An attempt at an evaluation of Philippa Foot’s conception of naturalistic virtue ethics

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.62205

Keywords:

virtue, justice, morality, nature, metaethics

Abstract

In this article I present subsequent stages of the evolution of Ph. Foot’s conception. I point out that her concepts of morality, virtue and justice are detached from earlier visions of the world (ancient harmony, Christian divine order). At each stage of the evolution of her project, she is forced either to make arbitrary decisions or to make metaphysical assumptions. I emphasize that biological references in justifying the need for morality may be legitimate as long as we understand ethics as a practical science that aims to achieve practical goals (including the protection of the human species).

References

Anscombe E., Modern Moral Philosophy, “Philosophy” 1958 no. 33, p. 1–19.

Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics.

Foot P., Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford 1978.

Foot P., Natural Goodness, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2001.

Foot P., Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2002.

Foot P., The Grammar of Goodness: an Interview with Philippa Foot, “Harvard Review of Philosophy” 11 (2003), p. 32–44.

Foot P., Theories of Ethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1967.

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Published

2023-12-30

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Articles