Two kinds of empirical truth, and realism about idealized laws
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.31201Keywords:
semantic theory of truth, referential truth, approximate truth, idealization, descriptive truthAbstract
From the semantic point of view, empirical truth is the truth of sentences whose terms have empirical references. However, only some such references directly and without distortion relate to real-world phenomena, while others relate to them only through their idealizations. In the former case, we speak of descriptive truth, and in the latter, of approximate truth. This paper aims to clarify this distinction using a version of the semantic theory of truth, invoking the context of the realism/anti-realism debate about idealized laws. The paper consists of two parts. The first informally clarifies the details of the distinction and criticizes the widespread belief that idealized laws or the assumptions they involve, are falsehoods. The second sets out to a formal-semantic account in which the idealized laws are both referentially true (in the idealized model) and approximately true (of the target system’s structure).
References
Balzer W., Moulines C. U., Sneed J., An architectonic for science. The structuralist program, Dordrecht–Boston 1987.
Cartwright N., How the laws of physics lie, Oxford 1983.
Cartwright N., How theories relate: Takeovers or partnerships?, “Philosophia Naturalis” 35 (1998), pp. 23–34.
Cartwright N., Shomar T., Suárez M., The tool box of science: Tools for the building of models with a superconductivity example, Poznań 1995, pp. 137–149 (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 44).
Chakravartty A., Scientific realism, in: The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (2017), ed. E. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/scientific-realism/.
Elgin C. Z., True enough, Cambridge 2017.
Elgin C. Z., Understanding and the facts, “Philosophical Studies” 132 (2007) no. 1, pp. 33–42.
Frigg R., Nguyen J., Modelling nature: An opinionated introduction to scientific representation, New York 2020.
Frigg R., Nguyen J., Models and representation, in: Springer handbook of model-based science, eds. L. Magnani, T. Bertolotti, Dordrecht–Heidelberg 2017, pp. 49–102.
Frigg R., Scientific representation and the semantic view of theories, “Theoria” 21 (2006), pp. 49–65, https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.553.
Hilpinen R., Approximate truth and truthlikeness, in: Formal methods in the methodology of empirical sciences, eds. M. Przełęcki, K. Szaniawski, R. Wójcicki, Dordrecht–Boston–Wrocław 1974.
Hodges W., Model Theory, in: The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (2023), ed. E. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/.
Hodges W., Tarski’s truth definitions, in: The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (2018), ed. E. Zalta, Thttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski-truth/.
Kuipers T. A. F., Approaching descriptive and theoretical truth, “Erkenntnis” 18 (1982) no. 3, pp. 343– 378.
Kuipers T. A. F., Epistemological Positions in the Light of Truth Approximation, “The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy” 37 (1998), pp. 131–138.
Levy A., Idealization and abstraction: refining the distinction, “Synthese” 198 (2018) issue 24 supplement, pp. 5855–5872.
Models as mediators: Perspectives on natural and social science, eds. M. S. Morgan, M. Morrison, Cambridge 1999.
Nawar T., Veritism refuted? Understanding, idealization, and the facts, “Synthese” 198 (2021) issue 5, pp. 4295–4313, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02342-2.
Nowak L., The idealizational approach to science: a survey, Poznań 1992, pp. 9–63 (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 25, 3).
Nowak L., Wstęp do idealizacyjnej teorii nauki, Warszawa 1977.
Portides D., Models and theories, in: Springer handbook of model-based science, eds. L. Magnani, T. Bertolotti, Dordrecht–Heidelberg–London–New York 2017, pp. 25–48.
Potochnik A., Idealizations and the aims of science, Chicago 2017.
Przełęcki M., The concept of truth in empirical languages, “Grazer Philosophische Studien” 3 (1977) issue 1, pp. 1–17.
Psillos S., Living with the abstract: Realism and models, “Synthese” 180 (2011) issue 1, pp. 3–17, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9563-3
Psillos S., Scientific realism. How science tracks truth, London–New York 1999.
Rowbottom D. P., Can meaningless statements be approximately true? On relaxing the semantic component of scientific realism, “Philosophy of Science” 89 (2022) issue 5, pp. 879–888, https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.74.
Sainsbury R. M., The essence of reference, in: The Oxford handbook to the philosophy of language, eds. E. Lepore, B. Smith, Oxford 2008.
Suppes P., A comparison of the meaning and use of models in mathematics and the empirical sciences, in: The concept and the role of the model in mathematics and natural and social sciences, ed. J. Freudenthal, Dordrecht 1961, pp. 163–177.
Tarski A., Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych, Warszawa 1933 (Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, Wydział III Nauk Matematyczno-Fizycznych, 34).
Tarski A., Vaught R., Arithmetical extensions of relational systems, “Compositio Mathematica” 13 (1957) no. 2, pp. 81–102.
Van Fraassen B., Scientific representation, Oxford 2008.
Weston T., Approximate truth and scientific realism, “Philosophy of Science” 59 (1992) issue 1, pp. 53–74, https://doi.org/10.1086/289654.
Winther R. G., The structure of scientific theories, in: The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (2021), ed. E. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/structure-scientific-theories/.
Wójcicki R., Theories, theoretical models, truth. Part II: Tarski’s theory of truth and its relevance for the theory of science, “Foundations of Science” 4 (1995/96), pp. 471–516, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00145402.
Woleński J., The semantic theory of truth, in: Internet encyclopedia of philosophy (2021) https://iep.utm.edu/s-truth/.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 Andrzej Biłat

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
- Authors retain the copyright and full publishing rights without restrictions, and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).