Hedonism reconsidered — again
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15633/lie.31203Keywords:
hedonism, well-being, pleasure, perceptual approach to pleasure, intrinsic goodAbstract
This paper presents a comprehensive re-examination of hedonism, challenging its foundational assertions with a fresh perspective on the nature of pleasure. We embark on a critical analysis through a deeper exploration of the notion of pleasure. The paper argues that a meaningful discussion of hedonism necessitates an understanding of pleasure not as a mere sensation but as a form of awareness of the good or “felt evaluations,” as conceptualized by Bennett Helm and others. This nuanced perspective leads to the conclusion that pleasure, primarily seen as an instrumental good, cannot be the sole or highest intrinsic good, thereby questioning the feasibility of hedonistic claims. The paper systematically evaluates various hedonistic assertions, from classical to well-being hedonism, and addresses potential objections from hedonist advocates. The perceptual interpretation of pleasure significantly impacts the evaluation of these claims, leading to the rejection of both classical hedonism and its modified versions. In conclusion, we assert that understanding pleasure as a consciousness of the good not only challenges the core of hedonism but also invites a shift in how pleasure is positioned within ethical discourse. This paper contributes to the philosophical debate by offering a nuanced critique of hedonism grounded in a detailed conceptual analysis of pleasure.
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Copyright (c) 2025 Artur Szutta, Paweł Sikora, Błażej Szymichowski, Stanisław Kamiński, Krzesimir Cholewa, Ewelina Grądzka
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