The types and role of substitutes in morality in terms of Dietrich von Hildebrand

Authors

  • Daniela Wiśniewska

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.797

Keywords:

values, axiology, ethics, substitute for true morality, Dietrich von Hildebrand

Abstract

The phenomenological analysis of the world, first introduced by Dietrich von Hildebrand, is based on a rational intuition, which is directed towards analyzing the quality of content as opposed to the process of drawing conclusions. According to Hildebrand the intuitive description and insight into phenomena is the source of outstanding philosophical discoveries that bring out the specifics and essence of a given object.

The aforementioned direction is visible in Dietrich Hildebrand’s book co-written with Alice Jourdain in 1957. The main idea of Hildebrand’s axiological research is to identify a phenomenon of substitutional morality which, according to the philosopher, distorts the appropriate functioning of moral consciousness because of its attraction – being an effect of a compromise between pride and concupiscence and extra-moral values.
This essay is an attempt to present the way pseudo-norms function, their classification, and the seizure of qualitative differences appearing in this domain.

Another vital point in the article is the research concerning relative aspects of the nature of substitutes. It shows the mechanisms functioning within a substitute and it indicates the functioning of the components constituting it as a norm, which is structurally submerged in the moral sphere. This description allows for the distinction of a dual role of substitutes (destructive and positive) in an individual life.

The author tries to show, in the context of Hildebrand’s axiology, the mechanisms of relativistic perception of the moral sphere, as well as the threats resulting from the reality specified in this way.

Author Biography

  • Daniela Wiśniewska
    Doktor filozofii, rozprawa doktorska napisana pod kierunkiem ks. prof. nadzw. dr. hab. T. Biesagi pt. Pseudonormy w świadomości aksjologicznej w ujęciu Dietricha von Hildebranda na Akademii Ignatianum w Krakowie. Ukończyła studia z zakresu wychowania muzycznego, pedagogiki społeczno-opiekuńczej, pedagogiki specjalnej oraz psychologii. Pracuje czynnie we wszystkich zdobytych specjalizacjach. Zainteresowania naukowe: filozofia człowieka, etyka, aksjologia oraz wyzwania fenomenologiczne wobec współczesnych kierunków naukowych.

References

Biesaga T., Dietricha von Hildebranda epistemologiczno-ontologiczne podstawy etyki, Lublin 1989.

Biesaga T., Hildebrand Dietrich von, [w:] Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, red. A. Maryniarczyk i in., t. 4, Lublin 2003.

Biesaga T., Spór o normę moralności, Kraków 1998.

Biesaga T., Świadomościowe i osobowe warunki odpowiedzialności, „Studia Philosophie Christianae ATK” 29 (1993) 2, s. 27–37.

Hildebrand D. von, Christian ethics, New York 1952.

Hildebrand D. von, What is philosophy?, New York 1973.

Hildebrand D. von, Jourdain A., Graven images. Substitutes for true morality, New York 1957.

Hildebrand D. von, Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis, Eine Untersuchung über ethisch Strukturprobleme, Vallendar-Schönstatt 1982.

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Published

2014-11-01

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Articles