he attempt to convince his interlocutors to believe it? Taking all that into concern, an attempt was made to analyze the text in order to determine whether specific characteristics of good that lead to its relationship with pleasure are mentioned there. An important point in Socrates’ justification of that relationship is his explanation of what should direct one’s actions if one want to feel pleasure throughout one’s life and to avoid illusions that might lead to the belief that pleasure is bad. Such analyses lead to the conclusion that self-control plays the key role in achieving the state of pleasure throughout the whole of one’s life.

Author Biography

  • Wojciech Kleofas Gródek, Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
    Wojciech Kleofas Gródek OFM, doktor, wykładowca historii filozofii starożytnej i średniowiecznej na Wydziale Filozoficznym UPJPII w Krakowie. Członek zarządu Towarzystwa Metafizycznego im. A. N. Whiteheada. Zajmuje się wczesną filozofią ­grecką, w szczególności szkołą eleacką.

References

Aristoteles Graece, ex rec. I. Bekkeri, vol. 2, Berolini 1831. Wydanie drugie, poprawione: Aristoteles Graece, ed. O. Gigon, Berolini 1960.

Balaban O., Plato and Protagoras. Truth and Relativism in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Lexington Books 1999.

Goodell T. D., Plato’s Hedonism, „The American Journal of Philology” 42 (1921) No. 1, s. 25–39.

Hackforth R., Hedonism in Plato’s Protagoras, „Classical Quarterly” 22 (1928), s. 39–42.

Kahn Ch. H., Platon i dialog sokratyczny, tłum. M. Filipczuk, Warszawa 2018.

Pacewicz A., Hedone. Koncepcja przyjemności w filozofii Platona, Wrocław 2016.

Plato, Philebus, w: Platonis Opera, vol. 2, ed. J. Burnet, Oxford 1910.

Plato, Protagoras, w: Platonis Opera, vol. 3, ed. J. Burnet, Oxford 1909.

Plato, Respublica, w: Platonis Opera, vol. 4, ed. J. Burnet, Oxford 1905.

Plato, Theaetetus, w: Platonis Opera, vol. 1, ed. J. Burnet, Oxford 1905.

Sullivan J. P., The Hedonism in Plato’s „Protagoras”, „Phronesis” 6 (1961) No. 1, s. 10–28.

Zeyl D. J., Socrates and Hedonism: „Protagoras” 351b-358d, „Phronesis” 25 (1980) No. 3, s. 250–269.

Downloads

Published

2021-06-30

Issue

Section

Articles

Similar Articles

11-20 of 234

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.